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Abstract 
Recent advances in conflict studies have led to relatively robust conclusions that 
inequality fuels conflict when it overlaps with salient group identities. Central to 
quantitative studies supporting this relationship is a stipulated causal chain where 
objective group – or horizontal – inequalities are translated into grievances, which in 
turn form a mobilization resource. All these studies are however limited by their use of 
objective measures of inequality, which leaves them unable to directly test the assumed 
grievance mechanism. In four papers I argue that objective asymmetries are not enough 
to trigger conflict. For people to take action on horizontal inequalities, they will have to 
be aware of them and consider them unjust. In the first paper, Perceptions, Horizontal 
Inequalities and Civil Conflict, I use data from the World Values Survey to show that 
perceived rather than objective economic inequality between sub-national regional 
groups is associated with increased risk of civil war. In the second paper, Injustice is in 
the eye of the beholder: Perceived Horizontal Inequalities and Communal Conflict in 
Africa, I analyse 20 countries covered by the Afrobarometer Surveys. I conclude that 
combined objective and perceived economic ethnic inequality, political ethnic 
inequality, and particularly perceived political ethnic inequality, increase the risk of 
between-group conflict. In the third paper, Expectations, Grievances and Civil Unrest in 
Emerging Petrostates. Empirical Evidence from Tanzania, I present evidence 
suggesting that those who feel that their region has been treated unfairly by the 
government are most prone to support and participate in civil unrest. I base my 
conclusions primarily on survey data collected in 2015. In a final article, From Silence 
to Storm. Investigating Mechanisms Linking Structural Inequality and Natural 
Resources to Mobilization in Southern Tanzania, I rely on 35 semi-structured interviews 
to argue that natural gas mismanagement triggered group grievances, which in turn 
fuelled civil unrest. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and main aim 
[T]o understand grievances, we must first examine where people stand in 
society and what goods and bads they experience from governments. It is not 
enough to point to big economic and social structures as the “explanation”. We 
need to understand how people interpret the situations in which they find 
themselves (Gurr 1970/2011, xi).  
The main aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of when and how 
inequality leads to conflict. This question is closely linked to the above quote. To 
understand when inequality leads to conflict we will have to understand how inequality 
is perceived and judged by those who experience it. Current quantitative studies 
collectively skip this step, and rather assume that objective structural inequalities and 
people’s judgements about them – and their related grievances – fully overlap. As I will 
demonstrate, this assumption is not fully warranted. People often misperceive actual 
inequality levels and differ in how much inequality they tolerate.  
The question about whether inequality leads to conflict has preoccupied scholars since 
ancient times. While case and qualitative examples of people rising up to rectify 
injustices are plentiful, cross-country quantitative studies have struggled to establish a 
clear link between individual level inequality and conflict (Blattman and Miguel 2010, 
Lichbach 1989, Linehan 1980). However, more recent studies of conflict and inequality 
between groups – so called horizontal inequalities – support that inequality lead to 
conflict when it overlaps with salient group identities (Cederman, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug 2013, Stewart 2008, Østby 2008b).  
The work on horizontal inequalities (HIs) has thus established that not all inequality 
leads to conflict – it is groups and not individuals that rebel, and hence it is inequality 
between relevant groups and not inequality between individuals that drive conflict. 
Promising as these studies are, they do to some extent fall short of countering the same 
argument that has been posed to scholars studying individual inequality and conflict 
outbreak: Inequality is more or less omnipresent in all societies, and hence cannot 
explain the outbreak of (the relatively rare event of) violence (Collier and Hoeffler 
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2004, Snyder and Tilly 1972, Tilly 1978). While studies of horizontal inequalities do 
find an association with conflict outbreak (see e.g. Østby 2008b, Cederman, Gleditsch, 
and Buhaug 2013), it remains a fact that such horizontal inequalities are also 
widespread, and that they do not necessarily induce conflict. Hence, the question of 
when inequality induces conflict has not been fully answered. 
My motivation to explore when and how horizontal inequalities lead to conflict is 
rooted in a puzzle and in a corresponding gap in the current literature. Let me start with 
the puzzle. 
Tanzania is one of the most politically stable countries on the African continent. Some 
conflict scholars have attributed this to the lack of horizontal inequalities – or 
inequalities between ethnic groups – in the country (Østby 2008b). However, while 
ethnic horizontal inequalities may be low, regional horizontal inequalities are severe. 
The southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi have been marginalized compared to the rest 
of the country at least since independence. Still, and despite the fact that empirical 
studies find regional inequalities to be a stronger source of conflict than ethnic 
inequality, the ‘Wakusini’ – or ‘Southerners’ remained peaceful for more than 50 years. 
Then, in 2012, and following large gas discoveries outside their coastlines, the locals 
rioted against the government.  
Why did the locals not protest earlier? According to horizontal inequality theory, they 
should have done so in order to improve their relatively disadvantaged situation. When 
structural inequalities alone did not spark conflict, what did? The natural gas discoveries 
represent the main change in the region. But commonly assumed causal mechanisms 
linking non-renewable natural resources to conflict are all related to revenue flows
1
, and 
at the time of the riots the discoveries were still undeveloped and no revenues had yet 
accrued. So what made people go from silently accepting their marginalization to 
violently opposing the government? In order to investigate this question I conducted 
two rounds of field work in Southern Tanzania, during which I carried out 35 semi-
structured interviews and an 800 respondent survey.   
                                                 
1
 Such as providing opportunity to mobilize in terms of funding (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), weakening 
state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or intensifying horizontal inequalities (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 
2009). 
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However, Tanzania is not the only country where horizontal inequalities have failed to 
produce conflict. Hence, a broader puzzle exists – why do horizontal inequalities lead to 
conflict in some instances, and not in others?  
The clue to investigating this lies in the assumed causal mechanisms underpinning 
existing studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict. These studies all analyze the 
effect of objective asymmetries on conflict risk. Objective asymmetries are assumed to 
generate grievances, which in turn is the driving force for conflict. Yet, these grievances 
are never measured or tested, but rather taken to reflect actual horizontal inequalities. In 
other words, objective horizontal inequalities and grievances are assumed to amount to 
the same thing. It follows that any study of the conflict risk in Tanzania – where 
objective asymmetries have remained severe and stable since independence – would 
predict the conflict risk as high for a period of more than 50 years, while in essence it 
culminated towards the end of this period.  
While objective horizontal inequalities – in general – have been demonstrated to be 
remarkably stable over time (Tilly 1999), grievance levels fluctuate (Wood 2003). 
Suspecting that this is exactly what lies at the heart of the conflict in Tanzania, and that 
felt grievances linked to perceptions and judgements of horizontal inequalities are 
central to when such asymmetries lead to conflict, I aim to more comprehensively test 
group grievances. I will do this in two quantitative cross-national studies, and one 
quantitative and one qualitative study of Southern Tanzania. Based on these studies, the 
main argument put forward in this dissertation is that for horizontal inequalities to cause 
conflict, people will have to be aware of them and consider them unfair. 
Before I move on, a definition of what I mean by conflict is necessary. In the term 
conflict I include both political violence and non-violent uprisings. Political violence 
encompasses within country violence that has political objectives, ranging from civil 
war, via communal conflict between non-state groups, to riots. The term does not 
include crime or domestic violence. For non-violent uprisings I rely on Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder’s (2015, 23) definition: ‘Civil resistance is a form of active conflict in which 
unarmed civilians use a combination of tactics such as strikes, boycotts, protests, go-
homes, stay-aways, and demonstrations to disrupt and apply pressure against a state 
opponent without physically harming or threatening to physically harm the opponent’.  
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The boundaries between these different types of conflict are often blurred. In the case of 
Tanzania, peaceful protests and strikes developed into violent riots. For this case, I 
therefore use the term civil unrest to include both non-violent uprisings and riots – 
distinguishing between the two where relevant. 
I will continue this introduction with a literature review, in which I identify gaps that I 
aim to contribute to reducing. I then move on to the overall theoretical framework for 
the dissertation and the research questions. Next, I describe methods, data and 
measurements before providing the rationale for choosing Tanzania as a case. I then 
introduce the four articles that form the core of the dissertation, and finally draw up 
main limitations linked to my analyses and the scope of my argument. 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Inequality and conflict 
Early theoretical approaches to inequality and conflict include the Marxist theory of 
class struggle and revolution (Marx 1887/1967), relative deprivation theory (Davies 
1962, Gurr 1970) and theories of ethnic conflict and structural inequality (Gurr 1993b, 
2000, Hechter 1975, Horowitz 1985). While not denying material motivations, all these 
approaches emphasize grievances among the relatively disadvantaged in society as a 
key underlying cause of conflict. 
The relative deprivation theory soon came under heavy critique by what has been called 
the ‘resource mobilization’, or ‘mobilization opportunity’ approach spearheaded by 
Snyder and Tilly (Snyder and Tilly 1972, Tilly 1978). Their key objection is the fact 
that grievances are more or less omnipresent in all societies, and hence cannot explain 
the outbreak of violence. Rather, opportunity, economic or political, for mobilizing a 
rebel group, is the most important explanatory factor.  
Around the turn of the century, the focus on the economic dimensions of civil wars 
increased substantially. The political economy aspect, often labelled the ‘greed’ 
account, emphasized the role of predatory actors, lootable resources, warlordism and 
structural forces in conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Duffield 2000, Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, Kaldor 1999, Keen 1998, 2008). This work, and especially the empirical 
studies of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), have had an 
enormous influence on policy makers (see e.g. World Development Report 2011), and 
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are widely cited. Much like Snyder and Tilly (1972), they argue that grievances have 
poor explanatory power due to their ubiquity. Also, groups facing grievances are 
prevented from mobilization through a collective action problem. By introducing 
economic incentives to participants in rebellion, these collective action problems can be 
overcome (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Later, Collier and Hoeffler toned down the focus 
on ‘greed’, focusing rather on opportunity in terms of the feasibility of organizing 
mobilization (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). 
The great impact of the ‘greed’ account led to numerous responses. In general, several 
more nuanced approaches opposing a simplistic greed/grievance dichotomy emerged. 
Arnson & Zartman (2005) and Ballentine & Sherman (2003) conclude that while 
grievances are a major driver of conflict outbreak, economic agendas are central to the 
duration of war. Studying the 20
th
 century violence in Eastern Europe, Petersen (2002, 
5) concludes that a lack of government constraint is essential for violence to erupt, 
however, it is only ‘one part of the story’. Motivation, and particularly resentment 
linked to a sense of unjust treatment of the ethnic group, is equally important. On the 
other hand, Kalyvas (2003) argues that ‘greed and grievance’ tend to operate 
simultaneously but on different levels, with greed being more salient at the local. 
Overall, these studies conclude that conflicts are complex and that both motivations – 
either in terms of greed or grievance or both – and opportunity need to be in place for 
mobilization to materialize. This view has later been supported by rigorous cross-
country quantitative studies (e.g Bara 2014). 
More specifically targeting the Collier and Hoeffler analysis, several studies document 
how poor data and methodological choices skew the results, rendering their conclusions 
questionable (see e.g. Fearon (2005) for missing data and Keen (2008) for the use of 
proxies). While such limitations in data quality and accuracy are likely to remain an 
issue given the inherent problems of getting data from conflict ridden societies, 
conceptual issues are less challenging to rectify. In conceptual terms, a major limitation 
of the Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin studies is their use of individual 
measures to capture inequality. It is mainly groups rather than individuals that rebel, 
thus as long as the analysis does not highlight the grievances of those groups, no firm 
conclusions on the link between grievances and conflict can be made (Sambanis 2005). 
The focus on individual level motives in studies of intrastate wars is contrasted by the 
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emphasis on the powerful role of group socialization and social identity in military 
sociology and history (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Kenny 2008).  
1.2.2 Horizontal inequalities and conflict 
Taking into account the importance of group dynamics, the most prominent theoretical 
development has been made by Frances Stewart and her colleagues at Oxford (Stewart 
2002; 2008; 2010). Challenging the use of the individual as a unit of analysis, Stewart 
proposes the concept of horizontal inequalities, which she defines as ‘inequalities in 
economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined 
groups’ (Stewart 2008: 3). When inequalities coincide with cultural differences, culture 
can act as a powerful mobilizing agent (Stewart 2002). Combining elements from 
relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970) and social identity theory (e.g. Abrams and 
Hogg 1988, Tajfel and Turner 1979), Stewart starts to dismantle the divide between 
collective action and relative deprivation theory. Motivation and mobilization is then 
facilitated by salient identities, and this, rather than economic incentives, becomes a 
driving force for conflict outbreak. This concurs with the earlier work of Gurr (1993a, 
2000), Horowitz (1985) and Tilly (1999).  
The concept of identity in Stewart’s theory is social constructivist, where group 
identities may be shaped and mobilized by political entrepreneurs. On the other hand, it 
is argued ‘that people themselves can be strongly convinced about the essential nature 
of their identities and that of others – which is why mobilization by identity can work’ 
(Stewart 2008, 10). Group identities can develop based on different identifiers, with 
ethnic, religious, regional and cultural the most salient ones. In terms of dimensions, 
horizontal inequalities can be economic, social, political, or combined (Stewart 2002). 
Stewart fully recognizes the importance of opportunity structures in order for conflict to 
materialize, at the same time as opportunity to some extent is embedded in the 
horizontal inequality concept. As opposed to groups delineated by class, which by 
definition constitute people with similar socio-economic status, identity groups may 
have resourceful members willing to fund mobilization (Esteban and Ray 2008). 
Membership of the group may also be used to identify, reward and sanction free-riders, 
thus lowering the barriers of collective action (Moore 1993, Ostrom 1990, Petersen 
2001, Weinstein 2006).   
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As opposed to previous grievance based theories of conflict, horizontal inequality 
theory emphasizes the conflict potential of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, 
and argues that the latter might instigate violence as a response to a perceived threat 
from more disadvantaged groups. The Basques in Spain and the Biafrans in Nigeria, for 
instance, represent examples of wealthy groups mobilizing to protect their wealth 
through secession (Østby 2008a). 
Stewart’s work soon became widely read and influential among policy makers. This is 
likely to be at least partly linked to the already voluminous empirical literature 
providing support to the theory. A range of case studies highlight the role of horizontal 
inequalities in inducing political violence (Cramer 2006, Holmqvist 2012, Stewart 2002, 
2008, Tadjoeddin, Suharyo, and Mishra 2003). Even more importantly, Stewart’s 
conceptualization of inequality between groups rather than individuals has paved the 
way for quantitative cross-country studies that provide robust support for a link between 
horizontal inequalities and conflict. Since this dissertation is closely linked to this 
quantitative body of work, I will summarize key findings and limitations from the main 
studies in more detail. 
1.2.3 Quantitative studies of horizontal inequality and conflict 
According to Stewart’s definition, horizontal inequalities can emerge along different 
dimensions – social, economic, political and cultural – and for different identity groups 
– ethnic, regional, religious, or other salient identifiers. Apart from the cultural 
dimension, quantitative studies find support for a conflict inducing effect for all these 
dimensions and identifiers.  
In a pioneering paper, Østby (2008b) uses data from the US Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) to study 36 developing countries, with education as proxy for social 
inequalities and household assets as proxy for economic inequalities. While she finds 
that ethnic social inequalities are significantly associated with civil conflict outbreak, 
the result for ethnic economic inequalities is positive, but weak
2
. In a follow up study 
also using DHS data, Østby (2008a) tests various dimensions of horizontal inequalities 
across different group identifiers in 55 developing countries, and concludes that the 
model with the strongest explanatory power is the one that interacts levels of regional 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that Barrows (1976) was the very first to quantitatively analyse – and find evidence of 
– a link between ethnic group inequality and political instability in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s. 
However, he based the group inequality scores solely on his own personal judgements. 
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economic horizontal inequalities and the degree of political exclusion. While Østby’s 
data offers relatively good coverage of developing countries, it cannot provide global 
generalizations. In addition, several developing countries are omitted due to lacking 
data on ethnicity and/or region. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) note this, 
and in order to overcome the scarce data problem they combine geocoded data on ethnic 
group settlements with Nordhaus’ (2006) G-Econ dataset on local economic activity. 
This way they are able to analyze the link between horizontal inequalities and ethno-
nationalist civil wars on a global scale with group years as unit of analysis. They find 
that both relatively privileged and relatively deprived ethnic groups are more prone to 
violence, and that both political and economic horizontal inequalities increase the risk 
of civil war.  
Despite the global coverage, the G-Econ data suffers from several weaknesses. It does 
not take into account the informal economy, which is particularly relevant for African 
and Asian countries. Even more seriously, closer analysis of the data reveals that the 
quality is very poor particularly in the developing world – where indeed most conflicts 
occur (Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Østby 2011). Hence, in an effort to 
further improve data quality, Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann (2015) conduct the 
most comprehensive test of ethnic economic inequality to date. They combine G-Econ, 
survey, and night lights emission data using data quality adjusted weights to ensure that 
the best data is used at all times, and find that the resulting composite measure yields 
the strongest results compared to using only one of the data sources or a combination of 
only two of them. Overall, they conclude that relatively poor and rich ethnic groups are 
more likely to mobilize for civil war than groups that are closer to the country average. 
Other studies supporting a link between economic ethnic inequality and civil war 
includes Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsh (2014), Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 
(2013) and Gubler and Selway (2012). While most studies focus on ethnic inequalities, 
Buhaug et al. (2011), Deiwiks, Cederman and Gleditsch (2012), Murshed and Gates 
(2005) and Østby, Nordås and Rød (2009) find robust support that regional economic 
inequality have the same effect, and Østby (2008a) concludes that while both ethnic and 
religious economic inequality drive conflict in developing countries, regional economic 
inequality have the strongest effect.  
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In addition, Fjelde and Østby (2014) find that economic ethnic inequality increase the 
risk of communal – or non-state group – conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mancini (2008) 
find the same in Indonesia, while Hegre, Østby and Raleigh (2009) conclude that ethno-
communal and separatist conflict increases with a combination of high population 
pressure and religious socio-economic inequality also in Indonesia. Olzak (1994) and 
Dancygier (2010) find that economic horizontal inequalities are linked to increased 
incidents of race riots in the US and ethnic riots in the UK, respectively.  
While the work on economic horizontal inequality use different data sources, most of 
the recent studies of political horizontal ethnic inequality rely on the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) and later the EPR-ETH (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009) dataset 
which identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power. In 
concert, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), Cederman, Weidmann  and Gleditsch 
(2011) and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) conclude that the presence of 
politically excluded groups substantially increases the risk of civil war. Østby (2008a) 
uses the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset first presented by Gurr (1993a) and 
concludes that a combination of regional economic inequality and politically excluded 
ethnic groups (on a country level) is associated with civil war occurrence. Forecasting 
civil war risk with an out of sample model, Goldstone et al. (2010) find that a 
specification that includes discrimination of ethnic groups performs especially well.   
Finally, pursuing the new research agenda on non-violent uprisings, Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder (2015) find that horizontal political inequality also has some explanatory 
power on non-violent political mobilization, though they conclude that political 
opportunity gives the strongest effect.  
In summary, all these studies provide quite compelling support for the relationship 
between various kinds of horizontal inequality and conflict. Most studied is economic 
ethnic inequality and civil war, followed by political ethnic inequality and civil war – as 
can be seen from the overview in Table 1. Those studies comparing different 
dimensions and identifiers find political ethnic inequality to have a stronger effect than 
economic (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013), and regional economic inequality 
to have a stronger effect than ethnic and religious (Østby 2008a). 
  
22 
 
Table 1. Overview of horizontal inequalites and conflict studies across different conflict types, 
group identifier and inequality dimensions 
 Ethnic Groups Regional Groups 
 Economic HIs Political HIs Economic HIs Political HIs 
Civil War Buhaug, Cederman and 
Gleditsch (2013) 
Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug (2013) 
Cederman, Weidmann 
and Bormann (2015)  
Cederman, Weidmann 
and Gleditsch (2011) 
Gubler and Selway (2012) 
Østby 2008a  
Østby 2008b 
Cederman, Gleditsch 
and Buhaug (2013) 
Cederman, Weidmann 
and Gleditsch (2011) 
Cederman, Wimmer, 
and Min (2010)  
Østby 2008a 
Goldstone et al. (2010) 
Buhaug et al. (2011) 
Deiwiks, Cederman and 
Gleditsch (2012) 
Murshed and Gates (2005) 
Østby 2008a  
Østby, Nordås and Rød 
(2009) 
 
 
Communal 
Conflict 
Fjelde and Østby (2014) 
Hegre, Raleigh and Østby 
(2009)  
Mancini (2008) 
   
Riots Dancygier (2010) 
Olzak (1994) 
   
Non-violent 
mobilization 
 Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder (2015) 
  
 
1.2.4 Non-renewable natural resources, horizontal inequality and conflict 
While the literature on the so called ‘resource curse’ more broadly study how countries 
endowed with large, non-renewable natural resources frequently struggle to achieve 
economic growth and avoid institutional failure and conflict (Basedau and Lay 2009, 
Lujala 2010, Ross 2001, 2004, Sachs and Warner 1995), this work also has many links 
and similarities to the inequality/conflict literature. The conflict related part of this 
literature has produced increasing empirical evidence that countries depending on non-
renewable resources, particularly onshore oil and gas, face a higher risk of intrastate 
conflict (Koubi et al. 2014, Lujala 2010, Ross 2012)
3
.  
Similar to the inequality/conflict nexus, the natural resource/conflict nexus has largely 
been dominated by studies that lean towards the ‘opportunity’ civil war literature. For 
example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) highlight that revenues from natural resources 
constitute financial support for rebels. Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasize that resource 
wealth weakens state institutions by diminishing incentives to collect taxes, making it 
an easy target for rebel groups. Less studied is the role of grievances, which is 
surprising given that natural resource wealth rarely spreads evenly, and hence is likely 
to both exacerbate existing as well as create new horizontal inequalities. Only a few 
                                                 
3
 Here and throughout the dissertation, when I talk about natural resources or non-renewable natural 
resources I refer to petroleum – or oil and gas – resources.  
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quantitative studies analyze a link between natural resources, horizontal inequalities and 
civil war (Asal et al. 2015, Basedau and Pierskalla 2014, Wegenast and Basedau 2014, 
Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Case studies also highlight how the prospect of resource 
revenues could create high expectations in resource-rich regions, which can again lead 
to frustration and conflict if they are not met (Ross, Lujala and Rustad 2011; Stewart, 
Brown and Langer 2008). This was apparent in Indonesia in the late 1990s, where 
separatist sentiments were strongly related to the distribution of natural resource rents, 
and a key driver was ‘the rage of the potentially rich’ and an ‘aspiration to inequality’ 
(Tadjoeddin 2007: 23).  
In general, the competing and to a large extent untested causal mechanisms – both 
opportunity and grievance related – made a recent review article conclude that the 
causal mechanisms underpinning the resource-conflict relationship are ‘underspecified 
and inadequately tested’ (Koubi et al. 2014, 238). Much as we have already seen for the 
inequality and conflict literature, Koubi et al. (2014) also point out that existing 
literature focuses largely on civil war, while responses to grievances related to natural 
resources may also encompass other forms for political violence and civil unrest. These 
are important limitations also very much relevant for the horizontal inequality vs. 
conflict literature – as I will further elaborate in the next section. 
1.3 Gaps in current literature and contribution 
The main contribution of this dissertation is related to investigating when and how 
horizontal inequalities lead to conflict. However, I aim to make some contributions 
related to neglected types of conflict, inequality dimensions and group identifiers as 
well. I will briefly outline these first. 
1.3.1 Broadening the scope to neglected conflict types, inequality dimensions and 
group identifiers  
The emphasis on analyzing civil war in both the inequality and the natural resource 
literature so far is reasonable taking into account the increase in such conflict events 
after the end of the Cold War and the high number of fatalities. While the number of 
active civil war events showed a marked decrease from 1994 and onwards, in 2014 and 
2015 there was another increase – all according to the Uppsala Program Conflict Data 
Program (UPDC) (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Hence, the challenge of 
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understanding causes, ending and preventing civil war remains highly relevant. 
However, the global number of conflicts between non-state groups – or communal 
conflicts – now exceeds that of civil wars – as shown in Figure 1 (Sundberg and 
Melander 2013). And while civil war remains the overall most lethal conflict type, 
communal conflict and several other types of political violence pose an equal – or 
bigger – threat to peoples’ lives in some regions – particularly in Africa. Countries such 
as Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria lost far more people in 
communal conflict than in civil war in the period from 1989 to 2014
4
.  
Figure 1. Development in number of state based (civil war), non-state (communal) and one-sided 
(civilians targeted) conflict.  
 
Source: Downloaded from UCDP GED http://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia  
At the same time, Africa experiences a skyrocketing increase in the number of protests 
and riots (Figure 2). Africa is also home to the largest share of non-state/communal 
conflicts (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). 
  
                                                 
4
 All according to the Uppsala Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) and authors calculations. 
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Figure 2. Protest and riot events in Africa 1997-2014.  
 
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (Raleigh et al. 2010). Note: similar to all 
conflict data based on media reports, the ACLED data is subject to potential reporting biases (see e.g 
Weidmann 2013). It is however unlikely that the large spike from 2011 to 2013 is solely linked to such 
biases. 
The sheer number of communal conflict and protests/riots events speaks against 
neglecting them when analyzing the effect of structural asymmetries. In addition, these 
forms of political violence may well develop into full scale civil wars – as was the case 
in Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan (Fjelde and Østby 2014). 
Correspondingly, the one-dimensional focus on civil war has concerned scholars, most 
notably the founders of the ‘contentious politics’ school, who find that similar causal 
mechanisms appear across quite different types of contentious politics and collective 
violence (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001, Tarrow 2007, Tilly 2003) Cunningham and 
Lemke (2011) reach the same conclusion and find that factors such as population, 
economic development and regime type have similar effects on civil war, communal 
conflict, one-sided violence and riots. These results are fully in line with the underlying 
theories of violent mobilization. Horizontal inequality theory, as well as the theories it is 
partly built on such as relative deprivation theory and social identity theory, are 
specifically developed to explain all types of political violence, not just civil war.  
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In summary, underlying conflict theories, existing empirical evidence as well as 
relevance all support that it is due time to expand the analysis of horizontal inequalities 
to a broader set of political violence. This is one of the contributions of this dissertation. 
Moving on to different types of horizontal inequality dimensions and identifiers, ethnic 
economic inequality and civil war is by far most investigated. This is despite the fact 
that those few studies making comparisons across dimensions and identifiers find the 
political dimension and the regional group identifier to have the strongest explanatory 
power on conflict.  
While I cannot hope to cover all the open boxes identified in Table 1, my dissertation 
will focus on the gaps highlighted in Table 2 and analyze ethnic economic and political 
inequality and communal conflict, regional economic inequality and riots and regional 
economic inequality and non-violent protests.  
In addition I will perform the first country level, time-variant study of regional 
economic inequality and civil war covering both developed and developing countries, 
however this analysis is mostly linked to the contribution on perceptions and 
judgements further elaborated on in the next section. 
Table 2. Overview of horizontal inequality studies and the contribution of this dissertation 
 Ethnic Groups Regional Groups 
 Economic HIs Political HIs Economic HIs Political HIs 
Civil War Buhaug, Cederman and 
Gleditsch (2013) 
Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug (2013) 
Cederman, Weidmann and 
Bormann (2015)  
Cederman, Weidmann and 
Gleditsch (2011) 
Gubler and Selway (2012) 
Østby 2008a  
Østby 2008b 
Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug (2013) 
Cederman, Weidmann and 
Gleditsch (2011) 
Cederman, Wimmer, and 
Min (2010)  
Østby 2008a 
 
Buhaug et al. (2011) 
Deiwiks, Cederman and 
Gleditsch (2012) 
Murshed and Gates (2005) 
Østby 2008a  
Østby, Nordås and Rød 
(2009) 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
Communal 
Conflict 
Fjelde and Østby (2014) 
Hegre, Raleigh and Østby 
(2009)  
Mancini (2008) 
CONTRIBUTION 
CONTRIBUTION 
  
Riots Dancygier (2010) 
Olzak (1994) 
 
 CONTRIBUTION 
 
Non-violent 
mobilization 
 Chenoweth and Ulfelder 
(2015) CONTRIBUTION 
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1.3.2 Bridging the gaps in the causal chain from structural patterns to group 
grievances 
Moving on to the main contribution of this dissertation, this is addressing a more 
substantial, and different, gap in the literature. This gap relates more broadly to the 
central question of whether inequality causes conflict. While existing quantitative 
studies provide convincing evidence that inequality leads to conflict when it overlaps 
with salient identity groups, the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict 
is not an automatic one. Several countries with high structural inequalities avoid 
substantial political violence – such as for instance Ghana and Bolivia (Stewart 2010). 
So when and how do horizontal inequalities lead to conflict? 
At the heart of both theories and quantitative studies of inequality and conflict is the 
notion that unequal distribution of resources – or power – fuels grievances, which in 
turn motivates people to mobilize. Still, none of the studies actually test the effect of 
grievances. Instead, they test the reduced-form empirical relationship between 
inequality and conflict. Individual inequality is commonly proxied by measures such as 
the Gini-coefficient, which is in turn based on official income statistics (see e.g. Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004). Horizontal inequality is proxied by group measures of asset 
ownership, local economic data, child mortality rates, education and actual political 
inclusion or exclusion. None of these measures take into account if people are actually 
aware of the documented inequalities, let alone how they judge them. As I will 
demonstrate in the next section, incorporating such perceptions is essential, since people 
very often misperceive existing inequalities, and also to a great extent differ in how 
much inequality they tolerate, and on whether they deem known inequalities to be just 
or unjust.  
I am only aware of two studies that take into account perceived horizontal inequalities. 
Rustad (2016) finds that perceived economic ethnic inequality is correlated with higher 
acceptance of use of political violence in the Niger Delta. Miodownik and Nir (2015) 
analyse cross-sectional data on 18 countries covered by Afrobarometer Survey round 3, 
and also find that high perceived economic and political ethnic inequality is related to 
higher acceptance of political violence, and to participation in protest marches.  
If group grievances lead to conflict, but these felt grievances differ from objective 
structural inequalities, the tests based on statistical measures of objective horizontal 
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inequalities cannot provide answers to when and how horizontal inequalities lead to 
conflict. In a similar vein, current studies cannot draw any firm conclusions on whether 
horizontal inequalities lead to conflict via grievances. In fact, such inequalities may 
induce material motivations of gain and instigate mobilization through this mechanism 
instead. As noted by Blattmann and Miguel (2010, 18) in a review paper 
‘Understanding these complex relationships is crucially important for preventing armed 
conflict. Innovative ways of modelling and measuring individual political grievances 
are required to make progress on this arena’.  
I attempt to tackle this challenge. Hence, the main contribution of this dissertation is to 
more comprehensively test group grievances as a source of political mobilization, and to 
look at when such grievances are triggered. For this latter aspect I will particularly look 
at the effect of large non-renewable natural resource discoveries. 
1.4 Theoretical framework  
The starting point of my theoretical framework is the postulated causal chain 
underpinning horizontal inequality theory and the current quantitative studies testing it: 
structural inequalities between groups lead to grievances which in turn drive 
mobilization. More specifically, group members are assumed to make comparisons to 
other groups, and become frustrated if they find that their own group’s economic, 
social, political or cultural position is inferior.  
Among quantitative studies of the relationship between horizontal inequalities and 
conflict, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) have done the most extensive 
theorizing on the assumed causal chain linking the two. Drawing once more on social 
identity theory, and introducing key insights from the social movements literature, they 
draw up a framework where four steps need to be in place for structural asymmetries to 
develop into grievances: 1) group identification, 2) group comparison, 3) evaluation of 
injustice, and 4) framing and blaming. In other words, for grievances to develop, group 
members will have to identify with the group identity, make comparisons based on this 
group identity to other groups, evaluate identified asymmetries as unjust, and target the 
blame for this on a specific actor. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) underline 
that these steps that have to be in place for horizontal inequalities to develop into 
grievances. They furthermore both explicitly and implicitly state that they will not 
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always be in place – i.e. not all horizontal inequalities lead to grievances. Nonetheless, 
they return to objective data in their analyses and investigate the reduced-form empirical 
link between objective horizontal inequalities and conflict. This is also the case for all 
the other quantitative studies reviewed above. So while the main concept – groups react 
to inequalities – is intuitive and logical, it remains untested. The process in between – 
the development of group grievances – remains as an assumed relationship. Current 
quantitative studies thus hinge on two critical assumptions: 
1) Perceptions of horizontal inequalities reflect reality – i.e. group members have 
accurate knowledge of overall inequality structures and their group’s relative 
position 
2) Perceived horizontal inequalities are also considered unfair – i.e. once group 
members are aware of inequality, the will not tolerate it 
Or, as Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013, 41) put it ‘on average, grievances will 
be experienced roughly in proportion to the degree of violation’. These are bold 
assumptions that deserve investigation. In the following two sections I will provide 
evidence that they do not stand up to scrutiny. I will then look at variables moderating 
the relationship between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities, before 
outlining the overall framework for my analyses. 
1.4.1 Perceptions do not reflect reality 
In an early study of perceptions of class and racial inequality, the sociologist Robert V. 
Robinson (1983) surveyed 113 persons in the US and 101 in the UK and found 
suggestive evidence that many – including disadvantaged people – did not perceive 
their society to be particularly unequal even if it was. This mismatch between reality 
and perceptions has later been confirmed by more rigorous studies.  
Based on responses from a nationally representative online survey of 5500 Americans, 
Norton and Ariely (2011) found a striking discrepancy between actual and perceived 
wealth inequality
5
. While the wealthiest quintile in the US is documented to hold close 
to 84% of the wealth, people believed this number to be 59% – hence greatly 
underestimating the actual level of inequality. Looking instead at pure income 
                                                 
5
 Defined as: ‘Wealth, also known as net worth, is defined as the total value of everything someone owns 
minus any debt that he or she owes. A person’s net worth includes his or her bank account savings plus 
the value of other things such as property, stocks, bonds, art, collections, etc., minus the value of things 
like loans and mortgages’. (Norton and Ariely 2011, 9) 
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inequality and using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Osberg 
and Smeeding (2006) reach the same conclusion. Subjective estimates of income 
inequality in the US differ substantially from actual data, with people believing that 
inequality is lower than it actually is. Comparing data from a later wave of ISSP to 
national income statistics, and expanding the scope to the US and 23 EU countries, 
Niehues (2014) confirms the tendency to underestimate actual inequality among US 
respondents. Most Europeans, on the contrary, perceive their societies to be far less 
equal than they actually are.  
Apart from Robinson’s race study, all the studies above look at the overall level of 
individual inequality in developed countries. However, it is unlikely that group 
members – both in developed and developing countries – should be better informed on 
the relative positon of their group. Not many studies investigate the overlap between 
actual and perceived group inequality, but those who do once more document large 
discrepancies. Langer and Mikami (2013) conducted surveys with altogether 2,600 
respondents in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and complemented their 
data with results from Afrobarometer Surveys round 4. In all surveys the respondents 
were asked to assess the economic condition of their ethnic group compared to other 
groups in the same country. The responses to this subjective evaluation were then 
compared to objective wealth indexes for the same group
6
. It turns out most groups 
misperceive their relative economic position, with the discrepancies between objective 
and subjective ethnic inequalities being largest in Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe. Using 
the same measures of perceived and objective ethnic horizontal inequality, Holmqvist 
(2012) expands the analysis to cover 112 ethnic groups in 19 African countries covered 
by Afrobarometer Surveys round 4. He finds that the correlation between perceived 
ethnic inequality and a basic needs/poverty index is 0.33, while the perceived vs. asset 
index correlation is 0.27. So while there seems to be a link between objective and 
perceived ethnic inequality, the overlap is by no means perfect, and once more large 
discrepancies between subjective views and objective status on the group level are 
revealed.  
While Holmqvist uses simple correlations, Langer and Smedts (2013) aim to establish 
which are the main determinants of perceived ethnic inequality by using multilevel 
                                                 
6
 These wealth indexes were in turn calculated based on asset ownership and the fulfilment of basic needs 
(access to food, water, health care, etc.). 
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regression analysis. Also using Afrobarometer Surveys round 4, they actually find a 
negative association between objective and perceived ethnic inequality. Group members 
in a relatively advantaged group in terms of basic human needs fulfilment are nearly 5% 
less likely to perceive their group to be economically better off than other groups in the 
country. The difference in results in the Holmqvist vs. Langer and Smedts (2013) 
analysis is likely to be linked to the fact that the latter tests the explanatory power of 
actual ethnic economic inequality on perceived ethnic economic inequality and includes 
a battery of other independent and control variables in their analysis. Overall, they 
conclude that factors such as individual actual and perceived socio-economic position 
and access to media have a strong explanatory power on the level of perceived 
horizontal inequalities, while actual group situation has not.  
Finally, Rustad (2016) finds large discrepancies between objective and perceived ethnic 
economic inequality in four Federal states in the Niger Delta based on survey data from 
2009. She does however use individual level responses aggregated up to an ethnic group 
level. Miodownik and Nir analyse 13 countries based on Afrobarometer Surveys round 
3, and find that 35% of the altogether 17,500 respondents misperceive their ethnic 
group’s political status, while fully 48.3% of individuals’ perceptions of their group’s 
economic situation mismatch with their group’s objective condition. 
It seems highly counterintuitive that there is absolutely no – or a negative – link 
between objective and perceived horizontal inequality, and certainly more studies are 
needed in order to draw any firm conclusion on the size and determinants of this 
relationship. Regardless of this, and for the purpose of this dissertation, the review of 
existing evidence from a range of different sources strongly suggests that people have 
limited knowledge of the overall inequality level, and to a large extent misperceive their 
groups’ relative position. In summary, the assumption that perceived and objective 
inequality more or less overlap does not stand up to scrutiny. 
I have already noted how both underlying conflict theories and quantitative studies 
postulate that grievances will arise based on group comparisons and perceived 
inequalities. Above I have also demonstrated that perceived horizontal inequalities do 
not – or only to a limited extent – reflect objective horizontal inequalities. It follows that 
in order to perform a more comprehensive test of the effect of inequality on conflict, the 
analyses should take into account perceptions. 
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1.4.2 Judgements of inequality 
Once group members perceive their group as disadvantaged compared to other groups, 
they may or may not consider this acceptable. In other words, people may be aware of 
inequalities without considering them unfair. A growing literature on attitudes towards 
inequality finds that people differ in their judgement of what constitutes a fair income 
distribution. Preferences for redistribution vary greatly both within and across countries 
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Alesina and Giuliano 2009, Benabou and Tirole 2006, 
Kelley and Evans 1993, Kluegel and Smith 1986). These studies of inequality tolerance 
and redistribution mostly focus on individual inequality in developed countries. 
However, Tay (2013) find a great variation in inequality tolerance in 87 developed and 
developing countries. Using data from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (Solt 2009), as well as survey data, she furthermore finds no systematic 
relationship between objective inequality and inequality acceptance within countries.  
This documented variation in inequality tolerance is to some extent attributed to 
personal characteristics such as age, gender, race and socioeconomic status. However, it 
is also linked to history, culture, religion, ideology and to whether the individual 
believes in a just world where efforts are turned into rewards, or, on the other hand 
believes that luck, connections or corruption determines outcomes. Those who believe 
in a just world tend to tolerate far more inequality than those who do not (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2009, Benabou and Tirole 2006). The most cited example of this is the 
relatively high inequality acceptance in the US – people have for a long time believed in 
the American Dream and the notion that if you work hard enough you will get what you 
deserve in the end. Implicitly, if your income is below average, this is your own fault 
and up to yourself to rectify. Thus, if grievances arise when inequalities are considered 
unfair, it is as Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013, 40) notes, ‘clear that grievances 
may vary as much with the normative framework as with the actual level of inequality’. 
If people blame themselves for existing inequalities, this may discourage them from 
taking civic or political action to rectify any perceived asymmetries (Han et al. 2012, 
Rubin and Peplau 1975). On the other hand, for a group to rise up to confront the 
government – or another group – there has to be a clear attribution of blame for the 
perceived injustice.  This is exemplified by the case of China, where decades of growth 
have generated enormous inequalities, particularly between the urban and rural 
population. Challenging the myth that China is sitting on a 'social volcano' of unrest due 
33 
 
to these extreme and unfair inequalities, Whyte (2010) draws on robust survey data 
collected in 2004. His conclusion is simple: Most Chinese accept the severe inequalities 
as being a result of individual efforts, rather than the outcome of an unfair economic 
structure. Most Chinese, and particularly the relatively disadvantaged farmers, are 
optimistic about their economic future. As long as these sentiments prevail, political 
unrest is unlikely. 
No matter what level of inequality an individual sees as tolerable at the outset, group 
leaders may affect, manipulate and change this view. This is one of the main arguments 
put forward by the social movements literature. This branch of conflict studies puts 
particular emphasis on the vital role of group leaders and elites in portraying the current 
situation as unfair, and in assigning the blame for the injustices on specific actors – 
most often the government (Benford and Snow 2000, Gamson 1992). The underlying 
logic – that is also supported by empirical studies – is that without some sort of elite 
intervention, people are less likely to consider the status quo as unfair, less likely to 
blame one actor for it, and correspondingly less likely to rise up in unity to confront the 
wrongdoers (Benford and Snow 2000, Brass 1991). 
To the best of my knowledge, no studies exist that compare objective horizontal 
inequalities to a feeling of being treated unfairly as a group. Lacking such empirical 
evidence, there is still no intuitive reason to believe that group members in either 
developed or developing countries should be substantially more homogenous in their 
attitude towards inequality than individuals. Indeed, as we will see below in Chapter 4 
and 5, my survey data from Tanzania clearly supports this proposition. 
In summary, the documented variation in inequality tolerance – and the fact that the 
tolerance level is as much linked to normative frameworks as to personal socioeconomic 
status – once more highlights the need to take into account peoples’ judgements when 
analysing the relationship between inequality and conflict. The fact that group 
members’ perceptions of what is unfair and who is to blame for it is often manipulated 
by leaders precisely to facilitate mobilization, makes it even harder to defend an 
analysis of grievance driven conflicts based on objective statistical data. 
1.4.3 Variables affecting perceptions and judgements of horizontal inequalities 
Given the demonstrated differences in objective vs. perceived horizontal inequalities, 
and the variation in peoples’ judgments of the fairness of inequality, the question arises 
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of how such perceptions and judgements are formed. In other words, to be able to say 
something about when and how horizontal inequalities lead to conflict, one will have to 
pinpoint the origins of inequality awareness and attitudes. 
The literature on attitude towards inter-individual inequality does, as already mentioned 
in the previous section, highlight personal factors such as age, gender, race and 
socioeconomic status, in addition to history, culture, religion, ideology, and social 
norms. Empirical studies of objective vs. perceived horizontal inequalities – that rather 
analyse the awareness of group level inequalities – find an effect of all of the same 
variables (Han et al. 2012, Langer and Smedts 2013). However, these studies 
particularly emphasize how elites are able to manipulate perceptions as a tool to 
mobilize their followers (Brown and Langer 2010, Langer and Mikami 2013) – very 
much in line with the social movements literature. Another highly relevant factor is the 
extent to which a given group enters into competition with another group for resources 
(Robinson 1983). Further factors include lack of or inaccurate information, media 
access, and the size of the group (Han et al. 2012, Langer and Mikami 2013, Langer and 
Smedts 2013). Finally, beyond the inequality literature, existing studies of perceptions 
conclude that people under- or overestimate statistical facts depending on their prior 
expectations (Nisbett and Ross 1980).  
Expectations also have a prominent role in the large economic literature on happiness 
and satisfaction with income. One of the main conclusions from this work is that rather 
than making absolute judgements, people determine their satisfaction based on 
aspiration levels or reference points (Easterlin 1995, Frey 2008, Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, Toews 2013). This reference point is determined by several factors, most 
importantly past income, relative current income, and expected future income (Hack 
and Lammers 2008, Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Following from this, people will 
gain utility and satisfaction if their income rises as long as the rise does not fall short of 
their prior expectations. If, on the other hand, the rise in income is lower than expected, 
people will be dissatisfied no matter how large the rise (Ross 2007). This is supported 
by a study of the effect of expectations on household’s satisfaction with income in 
resource rich Kazakhstan. Using two waves of survey data, as well as exogenous 
changes in the oil price, Toews (2013) finds that a 10% increase in the oil price actually 
decreased satisfaction with income by 2%. He concludes that this dissatisfaction is due 
to a change in the reference point caused by inflated income expectations.  
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It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate all the above mechanisms. 
However, I will argue that the discovery and development of large oil and natural gas 
resources represents a situation where many of them become particularly relevant. 
Natural resources are always local, and likely to spark competition between the region 
where they are found and the rest of the country, as well as between groups (Collier 
2013, Koubi et al. 2014). Natural resources also represent an opportunity for elites to 
frame and manipulate perceptions of grievances. In Aceh, Indonesia, elites emphasized 
the unfair taxation of the region’s resource wealth by the central government, urging 
people to mobilize (Aspinall 2007). They furthermore repeatedly highlighted the 
paradox of people in a resource rich region living in poverty, and distributed flyers with 
claims that if independent, Aceh would be as rich as Brunei (Ross 2003). Similar 
arguments were put forward in Riau and East Kalimantan, also in Indonesia 
(Tadjoeddin, Suharyo, and Mishra 2001).  
Finally, natural resource discoveries are notorious in creating inflated expectations of 
future benefits – particularly in the regions in which they are found (Aryeetey and 
Asmah 2011, Stewart, Brown, and Langer 2008). Given the long lead time from 
discoveries to production of petroleum, these expectations will arise long before any 
revenues start flowing – increasing the probability of people becoming disappointed7. 
Common sources of such expectations are politicians campaigning for support, media 
outlets selling the story of a bright future, and expert reports such as IMF country 
reports (Weszkalnys 2008). If we return to Gurr, and the core of his definition of 
relative deprivation
8
, unfulfilled expectations linked to oil and gas revenues could 
potentially be highly conflict inducing.  
1.4.4 Overall framework for analyses and research questions 
Based on the conclusions and arguments presented above, I am now ready to draw up 
the overall framework for my analyses. As stated in the introduction, the main 
contribution of this dissertation is to investigate when and how horizontal inequalities 
lead to conflict, and to more comprehensively test group grievances as a source of 
political mobilization. The starting point is the postulated causal chain underlying 
existing quantitative studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict – portrayed in Figure 
                                                 
7
 For an account of how expectations are formed long before production starts, see e.g. Weszkalnys 
(2008). 
8
 His precise definition reads: ‘Relative Deprivation (RD) is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their value capabilities’ (Gurr 2011/1970: 24). 
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3. Theoretically, grievances are assumed to increase conflict risk, whereas the empirical 
studies test the association between objective horizontal inequalities and conflict. While 
this is not always explicitly modelled, the studies generally recognize that opportunity 
structures also need to be in place for conflict to materialize. 
Figure 3: Causal chain and empirical link underpinning current quantitative studies of horizontal 
inequalites and conflict 
 
The following conclusions from the previous sections lay the foundation for my 
framework: 
- Group grievances develop when people are aware of horizontal inequalities and 
consider them unjust  
- Objective horizontal inequalities do not equal perceived horizontal inequalities 
or perceived unfair horizontal inequalities 
- Natural resources can affect perceptions and judgements of horizontal 
inequalities 
The framework is portrayed in Figure 4. If we start with a situation where objective 
horizontal inequalities exist (a), group members may (c) or may not (d) be aware of 
them. The arrows between the boxes represent probabilistic relationships, and the 
thicker the arrow the more probable I assume the relationship to be. Hence, even in 
areas where no objective asymmetries are present (b), group members may perceive that 
inequalities exist. Once group members perceive horizontal inequalities (c) they may (e) 
or may not (f) consider them unfair and to be blamed on an identified actor. And once 
horizontal inequalities are considered unfair, mobilization is likely as long as favourable 
opportunity structures are in place (g). No perceived horizontal inequalities (d), no 
perception of unfairness (f) and absent opportunity structures (h) are all diminishing the 
likelihood of mobilization. Finally, natural resources may act as an intervening variable 
and affect either perceptions of horizontal inequalities (i) or perceptions of unfairness 
(j), or both.  
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Figure 4: Overall framework for analysis 
 
While Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) see evaluation of injustice and framing 
and blaming by elites as two separate steps on the road from structural asymmetries to 
grievances, I see them as inherently interlinked. No matter what sparks such a change 
(media, norm changes, leaders), changing from directing the blame on oneself, or fate, 
or other abstract circumstances, to blaming the government, might be exactly what 
triggers a feeling of unfairness. Correspondingly, a measure gauging a feeling of being 
unfairly treated by a certain actor will automatically capture the result of any framing or 
manipulation by elites. In terms of measuring grievances, it is this feeling we would like 
to pin down. 
It should be noted that natural resources may play a more independent role, for instance 
if resource revenues are unequally distributed and create new, or reinforce existing, 
objective horizontal inequalities. This has happened for instance in the Niger Delta 
(Akpan 2010). While recognizing this, for the purposes of this dissertation I will limit 
my analysis to a case where natural resources are discovered in a historically 
marginalized region, and where petroleum revenues have not yet started to flow – as 
further elaborated in section 1.6. Hence, I will leave for other work to study other 
scenarios. Furthermore, and as noted in a previous section, natural resources are just one 
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of a range of different potential intervening variables between objective and perceived 
inequality.  
I will not test all the relationships portrayed by the arrows in the framework. The main 
focus will be on testing the effect of various measures of group grievances on different 
types of mobilization. The grievances are then captured by measures of perceived 
horizontal inequalities, and by measures taking into account judgements (the blue box in 
Figure 4). The latter is the most comprehensive measure. Hence, I see both as measures 
of group grievances, that may at times be overlapping and at times not. 
I will investigate various forms of political mobilization – including civil war, 
communal conflict between non-state groups and riots and non-violent protests. 
Linked to the framework, the overall research question of when and how horizontal 
inequalities lead to conflict is split into somewhat more specific questions to guide my 
analyses: 
1. Do group grievances increase the probability of civil war outbreak? 
2. Do group grievances increase the probability of different types of political 
mobilization? 
3. How do objective horizontal inequalities relate to perceived horizontal 
inequalities?  
4. How are group grievances triggered, and how is this related to discoveries of 
non-renewable natural resources? 
1.5 Methodology, data and measures  
Since I aim to more comprehensively test group grievances as a source of political 
mobilization, and this aim is closely linked to a critique of current quantitative studies 
of horizontal inequalities and conflict, it follows that the main part of my analyses will 
be quantitative as well. The three first articles all use regression analysis of repeated 
cross-sectional (Chapter 2 and 3) and cross-sectional (Chapter 4) survey data.  
While these quantitative studies can suggest evidence of the overall effect of group 
grievances on conflict, they cannot give detailed insights into the causal mechanisms 
forming and activating such grievances. So even if my quantitative analyses suggest that 
horizontal inequalities lead to mobilization when people are aware of them and consider 
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them unjust, these same analyses give little clues to when and why such perceptions and 
judgements arise. Hence, my initial question on when and how horizontal inequalities 
lead to political mobilization motivated me to introduce a case study and mixed 
methods in my dissertation. By integrating quantitative evidence with case and 
qualitative analysis I attempt to detail and nuance my answer to what makes structural 
inequalities politically salient. Clues about this have vital policy implications and are 
paramount in attempts to prevent and solve conflicts.  
I will return to the rationale for choosing Tanzania as my case in section 1.6. Later in 
this section I will give some more details and comments about the measures used in the 
three quantitative articles (Chapter 2 - 4). But first I will elaborate more on the data used 
and the choice of methods.  
1.5.1 Data and methodology 
Obtaining good quality data on objective horizontal inequalities as well as measures that 
accurately capture them has posed a constant challenge to previous studies. This 
challenge is no less pressing for my analyses of perceived horizontal inequalities. In fact 
it is made even more acute by the fact that perceptions are volatile while objective 
horizontal inequalities have been demonstrated to be remarkably stable (see e.g. Tilly 
1999)
9
. This has encouraged a range of studies to rely on time in-variant inequality data 
– such as the Nordhaus (2006) data – in time series analyses (e.g. Buhaug, Cederman, 
and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Also existing survey-
based studies to a large extent use data from one particular year and extrapolate this data 
point to years with missing data (e.g. Østby 2008a)  
The overall framework for my analyses implies that perceptions and judgements can 
change. I will therefore not extrapolate data over long periods, and rather rely on truly 
time-variant data. Both this, and the fact that only surveys include questions linked to 
peoples’ perceptions and judgements, has made surveys the only available option to 
investigate my research questions on a cross-country basis. My limited use of 
extrapolation reduces the time frame I can actually cover, and a side effect is that the 
only survey covering enough years and countries to allow analysis of  civil war – which 
is a fairly rare event – is the World Values Survey. Fortunately this survey covers 85 
countries and includes questions on both objective and perceived economic status. It is 
                                                 
9
 I do however challenge this in chapter 2. 
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therefore the main data source for my first article (Chapter 2). Similar to the bulk of 
horizontal inequality and civil war studies, I analyse civil war events as reported by the 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and 
Wallensteen 2015).  
My second article is based on the Afrobarometer Surveys round 1-4, which contains 
specific questions on perceived ethnic political and economic inequality. I use these to 
analyze the effect on communal conflict outbreak, with data from the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset v.1.5-2011 (Sundberg and Melander 2013, Sundberg, 
Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010). For objective political ethnic inequality I rely on 
the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). 
My third and fourth articles are based on fieldwork in the southern regions Mtwara and 
Lindi in Tanzania. I will briefly introduce this work here. However, in order to avoid 
too much repetition, I will keep it short, and rather refer to Chapter 4 and Appendix 
4.8.2 for a more in-depth documentation of the survey, and to Chapter 5 and Appendix 
5.7.1 for detailed description of the qualitative interviews. In addition, the survey 
questionnaire and the interview guide are included at the end of the dissertation in the 
Supplementary Appendices. Here, I will rather focus on why I chose to use mixed 
methods and the advantages I obtain from it. 
I visited Tanzania four times in 2014 and 2015. I completed 15 semi-structured 
interviews in Mtwara in 2014, and visited key stakeholders
10
 in Dar es Salaam in order 
to prepare for the main field work round. I returned to Dar es Salaam in February 2015 
for further planning, before the main field work in Mtwara and Lindi in June 2015. This 
time I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews and organized and completed an 800 
respondent survey covering 6 of the 13 districts in the two regions. I hired and trained a 
survey manager, three supervisors, and 24 enumerators that were evaluated and reduced 
to 16 for the survey work. The survey manager and the supervisors finalized a 96 
respondent pilot test of the survey in May 2015 that served as basis for power 
calculations and final sampling strategy, and also served to improve questions and 
language and so forth. My fourth and final visit in September 2016 fully focused on 
dissemination of results to relevant stakeholders (see section 6.2 for more on this). 
                                                 
10
 NGOs, oil companies, research institutes 
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As already stated, the overall objective for including a case and mixed methods in my 
dissertation is to provide a more in-depth answer to the question of when and how 
horizontal inequalities lead to conflict by investigating causal mechanisms linking 
structural asymmetries, natural resources and group grievances in more detail. Personal 
accounts of the process leading up to mobilization – gathered by the semi-structured 
interviews – provide such information with a granularity that is beyond the reach of 
traditional survey instruments. At the same time, since several questions were replicated 
both for the interviews and the survey, I am also able to check how representative some 
individual responses are compared to the whole population in the sample. This is all 
done in my final article (Chapter 5).  
The potential issue of endogeneity and reversed causality is a challenge to all existing 
quantitative studies of horizontal inequalities – including my own. A further advantage 
with mixing quantitative and qualitative data is the ability to test the link between group 
grievances and mobilization on a representative sample while at the same time reducing 
– although not eliminating – such endogeneity issues. My survey data is cross-sectional, 
and no claims on causality can be made based on it. More specifically, I cannot 
establish whether the grievances I measure came before the civil unrest and caused it, or 
rather were a product of the same civil unrest. However, the detailed accounts from the 
qualitative material support the suggested  direction of causality, with group grievances 
stated as a main motivating factor for the uprisings, thus somewhat reducing the 
inherent endogeneity issue in the quantitative article in Chapter 4.  
Finally, I was able to draw extensively on the first 15 interviews conducted in May 
2014 when developing the survey questionnaire and the sampling strategy. For the 
sampling strategy, it was important to establish which districts are most affected by the 
gas developments, and from which the riot participants mostly came. For the 
questionnaire, the interviews greatly helped in designing questions relevant and adapted 
to the area and the sentiments around the marginalization and the gas developments. For 
example, during the first round of interviews I was able to establish that people to a 
large extent identified themselves as ‘Wakusini’ – the Swahili word for ‘Southerners’ – 
and that this regional identity was almost exclusively used when people made 
comparisons to other groups. I could therefore design my questions on horizontal 
inequalities around a regional identity. Also, people expressed anger and frustrations 
with the government, not the oil companies or other actors. This information allowed 
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me to build in specific targeting of the blame in relevant questions. These sentiments – 
both on group identity and blaming – where further strengthened during the second 
round of qualitative interviews in 2015 (see Chapter 5). 
1.5.2 Measuring perceived horizontal inequalities 
Measuring group grievances is a central part of my dissertation. Given this, I will spend 
some time describing the variables I use in each article, and outline what I believe they 
do and do not capture – linked to the overall framework presented in section 1.4.4.  
In general, existing studies vary to a great extent in how they calculate measures of 
objective horizontal inequalities. My two first articles also include analyses of objective 
inequalities – both because I generally do not claim that objective structural 
asymmetries are irrelevant, and because I wish, to the extent that it is possible, to 
compare the effect of objective and perceived horizontal inequalities. My overall goal in 
deciding upon objective measures has in turn been to keep my analysis as comparable 
as possible to the most relevant study of objective horizontal inequalities. So when I 
look at objective and perceived regional economic inequality and civil war with 
country-years as unit of analysis, I adopt the measure used by the most related study – 
which is Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch’s (2014) analysis of objective ethnic 
economic inequality. Hence, in my first article (Chapter 2) I derive country-level 
inequality indicators measuring the relative gap between the mean national income and 
the income level for the poorest regional group and the richest regional group 
respectively:  
Objective negative HI = country-level mean income/mean income for poorest group 
Objective positive HI = mean income for richest group/country-level mean income 
after first having identified the richest and poorest regional group in each country. 
I calculate perceived horizontal inequalities using the same formula, based on a survey 
question measuring subjective satisfaction with the financial situation of the household. 
(‘The question reads: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your 
household?’ Deciles, 1 completely dissatisfied, 10 completely satisfied).  
The first thing to note about the measure based on this question is that it does not only 
capture perceived economic inequality, but it also includes a judgement of the economic 
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situation. On the other hand, while the measure will indicate the regional mean level of 
satisfaction with the economic situation, it does not necessarily follow that in a region 
with low satisfaction people also find the situation unfair. However, I argue that 
compared to measures based on pure income statistics, and in line with my overall 
framework, this new measure is much closer to capturing grievance levels. 
The second thing to note is that this is arguably not a perfect group measure. For each 
region, I aggregate the individual responses up to a mean for the whole region. Ideally, 
the question should have probed about the economic or financial situation on behalf of 
the region rather than the household in order to truly reflect the group aspect. Lacking 
such information, I nonetheless argue that this is a relatively good approximation of 
group sentiments. I back this claim with comparisons based on Afrobarometer Survey 
data showing that the correlation between perceived individual and perceived group 
inequality is very low for each individual, but very high if I rather compare mean 
individual and group inequality per sub-national region – which is what I do for the 
measure in this analysis as well. Thus aggregating individual responses up to a regional 
level substantially increases the correlation between the individual and group 
measures
11
. See Chapter 2 for more details on this analysis. 
Moving on to my second paper, which analyses the effect of objective and perceived 
horizontal inequalities on the risk of communal conflict, the issue of aggregating 
individual level perceptions can be left behind. The Afrobarometer Surveys, which is 
my main data source, includes questions on the perceptions of the economic and 
political situation of the respondent’s ethnic group. Since communal conflict is local by 
nature and rarely affects the whole country, at the same time as horizontal inequalities 
vary substantially within countries, (Fjelde and Østby 2014), the unit of analysis is 
region-years. Both in level of analysis and in measures for objective economic 
inequality, my setup corresponds to that of Fjelde and Østby (2014), which is the only 
other cross-country analysis of communal conflict. Please refer to Chapter 3 for details 
on the objective measures. 
For the political dimension of horizontal inequalities, I rely on the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Fjelde and von Uexkull 
(2012) have coupled this data with geographical information about the regional base and 
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 In her Niger Delta analysis, Rustad (2016) also aggregate individual responses up to a group level. 
44 
 
settlement patterns for each ethnic group included the EPR dataset using the GeoEPR 
dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011), and constructed a dummy variable for political 
exclusion per subnational region based on this. This data is used in the analyses. 
The question ‘Think about the condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Are their 
economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?’ is 
used to create measures of perceived economic ethnic inequality. The response 
categories are much better (0), better (1), same (2), worse (3) and much worse (4). The 
numbers in parenthesis are assigned, and since a group comparison is inherent in the 
question, the measure used is simply the mean figure for all the respondents in the 
biggest ethnic group in the region.  
The measures for perceived political ethnic inequality are constructed the same way as 
the perceived economic measures, with the question this time being ‘Think about the 
condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Do they have less, the same, or more 
influence in politics than other groups in this country?’ 
In summary, in Article 2 I apply specific measures of perceived inequality on a group 
level. This is a marked improvement compared to existing studies based on objective 
data. Yet, if I return to my overall framework from section 1.4.4, these perceptual 
measures do not take into account whether the respondents judge these inequalities as 
unfair or not. However, using perceptual data is first and foremost still an important 
improvement compared to existing studies based on only objective data. Furthermore, 
as noted previously, the tendency to judge inequalities as unfair is strongly linked to 
individual world views. Those who believe personal efforts bring rewards are less 
inclined to deem existing asymmetries as unfair. And those who believe rewards mostly 
follow from connections and corruption are more likely to perceive inequalities as 
unjust. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have a long tradition of 
neopatrimonialism, corruption and favouring of own ethnic group by government 
officials. Given this, it is possible – though untested – that people in this part of the 
world are more likely to judge perceived horizontal inequalities as unfair.  
To analyze cross-country effects of perceived horizontal inequalities in the two first 
articles I am dependent on using existing surveys and existing survey questions. When 
developing my own survey for the Tanzania case I was on the other hand able to design 
questions specifically targeting all the steps in my proposed framework.  
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To measure perceived regional economic horizontal inequality I used the question: 
Think about the condition of people living in this region. Are their economic conditions 
worse, same as or better than for those living in other regions in this country? (much 
worse = 5, worse = 4, same = 3, better = 2, much better = 1). Since the unit of analysis 
in Article 3 (Chapter 4) is individual-level, I applied the coded responses directly with 
no further calculations.  
Moving on to specifically measure the level of unfairness and blaming of perceived 
horizontal inequalities, I used the question: How often, if ever, are people living in this 
region treated unfairly by the government (Never = 1, Sometimes = 2, Often = 3 and 
Always is = 4). Once more the responses are used directly.  
Finally, in an attempt to capture the grievance inducing mechanism famously 
introduced by Gurr (1970) – frustrated expectations – that I also argue is particularly 
relevant for regions with newly discovered natural resource wealth, I create a variable 
measuring how satisfied people are with the development of the living conditions for 
the people in their region compared to the expectations they had right after the 
discoveries were announced and the widespread political promises of local development 
were made
12
.  
Overall, my three quantitative articles cover measures ranging from perceived 
horizontal inequalities to perceived unfair treatment blamed on a specific actor – with 
article three based on my own survey in Tanzania including the most comprehensive 
measures – as portrayed in Figure 5. Note that these figures picture how group 
grievances are measured. In chapter 2 and chapter 3 I also analyse objective horizontal 
inequalities. 
Figure 5. Group grievance measures in Chapter 2-4 
Chapter 2       Chapter 3       Chapter 4 
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 See Chapter 4 for details.  
46 
 
I should emphasize once more that I do not test all the relationships portrayed in the 
framework in the quantitative articles. For instance, I do not look at the link between 
perceived horizontal inequalities and perceived unfair horizontal inequalities – as the 
arrows may suggest. Rather, I regard those two variables as two different measures of 
group grievances, and I test the direct effect on mobilization of both of them. Similarly, 
I test the direct effect of objective horizontal inequalities on mobilization – comparable 
to what existing studies do. The two perceptual measures are not fully independent, and 
they are likely to capture some similar effects. I assume – based on my theoretical 
framework – that the measure taking into account unfairness and target of blame is most 
comprehensive and likely the best gauge of grievances – and hence mobilization. This 
assumption receives support from article 3 in Chapter 4.  
It is my fourth article in Chapter 5 that attempts to look at the whole framework in more 
detail by using qualitative data to investigate the links between objective and perceived 
and perceived unfair horizontal inequalities, natural resources and the effect on 
motivation for mobilization.  
1.6 Background for choosing Tanzania as a case 
The rationale for choosing Tanzania as my case study is three-fold. First, the case 
provides a clear example of how horizontal inequalities do not always lead to conflict. 
The ‘Wakusini’ inhabiting the southern regions Mtwara and Lindi remained 
marginalized yet peaceful for five decades before rioting against the government (see 
Chapter 4 and 5). This combination of grave horizontal inequalities and peace, and then 
a change, offers a good opportunity to study my question ‘when and how do horizontal 
inequalities lead to conflict’, and to investigate when and how long-existing objective 
regional inequalities become politically salient. 
Second, the riots followed discoveries of large natural gas resources. Importantly, 
however, the riots preceded the production phase – meaning that petroleum revenues 
had not yet started to flow. The non-renewable natural resource literature has mainly 
focused on conflict mechanisms related to large revenue flows. This also holds for 
studies of horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict, which generally claim 
that petroleum revenues rarely spreads evenly, and are likely to create new or reinforce 
existing horizontal inequalities (see e.g. Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Looking at the 
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pre-production phase hence offers an excellent lens to study the effect of natural 
resources at a time when such revenues are not yet present, and where the effect – if any 
– on objective horizontal inequalities will be small. The effect on perceived horizontal 
inequalities, and judgements about such inequalities, may on the other hand be far more 
pronounced. The Southerners were first given extensive promises of local development 
by then President Kikwete. The newly created hopes of change were dashed when the 
Government decided to build a pipeline bringing the first gas from a small onshore 
discovery to Dar es Salaam – a decision that was perceived by the locals as a breach of 
promise and a clear sign that local industries fuelled by the gas would not be prioritised 
after all.     
Third, while the above academic rationales were essential to my choice of case, I also 
put some emphasis on the policy relevance of studying Southern Tanzania. Oil and gas 
has been discovered in several African regions inhabited by marginalized groups
13
. This 
has made leading scholars warn that natural resources constitute a substantial security 
threat on the continent (Collier 2015). Policy recommendations on how to manage such 
natural resource developments and reduce conflict risk is therefore sought after and to a 
large extent lacking. Equally important, proper and representative data on the needs, 
priorities, expectations and attitudes of the people in such remote areas are scarce at 
best. For the case of Southern Tanzania, it just did not exist, making it a secondary 
objective of this dissertation project to provide such data to relevant stakeholders.  
1.7 Introducing the four articles  
Chapter 2 to 5 of this dissertation consists of four independent but related articles that 
are all under review at peer-reviewed journals. All of them contribute in different ways 
to analysing the effect of group grievances on conflict risk. They fit into the framework 
presented in section 1.4 in different and complementary ways, although they do not 
comprehensively cover all the stipulated relationships. While the three first articles 
apply quantitative methods and survey data, the fourth article relies primarily on 
qualitative data and analysis. And while the two first articles investigate the effect of 
group grievances on a cross-country basis – with a global and Sub-Sahara African scope 
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 Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana are just some other examples. 
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respectively, the two last articles are both based on data gathered during fieldwork in 
Tanzania.  
In essence, I start with a wide scope and country-years as the unit of analysis, and 
narrow down step by step ending up with an individual level quantitative analysis and 
finally detailed individual accounts of group level motivations for mobilization. 
Throughout the articles I find support for the inference that group grievances motivate 
and increase the risk of political mobilization ranging from non-violent protests all the 
way to civil war.  
Article 1 – Perceptions, Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict – analyses the effect 
of both objective and perceived regional inequality on the probability of civil war in 85 
developed and developing countries in all world regions. Based on conflict data from 
the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and 
Wallensteen 2015) and survey data from the World Values Survey for the period 1989-
2014, I find  that perceived regional economic inequality increases the probability of 
civil war, while objective regional economic inequalities do not. This article 
investigates research question 1 and 3.  
Article 2 – Injustice is in the Eye of the Beholder: Perceived Horizontal Inequalities 
and Communal Conflict in Africa – analyses the effect of both objective and perceived, 
and both economic and political, ethnic inequality, and communal conflict. Communal 
conflict is defined as conflict between non-state groups, and the data stems from the 
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset v.1.5-2011 (Sundberg and Melander 2013, 
Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010). For my independent variables I use 
survey data from the Afrobarometer Surveys round 1-4 covering 20 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, as well as the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, 
and Min 2009). My analysis suggests that both objective and perceived political ethnic 
inequality increase communal conflict risk, as do the combination of both high objective 
and high perceived economic ethnic inequality. This article investigates research 
question 2 and 3.  
Article 3 – Expectations, Grievances and Civil Unrest in Emerging Petrostates. 
Empirical Evidence from Tanzania – is the first article based on data from my fieldwork 
in Tanzania. This paper has a quantitative orientation, and investigates attitudes as well 
as actual participation in civil unrest – comprising protests and use of political violence 
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– using survey data from two historically marginalized regions with newly discovered 
natural gas wealth. Using measures of group grievances in line with the framework 
presented above, I find that people who think that the region is treated unfairly are more 
likely to support and participate in civil unrest than people who do not hold this opinion. 
Frustrated collective expectations and perceived economic regional inequality are also 
significantly associated with support for civil unrest, but not with participation. A 
perception of individual inequality is insignificant in all models – suggesting that 
perceptions on behalf of the group are indeed essential in motivating for mobilization. 
This article mainly consider research question 2 and 3.  
Finally, article 4 – From Silence to Storm. Investigating Mechanisms Linking Structural 
Inequality and Natural Resources to Mobilization in Southern Tanzania – attempts to 
take an in-depth and detailed look at the steps in the causal chain from objective 
regional marginalization to mobilization for protests and riots. Based primarily on data 
from 35 semi-structured interviews with political and religious leaders, riot participants 
and non-participants, and drawing to some extent on descriptive statistics from the 
survey data, I find that the discovery – and following mismanagement – of natural 
resources triggered a mobilization process, mainly through increased group competition, 
frustrated expectations, evaluation of injustice, and leadership framing. I find that a 
feeling of injustice is particularly salient in motivating riot participants, while personal 
material gain as an alternative mechanism has little explanatory power. This final article 
hence investigates research questions 2, 3 and 4.  
The quantitative Tanzania article suggests that a feeling of unfair treatment of the region 
by the government motivates mobilization. However, this article can only provide very 
indicative evidence that this feeling of unfairness is somehow linked to the natural gas 
discoveries and management. The data from the qualitative article, on the other hand, 
strongly indicates that the natural gas mismanagement created a feeling of injustice and 
hence increased group grievances. Participants in the riots link these group grievances 
directly to their motivation to mobilize.  
Since my dissertation is article based, and each article needs to be independent and 
include a literature review and a development of the argument, some repetition will 
unfortunately be necessary throughout Chapter 2 to 5.   
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1.8 Limitations and scope of argument 
Before moving on to the articles it is timely to say something about which claims I aim 
to make, which claims I do not and cannot make, and the limitations linked to my 
conclusions. 
First of all, I to some extent look at the role of opportunity structures in my fourth and 
final article, and to some extent include such factors as control variables in my 
statistical analyses in the three other articles. However, I do not comprehensively study 
the role of opportunity in governing when horizontal inequalities lead to conflict. This 
does not in any way mean that I disregard the importance of opportunity variables. 
However, my focus lies in how horizontal inequalities are perceived and judged, and 
what makes them politically relevant.  
Second, my emphasis on the role perceptions and judgements do not imply that I find 
objective structural inequalities irrelevant. A rigorous body of work has found evidence 
of a link between such asymmetries and conflict, and I do not at all claim that these 
results are spurious. What I do claim is that analyses that take into account how these 
asymmetries are perceived and judged are likely to provide better answers to the 
question of when the risk of conflict is greatest.  
Overall, I attempt to take a first step away from relying solely on objective data to take 
into account group members perceptions and judgements of horizontal inequalities 
when analysing conflict risk. In the two first articles I have strived to apply the best 
available data in the most rigorous way possible to tackle this challenge on a cross-
country level. While I believe these first steps have value and do bring insights into 
when horizontal inequalities lead to conflict, it remains indisputable that there are 
limitations to my analyses.  
Some of these limitations are similar to those of other quantitative studies of objective 
horizontal inequalities. I have already touched upon the issue of endogeneity. Repeated 
cross-sectional statistical analysis – even when controlling for time dependencies – 
cannot serve as the basis for any claims of causality. Particularly omitted variable bias 
linked to previous conflict incidents pose a challenge to the validity of the results. 
Throughout my quantitative articles I am therefore cautious to present my results as 
suggestive evidence of a relationship between group grievances and conflict. As I have 
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already touched upon, this issue is somewhat reduced in my third quantitative article 
that can also draw on case and qualitative data to support the suggested direction of 
causality, and where there has been no previous conflict.  
Similar to current studies, I also encounter issues of data availability and quality, which 
among other things mean that I cannot look at all relevant identity groups within each 
country, but have to restrict the analysis to those groups for which there is sufficient 
data – or number of respondents. While this is an issue that affect most survey based 
cross-country studies of horizontal inequalities, the fact remains that I cannot firmly 
establish that the data I analyse capture the sentiments among the groups and 
individuals that actually mobilize (ecological fallacy). This is however only an issue in 
my cross-country analyses (Chapter 2 and 3).  
Since my framework requires quite specific measures of group grievances, I do 
encounter some new challenges to how well I am able to reach my goal of testing them 
more comprehensively. I covered this part in section 1.5.2.  
To overcome data quality and measurement challenges I gathered my own survey data 
that is fully representative for the population of interest and includes tailor-made 
measures. In my quantitative article based on this data (Chapter 4) I use individual as 
unit of analysis and hence avoid any ecological fallacy issues.  
In summary, I have strived to make the most of existing – however limited – data 
sources, and supplied this with new data, in order to make a first contribution to 
understanding when and how horizontal inequalities lead to conflict. 
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2 Perceptions, Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict 
 
Abstract 
Recent advances in conflict studies have led to relatively robust conclusions about the 
association between group – or horizontal - inequality and conflict. Central to quantitative 
studies supporting this relationship is a stipulated causal chain where objective horizontal 
inequalities are translated into grievances through group comparison and a perception of 
injustice. Such grievances in turn form a mobilization resource. These studies are however 
limited by their use of objective measures of inequality, which leaves them unable to directly 
test the assumed grievance mechanism. I argue that taking into account how inequalities are 
actually perceived by group members will allow for a more comprehensive test. Furthermore, 
the use of objective measures in existing studies is based on an assumption that objective and 
perceived horizontal inequalities largely overlap. This is however not the case, as empirical 
data shows that the correlation between the two is very low. I take into account perceptions 
in a first time-variant study of regional economic inequality and conflict in both developed 
and developing countries. With data from the World Values Survey covering 1989-2014 and 
85 countries, I find support that perceived economic regional inequalities increase the 
probability of civil war. The results for objective economic regional inequalities do not reach 
conventional significance levels.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Does economic inequality lead to conflict? This question has attracted the attention of 
prominent scholars at least since the time of Aristotle (Nagel 1974). The frequent 
assumption that unequal distribution somehow fuels rebellion has resulted in a vast 
amount of theoretical as well as empirical work. For long, results remained mixed. 
Despite countless qualitative studies asserting that inequality is a major reason for 
conflict outbreak, quantitative studies struggled to establish a firm relationship between 
the two (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Cramer 2005, Lichbach 1989). 
These quantitative studies, including the most influential ones by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), rely on analysis of individual measures of 
inequality. However, as most prominently set forth by Frances Stewart, it is minority 
groups or collectives of individuals who rebel, not the whole population, nor individuals 
(Stewart 2002). Stewart’s theoretical development has given rise to several quantitative 
studies which uniformly support the role of economic group inequality in inducing 
conflict (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 
2015, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 
2012, Østby 2008a, b, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Hence, there is an emerging 
consensus in the literature that inequality causes civil conflict when it overlaps with 
relevant group identities.  
Promising as these studies are, they nevertheless neglect a potential crucial part of the 
inequality-conflict causal chain. Seemingly all studies of inequality and conflict, 
including those measuring group inequalities, are based on objective inequalities. Yet, 
as Stewart (2010, 14) herself notes, ‘People take action because of perceived injustices 
rather than because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be 
aware’. Economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, or by local GDP data, is 
most commonly used as proxies, leaving completely aside how economic inequality is 
actually interpreted and perceived by both groups and individuals (ref. Zimmermann 
1983). It remains obvious, however, that in order for people to take action to address 
inequalities, the first step is to recognize them and to consider them unjust (Han et al. 
2012). The use then, of objective measures in current empirical studies, is based on the 
assumption that both objective and perceived horizontal inequalities essentially amount 
to the same thing.  Put another way it is assumed that all objective inequalities are 
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actually perceived as inequalities by relevant groups, and conversely all perceived 
inequalities have an objective basis. These are strong claims that are so far largely 
untested.  Existing studies of the link between objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities range from concluding that there is no such link (Langer and Smedts 2013) 
to documenting imperfect correlations – ranging from 0.27 to 0.30 depending on 
indicators and datasets (Holmqvist 2012).  
While cross-country analyses of conflict have neglected perceptions of inequality, the 
case study literature does offer some examples demonstrating their importance. 
Interviewing Muslim immigrants in London and Madrid, Gest (2010, 178) finds that 
what distinguishes democratic activists from those who engage in anti-system behavior, 
is the nature of their individual expectations and perceptions about shared economic 
realities. Moving on to larger conflicts, a recent World Bank report concludes that the so 
called ‘Arab Spring’ was driven by a decrease in popular subjective satisfaction, while 
the objective economic situation actually improved in the years before the widespread 
mobilization (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). The report also points 
to the importance of inter-group inequality as opposed to individual inequality.  
My main argument is that in order to better capture the role of inequality in inducing 
civil conflict, measures have to account for relevant groups as well as for the perception 
of inequality in these groups. In addition, my analyses fill two other gaps in the 
literature. While Stewart emphasizes how groups can mobilize around different 
identities, current studies have almost exclusively focused on ethnic groups. However, a 
regional identity might be just as relevant (ref. Posner 2004). I will therefor look at the 
effect of regional economic inequality on civil war. And finally, most of the studies, and 
all of those with a global scope, rely on time invariant measures of economic horizontal 
inequality. This is commonly defended by referring to the demonstrated ‘stickiness’ of 
horizontal inequalities (see e.g. Stewart and Langer 2008, Tilly 1999). Still, a recent 
study covering 1992 to 2013 demonstrates a global decline of ethnic inequality 
(Bormann et al. 2016), while Kanbur and Venables (2005) compare case studies of 26 
developing countries and conclude that regional inequalities are rising. The data used in 
this analysis also show that horizontal inequalities change quite substantially over time. 
Using inequality data from one particular year to analyze decades of conflict incidents is 
therefore questionable. Hence, my study represents the first time-variant analyses of the 
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effect of both objective and perceived regional inequality on civil war covering 
developed and developing countries in all world regions
14
. 
Analysing data for the period 1989 to 2014 from the World Values Survey (WVS), I 
find that countries with a high level of perceived regional economic inequality have an 
elevated risk of civil war outbreak. On the other hand, mere objective regional 
economic inequalities do not have any significant effect. The group aspect remains 
essential, as neither objective nor perceived individual inequality is linked to increased 
civil conflict risk. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I briefly review the literature on conflict and 
inequality and set out issues and limitations. Second, I present paths forward and 
corresponding testable hypotheses. Third, I lay out my research design including data 
and methodology, and then present results, limitations and a set of robustness checks. 
Finally, I conclude by highlighting the importance of perceived inequality between 
regional groups and indicating routes for further research.  
2.2 Conflict vs. Inequality 
Gurr’s (1970) work on relative deprivation as a source of political violence remains a 
classic today. At the core of his theory is the notion that when people get less then they 
originally expected, frustration will arise and their willingness to participate in political 
violence to rectify the perceived injustice will increase. Despite initial praise, his work 
was very soon critiqued by scholars holding that frustrations/grievances are too 
ubiquitous to explain when conflict occurs, and that the economic or political 
opportunity to organize a rebel group is the most important explanatory variable 
(Snyder and Tilly 1972, Tilly 1978). This view received strong support from 
acknowledged statistical studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Rohner 2009, Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Lately inequality has received renewed attention following Frances Stuart’s (2002, 
2008) theory of horizontal inequalities. Defining horizontal inequalities as ‘inequalities 
in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined 
groups’ (Stewart 2008, 3), she argues that group inequality matters more than individual 
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 The analysis covers 85 countries – se Independent Variables Section and Appendix 2.8.1 for detailed 
information. 
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inequality, and that inequality becomes an important source of conflict when it overlaps 
with salient group identities. Thus, by combining social identity theory and relative 
deprivation theory, Stewart suggests causal mechanisms to bridge the gap between 
structural background patterns and collective action. A range of quantitative studies 
support Stewart’s theory. Economic, social and political inequality between ethnic 
groups (Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 
2013, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 
2014, Østby 2008b), between regional groups (Østby 2008a, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 
2009, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012) and between religious groups (Østby 
2008a) significantly increases the risk of civil war. While the studies of ethnic 
inequality have received most attention, Østby (2008a) actually find that regional 
inequality have the strongest explanatory power on civil war – when comparing with 
ethnic and religious inequality.   
As opposed to relative deprivation theory, the concept of horizontal inequalities 
highlights the mobilization potential of both relatively deprived and relatively 
privileged groups (Brown and Langer 2010) – echoing earlier work of Horowitz (1985). 
The relatively richer groups are assumed to mobilize to protect their resources. 
Examples of relatively privileged groups turning to political violence include the 
Basques in Spain and the Biafrans in Nigeria (Østby 2011).  
Ground breaking as the above studies are, they still have some weaknesses. First, and 
most importantly, the general assumption underpinning studies of horizontal 
inequalities and conflict is that structural inequalities between groups create collective 
grievances, which in turn form a mobilization resource (see e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch, 
and Buhaug 2013). However, all the above empirical studies rely on objective measures 
of horizontal inequalities as a proxy for collective grievances. This is problematic, since 
collective grievances are highly subjective phenomena that will not be reflected in the 
statistical figures currently used to measure their effect – as I will demonstrate in a later 
section.  
Second, all the global studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict look at ethnic 
groups, while Østby’s (2008a) analysis of 55 developing countries clearly indicates the 
importance of regional economic inequality as a conflict driver. Third, these same 
studies are based on time-invariant data, a choice that is justified by referring to studies 
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demonstrating the persistence of horizontal inequalities (e.g. Tilly 1999). The most 
commonly used source is Nordhaus’ (2006) data of local economic activity which dates 
from 1990. However, a recent study based on time-varying satellite data of nightlights 
emissions covering the entire globe reveal substantial changes in ethnic inequality from 
1990 to 2013. While on average ethnic groups have experienced a decline in inequality, 
this pattern is particularly strong in Asia. On the other hand, inequality between ethnic 
groups in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased substantially (Bormann et al. 2016).  
The nightlights emissions can only document changes in inequality among ethnic 
groups that live in separate territories. Where ethnic groups coexist, the authors have no 
means of linking luminosity – and in essence economic development – to one particular 
group. This means that the data also to a large extent reflects regional inequality. Pure 
regional inequality is less frequently studied. However, in a large project comprising  50 
developing countries, Kanbur and Venables (2005) find that in the 26 case countries for 
which time series data is gathered, inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged 
regions is high and rising. The general picture emerging from these studies is that rural 
and remote regions fall behind while urban and central regions experience larger 
growth. Examples include Mexico (García-Verdú 2005), Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia (Förster, Jesuit, and Smeeding 2005), China (Kanbur and Zhang 2005) 
and Indonesia (Friedman 2005). 
Given these trends in inequality, rather than using data from 1990 to analyze conflict 
incidents up to 20 years later and 30 years before, one should aim to use data that 
capture the variability. So while my main contribution is to analyze perceptual data and 
civil war, which to the best of my knowledge has not been done in any previous study, I 
also contribute with an analysis of time-variant, regional inequality in developed and 
developing countries in all world regions.  
2.3 Regional horizontal inequalities and civil war 
Stewart (2002) is clear that group identities can be based on different identifiers, with 
ethnic, religious, regional and cultural the most salient ones. Group identification and 
mobilization has emerged based on all these (Østby 2011). All of the identifiers deserve 
attention, yet, regional inequalities might prove particularly interesting. Location often 
coincides with ethnic or linguistic cleavages, as seen in for instance in Uganda, Zambia 
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and Indonesia (Tadjoeddin, Suharyo, and Mishra 2003, Østby 2011). As Rokkan (1967) 
points out, when spatial cleavages are reinforced by additional divisions such as 
ethnicity and religion, the threat of conflict should increase substantially. A growing 
number of studies find strong associations between violence and local inequalities 
(Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2004, Chen 2007, Murshed and Gates 2005).  In addition, 
regional identity might be important in itself, as shown by Posner’s (2004) study of the 
Chewa and Tumbuka groups in Zambia. He found regional cohesion to be apparently 
stronger than claims of ethnic affiliation. Similarly, in Tanzania, the government’s 
management of natural gas resources led to widespread protests and riots with people 
mobilizing around a regional – or ‘southern’ identity (Mampilly 2013, see also chapter 
4 and 5). 
There are also an abundance of case examples indicating that regional inequality is a 
major source of conflict, such as the Ashanti region versus the north in Ghana, the 
Central Province versus remaining regions in Kenya, north-south asymmetries in 
Uganda, Nigeria and Cote de Ivoir, and oil producing versus other regions in Nigeria 
and Sudan (Bates 2008). 
Despite this, most studies of horizontal inequalities look at inequalities between ethnic 
groups. Although clearly important, this could nonetheless lead to an omission of 
relevant group dynamics. There are some notable exceptions such as Tadjoeddin, 
Suharyo, and Mishra (2003) on the small-N level and Deiwiks, Cederman and Gleditsch 
(2012), Østby (2008a) and Østby, Nordås and Rød (2009) on larger samples. Deiwiks, 
Cederman and Gleditsch (2012) study 31 federal states, and demonstrate strong 
statistical evidence that regional inequality increases the risk of secessionist conflict. 
Østby (2008a) tests various dimensions of horizontal inequalities across different group 
identifiers in 55 developing countries, and concludes that the model with the strongest 
explanatory power is the one that interacts levels of regional horizontal inequalities and 
the degree of political exclusion. In general the regional group identifier performs better 
than the ethnic and religious for all tested horizontal inequality dimensions. To the best 
of my knowledge, the effect of regional inequality on civil conflict has not been tested 
on a time-variant dataset covering both developed and developing countries in all world 
regions. Hence, I propose the following hypothesis:  
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H1: The risk of civil war increases with high objective economic regional 
inequality 
2.4 Perceived horizontal inequalities 
People will only mobilize to change structural inequalities that they are actually aware 
of. This centrality of subjective judgements – or perceptions of inequality – for 
mobilization, is widely accepted by conflict theorists. In his definition of relative 
deprivation, Gurr (1970) explicitly stressed the importance of perceived inequality 
rather than merely objective inequalities
15
. Stewart (2010, 4) concurs stating that ‘(i)t is 
of course, perceptions which motivate people to action’. 
The importance of perceptions is also reflected in the assumed causal chains 
underpinning empirical studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict. Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011, 481-482), for instance, construct a causal path where 
objective political and economic asymmetries are translated into grievances ‘through a 
process of group comparison driven by collective emotions’. A ‘perception of injustice’ 
generates grievances that in turn facilitate recruitment and mobilization. Still, while the 
full causal chain is objective horizontal inequalities  => grievances => violent 
collective action, what Cederman Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) actually test is the 
effect of objective horizontal inequalities on violent collective action, hence by-passing 
the grievances. This is the case for all the above-mentioned empirical studies of 
inequality and conflict, which are consistently analyzing the effect of objective 
inequality on conflict
16
.  
In constructing the postulated link between structural asymmetries and grievances, 
Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) draw extensively on social psychology 
literature, and particularly on social identity theory (Abrams and Hogg 1988, Tajfel and 
Turner 1979). While emphasizing social comparison and intergroup evaluation, this 
                                                 
15
 His original definition reads: ‘Relative Deprivation (RD) is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their value capabilities. (..) The emphasis of the hypothesis is on the 
perception of deprivation; people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even 
though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want. Similarly, the existence of what the 
observer judges to be an abject poverty, or “absolute deprivation” is not necessarily thought to be unjust 
or irredeemable by those who experience it’. (Gurr 1970/2011: 24) 
16
 In addition to the previously mentioned Nordhaus data, the other most used data source is the 
Demographic and Health Surveys – with measures of economic ethnic inequality based on differences in 
ownership of household assets such as radios and televisions (see e.g Østby 2008a, b, Østby, Nordås, and 
Rød 2009) 
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school of work underlines the importance of existing group identities rather than 
objective between-group inequalities. Competitive behavior may arise regardless of 
whether any objective issues of conflict are present (Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
In summary, both relative deprivation theory and social identity theory – the two main 
building blocks for horizontal inequality theory – emphasize perceptions over objective 
facts. So why do objective studies rely on objective data? Besides the obvious point that 
perceptions are inherently hard to measure, this choice is commonly based on the 
assumption that ‘perceptions broadly reflect the observed reality’ (Stewart 2008, 18) 
and that ‘on average, grievances will be experienced roughly in proportion to the degree 
of violation’ (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 41). This assumption stands in 
contrast to both case examples and larger sample empirical comparisons of perceived 
vs. objective horizontal inequality.  
The Arab Spring, with protests, revolutions and violent conflict in a range of in Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, has remained a puzzle for conflict 
scholars. While ‘inequality’ has been a recurring explanation for the mobilization by 
both press and academics (Verme et al. 2014), conventional measures of inequality gave 
no advance indication of an increasingly frustrated population. On the contrary, the 
MENA region experienced decreasing inequality and substantial poverty reduction in 
the decade preceding the conflicts (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). A 
recent World Bank report addresses this ‘inequality puzzle’, and concludes that rather 
than any change in objective indicators, a subjective dissatisfaction with income 
inequality seems to have been a main driver behind the unrest
17
 (Ianchovichina, 
Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). What they found was that while objective inequality 
decreased prior to the widespread conflict, perceived inequality increased. For instance 
in Egypt, the difference between objective and perception data expanded significantly 
between 2000 and 2008. While household survey data showed that Egyptians overall 
became more affluent in this period, perception data showed a reversed trend. In 2000, 
people regarded themselves as more affluent than they actually were, while in 2008 the 
viewed themselves a less affluent than they were (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and 
Shantayanan 2015, Verme et al. 2014). 
                                                 
17
 The report also highlights that inter-group inequality – and not individual inequality – was linked to the 
increased level of conflict in the region – concurring with the theoretical starting point of this paper.  
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Other empirical studies of the overlap between actual and perceived horizontal 
inequalities tell a similar story. Langer and Mikami (2013) conducted perceptions 
surveys in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and found large 
discrepancies between subjective and objective socio-economic horizontal inequalities 
among their respondents. Their results are supported by a more comprehensive 
empirical analysis of 19 African countries. Based on data from the Afrobarometer 
Surveys and multilevel regressions, Langer and Smedts (2013, 23) actually find a 
negative association between objective and perceived economic ethnic inequality. 
Individuals who belong to an objectively economically advantaged group are less likely 
to perceive their group to be economically better off compared to other groups in their 
country. So rather than lending support to the assumption that objective and perceived 
horizontal inequalities overlap, these studies seem to confirm the view of sociologists, 
who claim that there may be little or no link between perceived and actual inequality, 
because social experiences, group interests, values and societal myths affect perception 
(see e.g. Robinson 1983).  
I am aware of only two studies that look at the conflict potential linked to perceived 
horizontal inequality. Both these are cross-sectional. In an analysis based on survey data 
from the Niger Delta, Rustad (2016) finds that the effect of perceived horizontal 
inequalities is far greater than the effect of objective, observed horizontal inequalities on 
attitudes towards violence. However, this study is limited to the Niger Delta and does 
not take into account participation in, or actual, conflict events. Miodownik and Nir 
(2015) use the Afrobarometer Round 3, and find high perceived economic and political 
ethnic inequality is correlated to higher acceptance of political violence and to 
participation in protest marches in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
While it is challenging to measure perceptions, their demonstrated theoretical and 
practical importance calls for an attempt to analyze their effect on civil conflict risk on a 
cross-country basis. My second hypothesis therefore reads: 
H2: The risk of civil war increases with high perceived economic regional 
inequality 
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2.5 Data and Methodology 
While the data sources of existing studies of horizontal inequality and conflict to some 
extent overlap, the calculation of the inequality measures tend to vary. In order to keep 
my results comparable to the only other global, country level study of economic 
horizontal inequality – Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) – I adopt the measures 
from this paper
18
. Since most studies of individual – or vertical – inequality and civil 
conflict risk are done on a country level, keeping country-years as unit of analysis adds 
the opportunity to run alternative models and make comparisons to this strand of the 
literature as well.  
2.5.1 Dependent variable: Civil Conflict onset  
As dependent variable I use civil conflict onset, defined as any armed conflict between a 
state government and an opposition group causing at least 25 annual battle-related 
deaths. The definition and the data stems from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). If a conflict falls 
below the 25 casualty threshold for at least two consecutive years, any new observation 
above the threshold is coded as a separate onset. The variable is coded with the value 1 
for years with a conflict onset, and 0 otherwise. Consecutive years of the same conflict 
are omitted and coded as 0 except where a new civil war breaks out
19
. The total number 
of conflict onsets in the dataset is 51
20
.  
2.5.2 Independent variables  
I derive my measures of horizontal inequalities from the World Values Survey (WVS). 
The survey has been used in a wealth of scholarly publications and findings reported in 
leading media
21
. It is unique in that it offers data on region of the respondents on a 
global scale and on both objective and perceived regional economic inequality. 
The WVS Longitudinal Aggregate file includes surveys conducted by the WVS from 
1981 to 2014 in 94 societies, totaling more than 340.000 interviews. The aggregated file 
is based on 6 waves of surveys, allowing for repeated cross sectional analysis. However, 
                                                 
18
 A different version of this analysis is also included in Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). 
19
 Here I also follow Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014). A country may experience distinct armed 
conflicts at the same time or in consecutive years.  
20
 This is the figure for which there are data points for all the variables included in the analysis.  
21
 Further information on the surveys and the association is available on 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
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since there are very few data points in the first wave running from 1981 to 1984
22
, and 
no surveys were conducted between 1985 and 1988, I exclude the first wave and include 
data from 1989 and onwards. Furthermore, the five remaining waves are somewhat 
unevenly scaled, running over between 4 and 6 years. To avoid skewing the results, and 
also to get more variation in the control variables, I split the data into annual figures 
rather than using aggregated averages for each wave.  
While one may suspect that survey data is biased towards including relatively fewer 
conflict countries than non-conflict countries, this does not seem to be the case for the 
WVS. Of the UNs 193 member states, 73 – or 38 % – experienced civil war in the 
period 1989-2014 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Of the 93 
countries surveyed by the WVS, 42 – or 45 % – experienced civil war in the same 
period. 
The regional group identifier is obtained from survey variable X048WVS (‘Region 
where the interview was conducted’). 5 countries lacked data per region and where 
omitted
23
, while 2 countries lacked data on the main independent variables
24
 or on key 
control variables
25
. The total number of countries in the analyses is therefore 85 (see 
appendix 2.8.1). Regions are administrative units, and the average number of regions 
per country is 15.  
The indicator for objective economic horizontal inequalities to test Hypothesis 1 is 
generated based on variable X047 from the survey, asking the respondents to indicate 
which income decile they belong to by summing up all household income and 
comparing it to presented scales based on country averages. For example, for Canada in 
2000, the question reads: ‘Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what 
group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that 
come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and 
other deductions’, and the response categories are: C: Up to 12,000, D: 12,501 to 
20,000 and so forth up to L: 100,000 or more
26
. This data is different to what is used in 
                                                 
22
 Only three countries covered the questions on objective and perceived financial situation in this first 
wave. 
23
 Includes Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Singapore and Tanzania 
24
 Israel 
25
 Andorra, Iraq and Serbia 
26
 For some countries, no scales are presented, and the respondents are rather asked to place themselves 
into income deciles: ‘Here is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 
the “highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. 
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earlier studies, which use proxies based on household assets (Østby 2008a, b, Østby, 
Nordås, and Rød 2009) and local economic activity (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 
2014, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 
2013, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012). Since also relatively privileged groups 
are expected to mobilize according to horizontal inequality theory, and indeed have 
been associated with increased civil war risk by extant studies (e.g. Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011), I analyse both wealthy and poor groups. I adopt 
Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch’s (2014) measures of economic horizontal inequality, 
with the only difference that I look at regional groups while they look at ethnic groups. I 
first identify the richest and poorest regional group in each country, from which I derive 
country-level inequality indicators measuring the relative gap between the mean 
national income and the income level for the poorest regional group
27
:  
Objective negative HI = country-level mean income/mean income for poorest group 
and then the richest regional group: 
Objective positive HI = mean income for richest group/country-level mean income 
Hypothesis 2 regarding perceived economic horizontal inequalities is tested by using 
variable C006 from WVS – measuring subjective satisfaction with the financial 
situation of the household. (The question reads: ‘How satisfied are you with the 
financial situation of your household?’ Deciles, 1 completely dissatisfied, 10 
completely satisfied). According to Liang and Fairchild (1979), financial satisfaction is 
directly linked to a feeling of relative deprivation. I calculate the relative gap between 
mean national satisfaction and least/most satisfied regional groups by using the same 
formulas as for objective inequalities. This is arguably not a perfect group measure. 
Ideally, the question should have probed for the opinion on behalf of the regional group, 
not the household. Lacking such data, I still hold that the measure used gives an 
approximation of the group sentiment. Data from the Afrobarometer Surveys support 
this assumption. Round 3 of the surveys covering 18 Sub-Saharan countries have data 
                                                                                                                                               
Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that 
come in’. This introduces a subjective element to the respondents it applies to. I handle this in the 
robustness tests.  
27
 Regions with less than 20 respondents are omitted and coded as missing. This means reducing the total 
number of respondents by 7922 (out of more than 340 000). Mean number of respondents per region is 
244. Omitting regions with less than 50 respondents instead does not alter the results (see appendix 2.8.1 
Table 7 for full results).  
65 
 
on perceptions of both individual and group economic inequality. The correlation 
between these two measures on an individual level for the whole dataset is very low at 
0.18. However, if I rather calculate the mean perceived individual and group inequality 
per sub-national region – which is what I do for the measure in this analysis as well – 
the correlation increases to 0.74 (see Appendix 2.8.4 for a scatter plot).  The country 
level correlation is even higher – at 0.8. Thus aggregating individual responses up to a 
regional level substantially increases the correlation between the individual and group 
measures
28
.  
2.5.3 Control variables and statistical model 
I add the most common control variables that are regarded as conflict correlates: the log 
of population lagged one year, the log of per capita GDP lagged one year (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006) and democracy (Gates et al. 2006). Since ethnic political exclusion is 
demonstrated to increase conflict risk (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013), I add a 
variable measuring the size of the largest discriminated ethnic group relative to the 
combined size of the group in power and the discriminated group. I take this measure 
from Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014). In addition, I include a civil war lag 
indicator to account for effects of previous and ongoing civil conflicts (Buhaug, 
Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014)
29
. Finally, I control for Ethnic and Linguistic 
Fractionalization (ELF) (Fearon and Laitin 2003). GDP data is obtained from World 
Development Indicators (2016) and population data from the United Nations Population 
Division (2010). I apply a logistic regression model on repeated cross sections, with 
clustered country codes to compensate for country-level dependencies.  
2.6 Results 
To test the hypotheses presented above I create three models. Model 1 tests the effect of 
objective regional economic inequalities on conflict outbreak, model 2 the 
corresponding effect of perceived regional economic inequalities and model 3 combines 
all measures. For both objective and perceived horizontal inequalities I interpolate 
values for intervening years and extrapolate the value from the nearest survey at the 
beginning and the end of the time period, in the case of lack of data for all waves. In 
                                                 
28
 In her Niger Delta analysis, Rustad (2016) also aggregate individual responses up to a group level. 
29
 The results remain unchanged if I rather use number of peaceyears and cubic splines as suggested by 
Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) (appendix 2.8.2, Table 8). 
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some instances these interpolations cover several years, but I limit extrapolations to two 
years as part of the robustness tests. For incidents where the survey is conducted in the 
same year as a new conflict, I systematically check all dates and ensure that no survey 
data collected after a conflict outbreak is used to analyze the same conflict. For a full 
list of countries and conflicts included in the various models please refer to appendix 
2.8.1.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Count Mean  sd Min Max 
onsetcivwar 2346 0.04 0.21 0 1 
objective neg hi 2106 1.27 0.24 0.81 3.11 
objective pos hi 2106 1.20 0.12 1.02 1.80 
perceived neg hi 2094 1.19 0.22 0.87 3.06 
perceived pos hi 2094 1.14 0.10 1.01 1.89 
democracy 2205 0.65 0.33 0 0.98 
largest discr group 2373 0.05 0.12 0 0.85 
ongoing 2418 0.17 0.38 0 1 
ethfrac 2224 0.36 0.26 0 0.90 
gdppercapitalog 2304 3.63 0.66 2.06 4.84 
poplog 2375 4.23 0.75 1.70 6.80 
      
 
The correlation between the objective negative economic horizontal inequality measure 
and the perceived negative economic horizontal inequality measure is 0.42. (For a full 
correlation matrix, see appendix 2.8.3). However, since I identify the poorest region in 
objective terms for the objective low measure, and the region with lowest financial 
satisfaction for the perceived low measure, this implies analyzing two different regions 
for many countries. Hence, in order to properly compare objective and perceived 
regional inequality for each country, I have created a plot where I match the perceived 
negative measure with objective data from the same region. Figure 6 shows that there 
are large discrepancies between objective and perceived negative horizontal inequalities 
in many countries in the surveyed sample. Pakistan, Moldova and Latvia stand out with 
a particularly large gap between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities. For 
Pakistan, the outlier figure is a result of a very low satisfaction among 221 respondents 
in the Sindh Rural region in 2001. The low score may be linked to the fact that this 
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region has a history of economic marginalization and a very active separatist movement 
(Khan 2002). The very low objective regional inequality in Moldova is based on only 20 
responses from the Causeni District, and high perceived regional inequality coupled 
with a very low objective regional inequality may be a result of measurement error. This 
also goes for Latvia, where the high objective economic regional inequality in the 
Liepāja region is based on 24 respondents. These data points are excluded from the 
analysis along with other regions with less than 50 respondents as part of the robustness 
tests
30
. The overall correlation between objective and perceived economic deprivation in 
the same region is 0.218. Together with Figure 6 this supports the main premise of this 
article: objective and perceived horizontal inequalities do not overlap.  
Figure 6. Correlation between perceived and objective negative horizontal inequality (HI) in same 
region. World Values Survey Wave 2 to 6, 1989-2014 
 
Note: one data point for each survey wave per country 
As can be seen from Table 4, hypothesis 1 is not supported – neither negative nor 
positive objective regional economic inequality is significantly associated with civil war 
                                                 
30
 The highest value for objective negative HI in Table 3 (3.11) is based on 222 responses from 
Thailand’s Northern region – once more a marginalized region. This data point do not show up in Figure 
6, as it is in a region where only the objective deprivation is lowest in the country, not the perceived. 
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outbreak. The results for poor groups (objective neg HI) are however close to 
significance with a p-value of 0.184 in Model 1.  
The results do however show a statistically significant association between perceived 
regional poor groups (perceived neg HI) and civil conflict outbreak. Hypothesis 2 is 
thus supported, but only for poor groups. Countries in which the richest region is much 
wealthier than the country average actually have a decreased civil war risk, but the 
results are not statistically significant. While this contrasts the results of Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann (2015), who 
find that relatively privileged ethnic groups are associated with higher risk of civil war, 
it is in line with Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014)
31
.  
The contrasting results for objective and perceived horizontal inequalities reflect and 
support the overall argument of this article. Since objective facts and the subjective 
assessment of these facts do not overlap, and we can only theoretically expect people to 
mobilize based on inequalities they are actually aware of, it is not surprising that it is the 
perception measure that is most strongly linked to risk of civil war. On the other hand, 
previous studies of regional inequality limited to Africa (Østby 2008a) and to federal 
states (Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012) have found objective regional 
inequalities to increase civil war risk. Based on this, one might have expected objective 
regional inequality to turn out significant also in my analysis – although less so than 
perceived regional inequality. A potential reason for this null result is my measure, 
which is different to all other studies in that it captures (time-varying) income rather 
than asset ownership and local economic data.  
  
                                                 
31
 The coefficient for the perceived positive HI is larger than the coefficient for the perceived negative HI, 
despite being insignificant. Since the correlation between those two variables is relatively high (see 
Appendix 2.8.3), I also run models where only the perceived negative HI, and then only the perceived 
positive HI, are included. The results for poor groups remain unchanged (the negative measure), but the 
coefficient for the positive measure is greatly reduced – and still insignificant. Results are available upon 
request. 
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Table 4. The association between objective and perceived horizontal inequality and civil war onsets, 
1989-2014. Repeated cross sectional data.  
 
Country clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  
The results for perceived negative horizontal inequalities are also substantive. Changing 
the level of perceived economic regional inequality from the 5
th
 to the 95
th
 percentile, 
while holding all other variables at their means, increases the risk of civil war outbreak 
by 53%. Figure 7 below show marginal effects for all the included variables. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -196.6381       -186.4593       -183.8879   
pseudoR-squared             0.187           0.216           0.215   
                                                                    
                          (2.683)         (2.341)         (2.559)   
Constant                   -8.132**        -6.594**        -6.963** 
                          (0.380)         (0.382)         (0.380)   
population (logged)         1.147**         1.216**         1.245** 
                          (0.406)         (0.416)         (0.432)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.750          -1.017*         -1.007*  
                          (0.571)         (0.671)         (0.671)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.227*          1.489*          1.534*  
                          (0.351)         (0.336)         (0.356)   
ongoing civil war           0.479           0.320           0.286   
                          (2.930)         (3.388)         (3.463)   
largest discr group         0.405          -3.652          -3.624   
                          (0.741)         (0.793)         (0.835)   
democracy                   0.268           0.710           0.609   
                                          (1.346)         (1.527)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.283          -1.222   
                                          (0.300)         (0.326)   
perceived neg HI                            1.021***        0.928** 
                          (1.088)                         (0.989)   
objective pos HI           -0.086                          -0.371   
                          (0.663)                         (0.836)   
objective neg HI            0.880                           0.570   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Figure 7. Average marginal effects, all variables, with 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 
 
The control variables for GDP and population are significant and with the expected 
signs for most models
32
. A high level of ethnic fractionalization also significantly 
increases conflict risk, while a large ethnically discriminated group does not. This latter 
result contrasts Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014), but is in line with Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013)
33
.  
The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset includes civil conflicts where the disputes 
concern both government and territory. One might suspect that regional inequalities are 
more linked to territorial conflicts than fights over government power. I therefore create 
models 4 to 6 where I rather test the effect of objective and perceived regional 
inequalities on territorial conflict
34
. Table 5 below shows the results, which are overall 
the same, but strengthened. Objective negative regional inequality is closer to 
significance this time with a p-value of 0.122 in Model 4.  
                                                 
32
 For model 1, GDPpercapita is significant on a 10% level with a p value of 0.06 
33
 Since this variable changes sign from model 1 to model 2, I also exclude it altogether as a robustness 
test. Results are unchanged, and available upon request. 
34
 There are too few government conflicts (18) to test this type separately 
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Table 5. The association between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities and territorial 
civil war onsets, 1989-2014. Repeated cross sectional data.  
 
In summary, the overall regressions support a link between perceptions of negative 
regional inequality and civil war. I now move on to test the robustness of this result, and 
start by looking at the descriptive statistics on a more granular level. In the previous 
section I gave examples of concrete conflicts seemingly rooted in a decrease in 
perceived economic satisfaction rather than an increase in objective inequality. Does the 
data used for this analysis offer indications of similar dynamics? Bangladesh and Egypt 
are two countries in the sample that experience a civil war outbreak after 14 and 16 
years of peace respectively. Figure 8 show the development in objective negative 
horizontal inequality and perceived negative horizontal inequality prior to the civil war 
outbreak in each country: 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -137.4158       -120.1432       -119.1208   
pseudoR-squared             0.229           0.294           0.300   
                                                                    
                          (3.364)         (2.711)         (2.811)   
Constant                   -9.957**        -7.410**        -7.677** 
                          (0.453)         (0.485)         (0.461)   
population (logged)         1.066*          1.378**         1.374** 
                          (0.565)         (0.489)         (0.506)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.787          -1.264**        -1.341** 
                          (0.780)         (1.011)         (0.988)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.814*          2.468*          2.457*  
                          (0.483)         (0.610)         (0.565)   
ongoing civil war           0.362           0.030          -0.011   
                          (6.323)         (9.133)         (7.703)   
largest discr group        -1.883         -21.060*        -19.142*  
                          (1.029)         (0.983)         (0.997)   
democracy                   0.695           1.134           1.079   
                                          (1.426)         (1.195)   
perceived pos HI                           -2.027          -2.837*  
                                          (0.410)         (0.414)   
perceived neg HI                            1.580***        1.337** 
                          (1.522)                         (0.966)   
objective pos HI            0.744                           0.436   
                          (0.735)                         (0.830)   
objective neg HI            1.136                           0.988   
onsetterritory                                                      
                                                                    
                        (4)Obj HI      (5)Perc HI     (6)Full mod   
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Figure 8. Development in objective and perceived economic negative horizontal inequalities in two 
countries before civil war outbreak 
 
Both countries experienced a decline in objective horizontal inequalities prior to the 
civil war outbreak, and marked increase in perceived negative economic horizontal 
inequalities in the years before the conflict. For Bangladesh, the plot is based on 
responses from the Rajshahi Division. This is one of two regions where the Purbo 
Banglar Communist Party-Janajuddha Faction (PBCP-Janajuddha), who pursued 
revolutionary class struggle against the Bangladeshi state, was most active. The Egypt 
plot is in line with the previously cited World Bank Reports which identify increasing 
subjective dissatisfaction and decreasing objective economic conditions prior to the 
Arab Spring (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). While these plots alone 
do not explain conflict outbreak, they do once more highlight the importance of 
capturing subjective views. They also show that time-invariant data is of limited use in 
evaluating conflict risk given that both objective and perceived horizontal inequalities 
are clearly changing with time. 
While these examples show that perceptions of negative regional economic inequality 
increased before a civil conflict incident, they cannot by themselves rule out the issue of 
endogeneity. Several of the other countries in my sample experience two or more civil 
war incidents, and even if I control for ongoing conflict – alternatively time since last 
conflict and cubic splines – I cannot rule out that some of the perceptions measured are 
driven by a previous conflict. I will have to leave to other carefully designed before and 
after studies, or innovative methodological designs, to tackle this issue in a fully 
satisfactory manner. 
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Furthermore, data quality is an issue in my analysis as it has been in all other large-N 
studies of conflict. The WVS has an overall good global coverage, including in conflict 
prone areas such as Latin-America and South-East Asia. However, the coverage of 
Africa could admittedly be better, with the five wave aggregate accounting for 13 
African countries. These are however evenly spread across the continent and do not 
seem to have a bias towards only non-conflict or only conflict countries. This goes for 
the sample of countries in general – as already noted in the Data and Methodology 
Section. Furthermore, the coverage in each wave is far from perfect, as only a handful 
of countries are covered in all consecutive waves. I solve this by relying on 
interpolation and extrapolation of data points – in some cases over several years. Given 
the demonstrated variability of inequality figures, this introduces another bias in my 
analysis. I therefor run models where I limit the years of extrapolation to 2. This nearly 
halves the number of observations, but the results remain unchanged (see Table 9 in 
appendix 2.8.2 for full results). 
As can be seen from the list of included countries and civil war outbreaks in appendix 
2.8.1, India is an outlier with as many as 15 civil conflict outbreaks. To ensure that my 
results are not driven by India alone, I run a test where I exclude this country. For this 
specification, results are actually strengthened (appendix 2.8.2, Table 10).  
Figure 6 revealed that Pakistan, Moldova and Latvia are outliers with respect to the 
main independent variables. Taking Pakistan out of the analysis does not change the 
results, (appendix 2.8.2, Table 11). Moldova and Latvia had few respondents and are 
dropped in the analysis where all regions with less than 50 respondents are censored. 
The results are unchanged for this specification as well (appendix 2.8.2, Table 7). 
Thailand is an outlier with very high objective regional deprivation. Without Thailand 
results also remain unchanged (appendix 2.8.2, Table 12). In summary the main results 
do not seem to be driven by outliers. 
As noted in the Data and Methodology section, in some countries and some years, the 
question on objective income is not accompanied by income scales for the given 
country. The respondent is rather asked to place his/her household in an income 
decile
35
. This introduces a subjective element to the measure, as people may over- or 
                                                 
35
 This applies for 7 countries in Wave 2, 9 countries in Wave 3, 1 country in Wave 4 and 31 countries in 
Wave 5. In Wave 6 it applies to all the countries.  
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underestimate their household’s position. To investigate if and how this affects the 
results, I run an analysis where I only include the objective economic regional measures 
that are based on responses given after comparing with presented country scales for 
incomes. For this specification, the objective negative measure turns out significant on a 
5% level – indicating that this inherent inconsistency in the question design of the 
World Value Survey does influence the results, and that once corrected for, objectively 
deprived regions are associated with a higher risk of civil war (appendix 2.8.2, Table 
13).  
Since oil and gas may increase the risk of civil war (Ross 2015), and particularly in 
economically deprived regions (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009), I add a control 
measuring the value of a country’s oil and gas production per capita (Ross 2013). 
Results once more remain unchanged (appendix 2.8.2, Table 14). 
Finally, controlling for power sharing between several ethnic groups, world regions, and 
oil and gas net value rather than value per capita does not alter the results (appendix 
2.8.2  Table 15-Table 17). In summary, the results remain unchanged through a battery 
of sensitivity tests targeted at identified potential weak spots and conflict related 
variables.   
2.6.1 Alternative specifications 
Since my analyses differ from existing studies in that I measure perceived inequality, 
one might ask if perceived individual inequality also leads to civil war. Put differently, 
is the lack of an association between vertical inequality and civil war also partly due to 
the use of objective measures? Using the same questions from the WVS for objective 
and perceived inequality as above, I first construct a Gini coefficient based on objective 
data for each country. I furthermore calculate mean financial satisfaction per country as 
a measure of the general level of perceived individual inequality. 
The results are given in Table 6, and generally offers yet another support for horizontal 
inequality theory – neither objective nor perceived individual inequality are associated 
with an increased risk of civil war outbreak. Perceived individual economic inequality is 
closest to significance with a p-value of 0.24
36
. 
                                                 
36
 The measure for perceived individual inequality does not reflect any spread in the subjective 
satisfaction across each country – rather, the higher the measure, the higher the share of people reporting 
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Table 6. Alternative specification. The association between objective and perceived individual 
inequality and conflict onsets, 1989-2014. Repeated cross sectional data.  
 
Country clustered standard errors in parenthesis. 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
While the role of inequality in inducing conflict has been questioned by a range of 
scholars, recent studies using group measures rather than individual measures indicate 
that the dismissal of inequality as a causal factor is not warranted. I agree with Buhaug, 
Cederman and Gleditsch (2014, 418), who argue that the ‘the contradictory findings of 
the civil war literature to a large extent stem from the use of empirical measures of 
inequality and grievances that lack strong theoretical justification’. However, while 
group measures are clearly essential, we still have a way to go before our measures fully 
capture the underlying theoretical assumptions. The assumed causal chain underpinning 
empirical analysis of horizontal inequalities and conflict stipulate that objective 
structural inequalities are translated into grievances, which in turn fuel mobilization. 
Still, none of the studies actually measure the grievances, instead they bypass them and 
look at the link between objective inequality and conflict. The implicit premise is that 
                                                                                                                                               
economic dissatisfaction. I also constructed a Gini based on the perception data for each country. The 
results (available upon request) remained unchanged for this measure. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                    
N                            1895            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -197.4893       -186.3695   
pseudoR-squared             0.183           0.205   
                                                    
                          (2.532)         (2.970)   
Constant                   -7.624**        -9.688** 
                          (0.333)         (0.320)   
population (logged)         1.151***        1.363***
                          (0.371)         (0.441)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.771*         -0.791   
                          (0.584)         (0.594)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.155*          1.408*  
                          (0.618)         (0.617)   
democracy                   0.173           0.284   
                          (0.430)         (0.355)   
ongoing civil war           0.483           0.169   
                                          (0.189)   
Perc ec satisfaction                        0.221   
                          (3.703)         (4.233)   
Gini                        2.747           1.741   
onsetcivwar                                         
                                                    
                           Model7          Model8   
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structural objective facts and the perception and evaluation of these ‘facts’ neatly 
overlap.  
As both the data from my study as well as other work demonstrate, this is not the case. I 
therefore argue that to bring the measures even closer to the theoretical assumptions, 
one should aim to capture perceived horizontal inequalities. The hypotheses that the risk 
of civil war increases with high perceived economic regional inequality receives support 
from my analyses. Countries where there are large differences in economic satisfaction 
between the least satisfied region and the country average, score higher on civil conflict 
risk than countries where the differences are smaller. These results are robust to a range 
of changes in specifications. In contrast, I find no link between objective regional 
horizontal inequality and civil conflict risk. There is however a weak association 
between high objective regional relative deprivation and civil war risk if I adjust for the 
inconsistency in measures of objective income in the survey data. An alternative 
specification testing individual inequality – both objective and perceived – indicate that 
neither of these are significantly increasing civil war risk either. In summary, my results 
strongly suggest that group identifications and the perceptions of inequality are 
important to the generation of grievances that may lead to conflict. 
In the analysis presented here I believe I have taken one important step closer to fully 
capturing the role of grievances in fomenting conflict. I do not argue that perceived 
horizontal inequality perfectly reflects grievances, but I do suggest that it is closer to 
doing so than mere objective statistical facts. In order to fully investigate the role of 
grievances in inducing conflict, measures taking into account whether the horizontal 
inequality is perceived as unfair, or similar measures capturing people’s judgements 
about the inequality, are needed. Such measures should also ideally reflect the 
perception of the situation of the whole group, not an aggregation of individual views 
within the group.  
Finally, the data from the World Values Surveys indicates that both objective and 
perceived horizontal inequalities change over time. Future studies should therefore 
strive to use data sources that capture such variation.  
Accepting the importance of perceptions naturally raises the question of what shapes 
them. Langer and Mikami (2013) point to the impact of one’s objective personal 
situation, manipulation of perceptions by elites/leaders, inaccurate media reporting, lack 
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of objective data, insufficient access to information, misleading comparisons, 
misjudgment of group size, and cross-dimensional contamination, as factors influencing 
perceptions. Along similar lines, Brown and Langer (2010, 41) highlight the importance 
of the extent to which elites are able to ‘generate, manipulate and utilize’ perceptions of 
horizontal inequalities as an instrument to mobilize their followers, with Kenya and 
Indonesia as key examples of such incidents. Han et al. (2012) highlight social and 
political factors. These include social norms, myths and ideologies, meritocracy, social 
circumstances, and; referring to Robinson (1983); meso-level factors such as the size of 
ethnic or class groups, population density, the effect of the education system, and 
whether the group one belongs to is ‘at threat’ from other groups, or in competition with 
those groups for resources. While highlighting the importance of perceptions, this study 
does not give any answers to how such perceptions are formed. This constitutes an 
interesting route for further research.  
Overall, my analysis constitutes a first cross-national test of perceived group inequality 
in inducing conflict. The results indicate a needed change in focus from only structural 
issues to a broader understanding of how identities and claims are formed.   
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2.8 Appendices Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.8.1 – Countries and civil war outbreaks included in analyses 
 
Note: only the civil war outbreaks with data points for all independent and control variables are given in 
this table. Several more countries experienced civil conflict in the time period 1989-2014, but in years 
with missing data points.  
Country 0 1 Total Country 0 1 Total
albania 26 0 26 Libya 2 1 3
algeria 1 0 1 lithuania 23 0 23
argentina 26 0 26 macedonia 21 1 22
armenia 14 0 14 malaysia 25 1 26
australia 26 0 26 mali 16 4 20
azerbaijan 13 5 18 mexico 24 2 26
Bahrain 26 0 26 moldova 22 0 22
bangladesh 14 1 15 morocco 26 0 26
belarus 23 0 23 netherlands 26 0 26
brazil 26 0 26 new zealand 26 0 26
bulgaria 26 0 26 nigeria 23 2 25
burkina faso 26 0 26 norway 26 0 26
canada 26 0 26 pakistan 15 3 18
chile 26 0 26 peru 24 1 25
china 25 1 26 philippines 17 0 17
colombia 26 0 26 poland 26 0 26
cyprus 26 0 26 romania 24 0 24
czech republic 21 0 21 russian federation 18 2 20
dominican republic 26 0 26 rwanda 11 1 12
Ecuador 26 0 26 saudi arabia 26 0 26
egypt 15 1 16 slovakia 21 0 21
el salvador 23 0 23 slovenia 23 0 23
estonia 23 0 23 south africa 24 0 24
ethiopia 8 0 8 south korea 26 0 26
finland 26 0 26 spain 25 1 26
france 26 0 26 sweden 26 0 26
georgia 19 2 21 switzerland 26 0 26
germany 25 0 25 taiwan 26 0 26
ghana 25 0 25 thailand 11 0 11
great britain 25 1 26 Trinidad and Tobago 24 0 24
guatemala 26 0 26 Tunisia 26 0 26
hungary 25 0 25 turkey 24 2 26
india 10 15 25 uganda 19 1 20
indonesia 14 0 14 ukraine 22 1 23
iran 14 1 15 united states 26 0 26
italy 26 0 26 uruguay 26 0 26
japan 26 0 26 Uzbekistan 10 0 10
jordan 26 0 26 venezuela 22 0 22
Kazakhstan 23 0 23 viet nam 26 0 26
Kuwait 25 0 25 Yemen 2 0 2
kyrgyzstan 23 0 23 zambia 26 0 26
latvia 23 0 23 zimbabwe 26 0 26
Lebanon 23 1 24 Total 51
Onsetcivwar Onsetcivwar
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Appendix 2.8.2 Additional results 
Table 7: Censoring regions with less than 50 respondents 
 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -195.2148       -186.8014       -183.5465   
pseudoR-squared             0.193           0.215           0.217   
                                                                    
                          (3.613)         (2.484)         (3.608)   
Constant                   -8.007*         -7.290**        -7.628*  
                          (0.357)         (0.383)         (0.403)   
population (logged)         1.113**         1.183**         1.180** 
                          (0.410)         (0.436)         (0.467)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.749          -0.938*         -0.937*  
                          (0.545)         (0.644)         (0.629)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.234*          1.379*          1.406*  
                          (0.347)         (0.334)         (0.353)   
ongoing civil war           0.463           0.357           0.309   
                          (2.694)         (3.524)         (3.472)   
largest discr group         0.733          -3.783          -3.467   
                          (0.722)         (0.724)         (0.751)   
democracy                   0.229           0.530           0.416   
                                          (1.521)         (1.600)   
perc pos HI sens                           -0.575          -0.821   
                                          (0.329)         (0.330)   
perc neg HI sens                            0.972**         0.897** 
                          (1.863)                         (2.050)   
obj pos HI sens            -0.487                          -0.325   
                          (0.875)                         (0.864)   
obj neg HI sens             1.333                           0.927   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 8: Peaceyears and splines 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -187.8738       -178.6901       -176.3509   
pseudoR-squared             0.223           0.249           0.247   
                                                                    
                          (2.624)         (2.326)         (2.527)   
Constant                   -7.854**        -6.335**        -6.593** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
spline_3                    0.000           0.000           0.000   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
spline_2                   -0.002          -0.002          -0.002   
                          (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
spline_1                    0.007           0.009           0.009   
                          (0.390)         (0.402)         (0.399)   
population (logged)         1.167**         1.245**         1.274** 
                          (0.384)         (0.401)         (0.418)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.429          -0.738          -0.726   
                          (0.539)         (0.639)         (0.649)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        0.940           1.212           1.231   
                          (0.161)         (0.161)         (0.166)   
peaceyears                  0.134           0.186           0.190   
                          (3.036)         (3.489)         (3.649)   
largest discr group         0.234          -4.130          -4.131   
                          (0.694)         (0.765)         (0.800)   
democracy                   0.251           0.631           0.552   
                                          (1.285)         (1.564)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.549          -1.390   
                                          (0.291)         (0.322)   
perceived neg HI                            0.797**         0.743*  
                          (1.018)                         (1.081)   
objective pos HI           -0.249                          -0.395   
                          (0.616)                         (0.759)   
objective neg HI            0.571                           0.357   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 9: Max 2 years of extrapolation of survey points 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1074            1087            1071   
log-pseudolikelihood    -147.7407       -148.4831        -146.135   
pseudoR-squared             0.209           0.221           0.217   
                                                                    
                          (2.753)         (2.709)         (2.934)   
Constant                   -5.356          -4.770          -4.993   
                          (0.364)         (0.351)         (0.365)   
population (logged)         0.996**         1.014**         1.018** 
                          (0.472)         (0.500)         (0.515)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.894          -1.010*         -0.992   
                          (0.850)         (0.862)         (0.871)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        2.174*          2.208*          2.200*  
                          (0.396)         (0.372)         (0.401)   
ongoing civil war           0.209           0.182           0.150   
                          (4.338)         (4.823)         (4.921)   
largest discr group        -5.115          -6.022          -5.905   
                          (0.720)         (0.823)         (0.847)   
democracy                  -0.328           0.223           0.178   
                                          (1.201)         (1.312)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.597          -1.520   
                                          (0.293)         (0.310)   
perceived neg HI                            0.860**         0.835** 
                          (1.035)                         (0.867)   
objective pos HI           -0.518                          -0.011   
                          (0.656)                         (0.749)   
objective neg HI            0.381                           0.099   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 10: Excluding India from analysis 
 
Table 11: Excluding Pakistan from analysis (outlier) 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1870            1858            1856   
log-pseudolikelihood     -173.287        -164.701       -159.9009   
pseudoR-squared             0.067           0.093           0.100   
                                                                    
                          (3.773)         (3.711)         (4.291)   
Constant                   -5.011          -3.469          -1.757   
                          (0.334)         (0.356)         (0.311)   
population (logged)         0.705*          0.667           0.697*  
                          (0.428)         (0.454)         (0.452)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.499          -0.710          -0.718   
                          (0.599)         (0.703)         (0.689)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        0.622           0.750           0.705   
                          (0.424)         (0.373)         (0.419)   
ongoing civil war           0.273           0.023          -0.081   
                          (2.056)         (2.238)         (2.393)   
largest discr group         1.116          -1.115          -0.982   
                          (0.800)         (0.850)         (0.849)   
democracy                  -0.647          -0.149          -0.387   
                                          (2.322)         (2.294)   
perceived pos HI                           -2.396          -1.082   
                                          (0.362)         (0.379)   
perceived neg HI                            1.338***        1.367***
                          (2.000)                         (2.311)   
objective pos HI           -1.366                          -3.780   
                          (0.762)                         (1.141)   
objective neg HI            1.153                           1.030   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1877            1865            1863   
log-pseudolikelihood    -188.5374       -177.7942       -175.3644   
pseudoR-squared             0.182           0.216           0.214   
                                                                    
                          (2.682)         (2.419)         (2.615)   
Constant                   -7.906**        -7.242**        -7.487** 
                          (0.387)         (0.367)         (0.365)   
population (logged)         1.143**         1.272***        1.300***
                          (0.415)         (0.428)         (0.440)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.798          -1.062*         -1.048*  
                          (0.564)         (0.645)         (0.655)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.177*          1.614*          1.646*  
                          (0.386)         (0.374)         (0.406)   
ongoing civil war           0.425           0.222           0.194   
                          (3.001)         (3.074)         (3.246)   
largest discr group         0.452          -2.929          -2.945   
                          (0.832)         (0.901)         (0.955)   
democracy                   0.476           0.937           0.845   
                                          (1.300)         (1.516)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.752          -1.514   
                                          (0.562)         (0.595)   
perceived neg HI                            1.751**         1.654** 
                          (1.069)                         (1.004)   
objective pos HI           -0.106                          -0.476   
                          (0.696)                         (0.925)   
objective neg HI            0.780                           0.409   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 12: Excluding Thailand from analysis (outlier objective negative HI) 
   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1884            1872            1870   
log-pseudolikelihood    -194.5972       -185.7147       -182.4718   
pseudoR-squared             0.194           0.218           0.220   
                                                                    
                          (2.760)         (2.320)         (2.639)   
Constant                   -8.471**        -6.559**        -7.088** 
                          (0.356)         (0.373)         (0.357)   
population (logged)         1.157**         1.201**         1.251***
                          (0.396)         (0.406)         (0.423)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.692          -0.992*         -0.974*  
                          (0.586)         (0.667)         (0.676)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.383*          1.506*          1.651*  
                          (0.351)         (0.336)         (0.374)   
ongoing civil war           0.668           0.384           0.443   
                          (3.226)         (3.387)         (3.600)   
largest discr group        -0.446          -3.873          -4.329   
                          (0.700)         (0.781)         (0.816)   
democracy                   0.195           0.703           0.525   
                                          (1.341)         (1.515)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.323          -1.454   
                                          (0.297)         (0.338)   
perceived neg HI                            1.019***        0.815*  
                          (1.106)                         (1.112)   
objective pos HI           -0.910                          -0.920   
                          (0.919)                         (1.314)   
objective neg HI            1.711                           1.397   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 13: Only based on questions with country level categories for income presented to respondent 
 
Table 14: Controlling for value of oil & gas production per capita 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                    
N                            1428   
log-pseudolikelihood     -133.932   
pseudoR-squared             0.220   
                                    
                          (3.174)   
Constant                   -9.681** 
                          (0.436)   
poplog                      1.388** 
                          (0.430)   
gdppercapitalog            -0.505   
                          (0.619)   
ethfrac                     1.493*  
                          (0.371)   
ongoing                     1.073** 
                          (3.507)   
largest discr group         0.708   
                          (0.760)   
democracy                  -0.072   
                          (1.997)   
objective pos HI           -2.310   
                          (1.090)   
objective neg HI            2.468*  
onsetcivwar                         
                                    
                        (1)Obj HI   
                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -196.0196       -185.1579        -182.551   
pseudoR-squared             0.189           0.222           0.221   
                                                                    
                          (2.776)         (2.424)         (2.616)   
Constant                   -7.892**        -6.140*         -6.526*  
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
oil_gas_valuepo~2009        0.000           0.000*          0.000*  
                          (0.369)         (0.359)         (0.357)   
population (logged)         1.152**         1.235***        1.263***
                          (0.447)         (0.441)         (0.465)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.865          -1.202**        -1.198** 
                          (0.568)         (0.662)         (0.661)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.205*          1.464*          1.517*  
                          (0.360)         (0.342)         (0.364)   
ongoing civil war           0.456           0.278           0.242   
                          (3.278)         (3.803)         (3.911)   
largest discr group         0.215          -4.179          -4.193   
                          (0.700)         (0.751)         (0.784)   
democracy                   0.383           0.865           0.766   
                                          (1.266)         (1.457)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.376          -1.376   
                                          (0.292)         (0.307)   
perceived neg HI                            1.053***        0.956** 
                          (1.107)                         (0.981)   
objective pos HI           -0.083                          -0.321   
                          (0.675)                         (0.854)   
objective neg HI            0.895                           0.609   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 15: Controlling for powersharing 
 
Table 16: Controlling for world regions 
   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -193.7675       -185.6786       -182.7162   
pseudoR-squared             0.199           0.220           0.220   
                                                                    
                          (2.676)         (2.294)         (2.483)   
Constant                   -7.933**        -6.389**        -6.730** 
                          (0.466)         (0.430)         (0.462)   
powershare                  0.878           0.488           0.609   
                          (0.401)         (0.383)         (0.388)   
population (logged)         1.187**         1.210**         1.249** 
                          (0.365)         (0.387)         (0.398)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.770*         -1.004**        -0.993*  
                          (0.662)         (0.667)         (0.686)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        0.406           0.992           0.929   
                          (0.348)         (0.333)         (0.353)   
ongoing civil war           0.503           0.371           0.349   
                          (3.113)         (3.540)         (3.660)   
largest discr group         0.157          -3.935          -3.994   
                          (0.702)         (0.748)         (0.781)   
democracy                   0.262           0.614           0.481   
                                          (1.362)         (1.489)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.280          -1.142   
                                          (0.301)         (0.320)   
perceived neg HI                            0.911**         0.777*  
                          (1.080)                         (0.896)   
objective pos HI           -0.471                          -0.572   
                          (0.663)                         (0.832)   
objective neg HI            0.992                           0.677   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
log-pseudolikelihood    -196.5062       -186.2553       -183.6588   
pseudoR-squared             0.187           0.217           0.216   
                                                                    
                          (2.657)         (2.312)         (2.525)   
Constant                   -8.079**        -6.523**        -6.884** 
                          (0.162)         (0.181)         (0.184)   
world_region               -0.086          -0.111          -0.119   
                          (0.387)         (0.399)         (0.393)   
population (logged)         1.172**         1.252**         1.282** 
                          (0.396)         (0.404)         (0.421)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.734          -0.996*         -0.987*  
                          (0.567)         (0.671)         (0.672)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.197*          1.470*          1.511*  
                          (0.347)         (0.332)         (0.352)   
ongoing civil war           0.506           0.351           0.318   
                          (2.974)         (3.391)         (3.459)   
largest discr group         0.316          -3.776          -3.750   
                          (0.746)         (0.805)         (0.846)   
democracy                   0.272           0.714           0.614   
                                          (1.347)         (1.533)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.305          -1.256   
                                          (0.293)         (0.320)   
perceived neg HI                            1.025***        0.930** 
                          (1.087)                         (0.982)   
objective pos HI           -0.076                          -0.354   
                          (0.662)                         (0.833)   
objective neg HI            0.878                           0.574   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Table 17: Controlling for oil/gas value 
   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1895            1883            1881   
pseudoR-squared             0.187           0.217           0.216   
                                                                    
                          (2.824)         (2.379)         (2.581)   
Constant                   -7.963**        -6.236**        -6.569*  
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
oil_gas_value_2009          0.000           0.000           0.000   
                          (0.404)         (0.399)         (0.399)   
population (logged)         1.126**         1.178**         1.201** 
                          (0.434)         (0.428)         (0.444)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.790          -1.104**        -1.107*  
                          (0.569)         (0.675)         (0.675)   
ethnic fractionaliz.        1.223*          1.493*          1.542*  
                          (0.365)         (0.349)         (0.371)   
ongoing civil war           0.468           0.290           0.254   
                          (2.971)         (3.495)         (3.588)   
largest discr group         0.395          -3.751          -3.756   
                          (0.736)         (0.785)         (0.822)   
democracy                   0.300           0.767           0.673   
                                          (1.330)         (1.519)   
perceived pos HI                           -1.286          -1.245   
                                          (0.301)         (0.324)   
perceived neg HI                            1.046***        0.953** 
                          (1.091)                         (0.995)   
objective pos HI           -0.078                          -0.371   
                          (0.660)                         (0.833)   
objective neg HI            0.891                           0.604   
onsetcivwar                                                         
                                                                    
                        (1)Obj HI      (2)Perc HI     (3)Full mod   
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Appendix 2.8.3  
Table 18: Correlation Matrix 
  
   
      poplog     0.1875   0.0567   0.2814   0.0657   0.0849  -0.0165  -0.1507   0.3270   0.0780  -0.1433   1.0000
gdppercapi~g    -0.1399  -0.1301  -0.3035  -0.3194  -0.3830   0.5110  -0.0948  -0.2603  -0.4509   1.0000
     ethfrac     0.1436   0.0541   0.2103   0.1272   0.1965  -0.1313  -0.0191   0.2669   1.0000
     ongoing     0.1564   0.0474   0.2206   0.0575   0.0938  -0.0089   0.0744   1.0000
         ldg    -0.0188   0.1541   0.0983   0.1035   0.0992  -0.2378   1.0000
   democracy    -0.0279  -0.0462  -0.1292  -0.3028  -0.1738   1.0000
     percphi     0.1111   0.4553   0.5527   0.5283   1.0000
     percnhi     0.1149   0.4099   0.3591   1.0000
      objphi     0.1203   0.4934   1.0000
      objnhi     0.0439   1.0000
 onsetcivwar     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
               onsetc~r   objnhi   objphi  percnhi  percphi democr~y      ldg  ongoing  ethfrac gdpper~g   poplog
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Appendix 2.8.4 
Figure 9. Scatterplot correlation between mean perceived individual economic conditions per region 
and mean perceived ethnic group economic conditions per region, 18 African countries, 
Afrobarometer Surveys round 3 
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3 Injustice is in the eye of the beholder: Perceived Horizontal 
Inequalities and Communal Conflict in Africa 
 
 
Abstract 
Ethnic conflict between non-state groups – or communal conflict – now claims far more lives 
than civil war in several Sub-Saharan African countries. Still, cross-country analyses of the 
causes of such clashes are mostly absent. Further, while conflict scholars widely accept that 
perceptions of inequality drive mobilization, existing studies generally base their analyses on 
objective data. In this study I contribute to filling these gaps, and find evidence that objective 
political ethnic inequality, and more so perceived political ethnic inequality, is a strong 
driver of communal conflict. My analysis further suggests that the presence of ethnic groups 
that are both objectively and subjectively economically deprived is also highly conflict 
inducing. I use cross-sectional data from Afrobarometer Surveys covering 20 Sub-Saharan 
African countries and 200 subnational regions. However, my results have implications for 
conflict studies in general, suggesting a needed change from analysing structural background 
patterns alone, to taking into account how these are perceived by group members.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The global number of conflict between ethnic groups where none of the parties are the 
state – often referred to as communal conflict – now exceeds that of civil wars 
(Sundberg and Melander 2013). The rise of such conflicts is particularly strong in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where, for many people, the largest threat of political violence comes 
from clashes between local communities (Fjelde and Østby 2014). Despite this, 
quantitative studies have largely neglected this type of conflict. As a consequence, we 
have only limited knowledge on why most ethnic groups live peacefully side by side 
(see Fearon and Laitin 1996), while some clash. 
In this paper I address this gap, and investigate under which conditions ethnic groups 
resort to violence. Based on a disaggregated analysis of 200 subnational regions I argue 
that regions with high levels of perceived ethnic inequality have a higher risk of 
experiencing a communal conflict outbreak than regions where a perception of ethnic 
equality prevails. As point of departure I take recent theoretical developments on group 
– or horizontal inequalities and conflict. Spearheaded by Frances Stewart (2002, 2008, 
2010), the core argument in this work is that ethnicity – or other salient identity markers 
– becomes a mobilization resource when it overlaps with economic, social or political 
inequalities. This theoretical perspective has given rise to several quantitative studies 
supporting the role of horizontal inequalities in inducing conflict (e.g. Buhaug, 
Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Østby 
2008b).  
While all these studies look at civil war, the theory as such was developed to account 
for a wide array of political violence – including communal conflict (Stewart 2002, 
2008). Case examples of communal conflict rooted in grievances linked to horizontal 
inequalities are also rife, and include electoral conflicts in Kenya, conflicts on access to 
land in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, and conflicts on access to petroleum revenues in 
Nigeria. Regardless of this, cross-country quantitative analyses of the communal 
conflict/horizontal inequalities link are mostly absent.  One exception is Fjelde and 
Østby (2014), who find that ethnic economic inequality significantly increases the risk 
of communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. But ethnic groups do not fight over 
economic resources alone. As most prominently set forth by Horowitz (1985, 186), 
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reducing the threat of being dominated by another group, and securing the group’s 
‘worth and place’ – might constitute an even stronger motive for violent collective 
action. This relationship between political ethnic inequality and communal conflict has 
to the best of my knowledge not yet been quantitatively investigated, and doing so is the 
first main contribution of this paper.  
Next, central to the analyses in all existing quantitative studies is a stipulated casual 
chain where objective horizontal inequalities – economic, social or political – are 
translated into grievances, which in turn form a mobilization resource. Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011, 481), for instance, recognize that ‘grievances are 
intersubjectively perceived phenomena’ – as opposed to objective horizontal 
inequalities. However, instead of operationalizing perceptions, they measure objective 
horizontal inequalities and construct theoretical mechanisms linking these via 
grievances to mobilization for violence. To do this they draw on the broad literature 
within social psychology on social and intergroup comparison (e.g. Abrams and Hogg 
1988, Tajfel and Turner 1979). The suggested mechanisms in the causal chain are well 
founded and plausible. This paper nonetheless argues that a measure capturing the 
perception of horizontal inequalities constitutes a much better test of the grievance 
mechanism. Such a direct test is the second contribution of this paper. The fact that 
there are large discrepancies between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities 
makes this all the more important (see e.g. Holmqvist 2012, Langer and Smedts 2013).  
I base my analyses on repeated cross-sectional data from the Afrobarometer Surveys 
covering 20 Sub-Saharan African countries and 200 subnational regions for the period 
1999-2009. The results first and foremost support that horizontal inequalities between 
ethnic groups increase the risk of communal conflict. The effect is by far strongest for 
perceived political inequalities. Regions with a high share of people perceiving their 
ethnic group to be politically disadvantaged have a substantial and significantly 
increased risk of communal conflict. This resonates with findings from the civil war 
studies, which generally find political inequalities to be the most conflict inducing (see 
e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Objective and perceived economic ethnic 
inequality does not seem to have a similar overall effect. However, when perceived 
economic ethnic inequality overlaps with objective economic ethnic inequality, there is 
a significant and substantial increased risk of communal conflict outbreak.  
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While my argument is tested on 20 African countries, there are reasons to believe that 
horizontal inequalities matter for communal conflict elsewhere as well. Horizontal 
inequality theory is not limited to certain countries, and has proven to have strong 
explanatory power on civil war on a global scale. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
discrepancies between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities also exist in other 
parts of the world. This has implications for the study of inequality and social outcomes 
in general, as people act on perceptions rather than objective facts, and still it is the 
latter that have received most attention.  
I begin with a brief review of the literature on ethnic conflict. I then proceed by 
presenting my theoretical framework by first linking horizontal inequalities and 
communal conflict, and then discussing why perceived inequality is important. 
Following this I develop testable hypotheses and outline the research design. In the 
result section I test the hypotheses and conduct a range of robustness checks. I then 
conclude, and argue, first, that horizontal inequalities drive communal conflict, and 
second, that in order to better understand when this happens, the group members’ 
subjective view on the group’s relative economic and political situation will have to be 
taken into account.  
3.2 Ethnic conflict - status of knowledge 
Theoretical explanations of the persistence of ethnic conflict can broadly be divided into 
primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives (Young 1993, Wolff 2006). 
Primordialist accounts see ethnicity as a fixed, inherited characteristic, and conflict as a 
result of nature given ethnic differences (see e.g. Geertz 1963, Connor 1993). Most 
critiques of this work emphasize the static view of ethnicity and the lack of ability to 
explain why some ethnic groups live peacefully side by side whereas others do not (see 
e.g. McKay 1982). Instrumentalists, on the other hand, see ethnicity as fully socially 
and politically constructed by elites as a means to mobilize their followers (e.g. 
Rothschild 1981). Combining these views, constructivists regard ethnicity as partly 
inherited and partly constructed and chosen (e.g. Anderson 1991). While ethnic 
boundaries are fluid rather than permanent, the reshaping of identities carries a 
substantial cost, making ethnic groups fairly stable (Bates 2008). Furthermore, people 
93 
 
can become convinced about the essential nature of their identity, making mobilization 
by identity viable (Stewart 2008, 10). 
The theory of horizontal inequalities and conflict is rooted in the constructivist tradition. 
Building on the work of conflict scholars emphasizing grievances among the relatively 
disadvantaged in society as a key underlying cause of conflict (e.g. Davies 1962, Gurr 
1970, 1993a, 2000, Horowitz 1985), as well as social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 
1979), Stewart emphasizes the group aspect of conflict. She defines horizontal 
inequalities as ‘inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status 
between culturally defined groups’ (Stewart 2008, 3). When inequalities and cultural 
differences overlap, they become a powerful mobilizing resource (Stewart 2002).  
Several quantitative studies now give strong support to Stewart’s theory by finding an 
association between economic and/or political horizontal inequalities and conflict 
outbreak. The economic studies can broadly be divided into two camps. One strand 
proxies economic inequality by inter-group variation in the possession of certain 
household assets, such as a TV, refrigerator, electricity etc. (e.g. Fjelde and Østby 2014, 
Østby 2008a, b, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Another strand relies on Nordhaus’ 
(2006) G-econ dataset on local economic activity giving a regional equivalent of gross 
domestic product (e.g. Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Gleditsch, 
and Buhaug 2013, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Deiwiks, Cederman, and 
Gleditsch 2012). Along the political dimension, studies analyze the effect of the 
presence of ethnic groups that are excluded from political power on the risk of conflict 
(e.g. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 
2013, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012, Østby 2008a). Common to all these 
studies is that they analyze objective statistical data, but not the way these facts are 
actually perceived by those who mobilize. Also, with the exception of Fjelde and Østby 
(2014), who look at communal conflict outbreak, all the above mentioned quantitative 
studies analyze civil war.  
Case studies of communal conflict, on the other hand, are not lacking, and tend to 
emphasize competition over scarce resources (e.g. Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012), and, 
with much evidence drawn from India and Indonesia, the role of elites in manipulating 
existing ethnic tensions to manifest their own power (e.g. Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2004). 
Particularly this last strand of the literature adds importance to using measures of 
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perceived inequality rather than objective, since perceptions are much more likely to 
capture the effects of deliberate political mobilization and use of ethnic inequality, than 
objective figures. 
3.3 Horizontal inequalities and communal conflict 
Despite the fact that violent clashes between groups now constitute the most prevalent 
and lethal type of political violence in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
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(Sundberg and Melander 2013), communal conflicts remain understudied by 
quantitative scholars. This is surprising, especially since the underlying theories of 
mobilization accounts for the full spectrum of political violence (see e.g. Gurr 1970, 
Stewart 2008), and empirical studies find that similar causal mechanisms and 
explanatory variables appear across quite different forms of collective violence 
(Cunningham and Lemke 2011, Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001, Tarrow 2007, Tilly 
2003).  
The focus on civil war is rooted in an intuitive logic: the state controls access to 
resources, thus the state will be the target of groups seeking to rectify unequal 
distribution. This logic does however neglect the fact that groups that perceive 
themselves to be treated unfairly might choose to attack the groups that hold the 
relevant resources directly (Fjelde and Østby 2014). This is particularly relevant for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where political power often follows ethnic lines, and political elites 
have incentives to favor co-ethnics when distributing resources in order to secure their 
support (Wimmer 1997, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). In addition, targeting a 
territorially proximate group might be seen as less costly and be judged to have a higher 
likelihood of success than targeting the government directly (Fjelde and Østby 2014). 
Examples of such dynamics are plentiful. In Kenya, communal conflict between various 
ethnic groups erupted amid claims of electoral fraud in 2007. During the electoral 
campaign, many candidates had promised access to land to their constituency. The 
perception of a stolen election made people see their access to land as taken from them. 
However, rather than attacking the government directly, the aggrieved groups directed 
their anger towards the group perceived to have supported the president – the Kikuyu 
(UCDP). In Nigeria’s Niger Delta, conflict between ethnic groups who dispute access to 
                                                 
37
 Examples include Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. 
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petroleum revenues has been rising steadily since 1999. While the federal government 
has clear criteria of sharing revenue to oil producing states, these states in turn lack 
criteria for sharing to the various communities within the region. This has resulted in 
numerous violent clashes between ethnic groups who claim they do not receive their fair 
share of the windfalls (Akpan 2010). In line with these examples, recent quantitative 
studies do find a link between horizontal inequalities and communal violence. Fjelde 
and Østby (2014) find a robust association between communal conflict and economic 
ethnic inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Mancini (2008) finds a significant 
association between socioeconomic ethnic inequality, measured by child mortality rates, 
and ethno-communal conflict in Indonesia. On the other hand, Østby et al. (2011) find 
that higher levels of inequality between religious groups in Indonesia only increases the 
risk of ethno-communal and secessionist conflict in provinces with high population 
growth.  
All these studies are limited to the economic dimension of inequality. This focus on 
economic considerations ignores how the qualitative literature identifies factors such as 
humiliation, pride and desire for affiliation as motives for action (Stewart 2010). 
Several studies highlight how collective action is facilitated by a leader’s charisma, 
group ideology, outrage over governmental repression or simply satisfaction in pursuing 
justice (Roemer 1985, Wood 2003). Furthermore, behavioral and experimental 
economic research presents growing lab evidence that individuals have a willingness to 
punish unfair behavior at quite high cost (Blattman and Miguel 2010). The importance 
of political over economic motivations is perhaps most forcefully advanced by 
Horowitz (1985) in his classic work on ethnic groups in conflict. Emphasizing the 
psychological determinants of conflict, he argues that the threat of domination by a rival 
group – a fear of subordination and in the most extreme cases survival – create a 
powerful motive to mobilize. In line with this, quantitative studies find stronger effects 
of political exclusion of ethnic groups on risks of civil war than of ethnic economic 
inequality. (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Østby 2008a). Yet, the effect of 
political ethnic inequality on communal conflict remains untested. 
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3.4 Perceptions – the missing link in empirical analyses of conflict 
outbreak 
Relative Deprivation (RD) is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their value capabilities. (..) The emphasis 
of the hypothesis is on the perception of deprivation; people may be subjectively 
deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective observer 
might not judge them to be in want. Similarly, the existence of (..) “absolute 
deprivation” is not necessarily thought to be unjust or irredeemable by those 
who experience it. (Gurr 1970/2011, 24) 
In line with this clear emphasis by one of the most influential theorists on inequality and 
conflict, conflict scholars widely accept the importance of perceptions of inequality for 
mobilization. For instance, Han et al. (2012) argue that experiences and perceptions of 
inequalities potentially constitute one of the crucial mechanisms linking actual 
inequality to a range of social outcomes such as civic and political participation. Stewart 
(2010, 4) concurs stating that ‘(i)t is of course, perceptions which motivate people to 
action’. 
Turning to quantitative studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict, Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) construct 
a causal chain where perceptions are instrumental in transforming structural – or 
objective – horizontal inequalities into grievances, which again form the mobilization 
resource. As they concede, their causal mechanisms are theoretical interpolations, and 
they are not able to provide direct evidence of their operations, since they by-pass the 
grievances and test the effect of objective horizontal inequalities on violent collective 
action. A similar causal chain and logic underpin the remaining quantitative studies. But 
clearly, we can have more confidence in the suggested underlying causal mechanism if 
we are able to analyse the ‘missing link’ by incorporating directly measures of 
perceived inequalities. 
The use of objective horizontal inequalities in current studies is commonly based on the 
assumption that ‘perceptions broadly reflect the observed reality’ (Stewart 2008, 18). 
This assumption is however not supported by empirical studies. Langer and Mikami 
(2013) find large discrepancies between subjective and objective socio-economic 
horizontal inequalities in five African countries. In a more comprehensive empirical 
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analysis of 19 African countries, Langer and Smedts (2013) actually find a negative 
association between objective and perceived economic ethnic inequality. On the other 
hand, Holmquist (2012, 25), covering the same African countries, demonstrates that 
actual group ‘disadvantages’ do tend to translate into perceptions, with all correlations 
having the expected sign. Still, the correlations are by no means perfect – ranging from 
0.27 to 0.33 for different indicators, and several striking exceptions are revealed.  
Comparing measures for objective and perceived horizontal inequalities based on the 
Afrobarometer Surveys round 4 gives results similar to those of Holmquist. Figure 10 
below shows the relationship between perceived and objective economic ethnic 
inequality. Perceived economic ethnic inequality measures the share of the respondents 
in the biggest ethnic group in each subnational region who find that their group is much 
better off (0), better off (1), equal to (2) worse (3) or much worse off (4) economically 
than other groups in the country. The figure shown is the mean for each group, so a 
mean of 2 reflects a perception of equality, less than 2 a perception of privilege, and 
more than 2 a perception of deprivation. The objective measure is the average basic 
needs variable for the biggest ethnic group in the region divided by the basic needs 
variable for the rest of the country
38
. Here, 0 means that the group is on the country 
average, whereas higher measures means it is worse off, and lower measures means it is 
better off. From the figure we can clearly see that there is a substantial difference 
between perceived and objective economic horizontal inequalities. For instance, the 
Mijikenda People in the Coast region of Kenya have a high feeling of economic 
deprivation, while according to the basic needs variable, they are slightly better off than 
the country average. Similarly, the Hausa in Katsina, Nigeria, perceive themselves to be 
privileged, while the basic needs variable places them among the most deprived groups 
in the country. 
  
                                                 
38
 The basic needs variable is calculated based on how often the respondents have gone without food, 
clean water, health care, fuel and an income. See the Research Design Section for more details.  
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Figure 10. Correlation between perceived and objective economic ethnic inequality in subnational 
regions, 19 SSA countries, 2008/2009  
 
Source: Afrobarometer round 4. Regions with less than 20 respondents for the biggest ethnic group are 
excluded 
Turning to the political dimension, Figure 11 shows perceived political ethnic inequality 
for the biggest ethnic group in each region, calculated similarly to the economic 
measure, and whether this group is politically excluded or not – according to the Ethnic 
Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Once more 
substantial discrepancies are revealed. For instance, the Mandingue in Tambacounda, 
Senegal, have a very high perception of being deprived of political influence, while 
according to the EPR there is no objective exclusion. On the other hand, the Tiv in 
Benue, Nigeria, perceive their group to be politically influential despite an objective 
exclusion from power. 
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Figure 11. Perception of political deprivation among group members in objectively non-excluded 
and excluded ethnic groups, subnational regions, 19 SSA countries, 2008/2009  
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, EPR. Regions with less than 20 respondents for the biggest ethnic group 
are excluded 
Some argue that political horizontal inequalities are more visible than economic (e.g. 
Langer and Smedts 2013). It is indeed likely that group members are more aware of an 
objective exclusion from power, as opposed to the correct relative economic position of 
the group – particularly given the poor data on the latter. In light of this, it is perhaps 
surprising that the discrepancy between objective and perceived political ethnic 
inequality is of such a magnitude as portrayed in Figure 11. These discrepancies are 
however fully in line with the conclusions of Miodownik and Nir (2015, 24). Cross-
tabulating exclusion from power with subjective perceptions of exclusion based on 
Afrobarometer Round 3, they find that ‘fully 35 percent of the respondents misperceive 
their group’s political status’.  
Turning to the roots of such disparities, existing work on why objective and perceived 
inequality may differ particularly highlight how leaders and elites are able to manipulate 
perceptions as a tool to mobilize their followers (Brown and Langer 2010, Langer and 
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Mikami 2013). Further factors include lack of or inaccurate information, social norms 
and ideologies and size of the group (Han et al. 2012, Langer and Mikami 2013, Langer 
and Smedts 2013), prior expectations (Nisbett and Ross 1980) and the introduction of 
competition with other groups for resources (Robinson 1983).  
These studies mostly look at the difference between objective and perceived economic 
horizontal inequalities. However, some of the identified factors are likely to affect 
political inequalities as well. In addition, emerging work on the relationship between 
governance and conflict highlight that rather than the formal level of democracy, the 
quality of the political work also determines how people judge ‘good governance’. In 
other words, the rules regulating elections, and how citizens participate in this selection, 
may in some instances matter less than how the elected candidates perform their tasks. 
The quality of their work, the extent of corruption, and the policies chosen in the end 
determine how citizens judge governance, and in turn the governments’ ability to avoid 
political violence (Hegre and Nygård 2015, 985).  
While there is no obvious pattern in the discrepancies between perceived and objective 
inequality, the empirical data clearly suggests that the two measures are too far apart to 
be used as proxies for each other. Despite this, quantitative research on perceptions of 
inequality and conflict is close to non-existent. I’m only aware of two exceptions: 
Rustad (2016), who find that perceived economic inequalities matters more than 
observed in explaining attitudes towards violence, and Miodownik and Nir (2015), who 
find that high perceived economic and political ethnic inequality is related to higher 
acceptance of political violence and participation in protest marches. While Rustad’s 
analysis is restricted to the Niger Delta, Miodownik and Nir analyse 13 countries 
covered by Afrobarometer Survey round 3. Fully in line with the empirical evidence 
presented in this section, they too find large discrepancies between objective and 
perceived horizontal inequalities.  
In summary, there is a mismatch between the theories of conflict, which highlight that 
people and groups will only act to address perceived inequalities, and empirical studies 
analysing objective inequalities. Furthermore, since objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities differ, measures taking into account perceptions will allow for a better and 
more precise test of whether grievances induce conflict.  
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3.5 Hypotheses on the association between horizontal ethnic inequalities 
and communal conflict outbreak  
I now proceed to develop testable hypotheses on the effect of objective and perceived 
horizontal inequalities on the risk of communal conflict outbreak. I do this first for the 
economic dimension, and then for the political dimension.  
3.5.1 Economic ethnic inequality and communal conflict  
Quantitative studies confirm a positive relationship between ethnic economic 
inequalities and civil conflict outbreak, although the results are somewhat mixed 
(Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012, 
but see Østby 2008b). As demonstrated by Fjelde and Østby (2014), this relationship is 
valid also for the outbreak of communal violence. Central to the analyses in this paper is 
the logic that although a given ethnic group might dispute the way the national 
government are distributing resources, they might chose to attack a neighboring ethnic 
group – perceived to be linked to the government – directly, rather than the government 
itself.  
While the main focus is the role of perceived horizontal inequalities, the intention is not 
to claim that objective horizontal inequalities have no relevance. Hence, the first 
hypothesis will test the effect of objective ethnic economic inequality on conflict 
outbreak.  
While ideally I should have a measure taking into account the overall objective ethnic 
inequality in each region, only the biggest ethnic group has sufficient respondents in the 
Afrobarometer Surveys to be analyzed
39
. Looking at only the biggest ethnic group can 
to some extent be defended by the fact that size affects the ability to mobilize, making 
the smaller groups less relevant (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Posner 2004). 
Fjelde and Østby (2014) do the same in their analysis. Hence:  
H1: The more economically deprived the largest ethnic group in a region, the 
higher the risk of regional communal conflict outbreak  
The second hypothesis follows from the previous section on perceptions:  
                                                 
39
 See Research Design Section, under Independent Variable, for further information on number of 
respondents. 
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H2: The more the largest ethnic group in a region is perceived by its members to 
be economically deprived, the higher the risk of regional communal conflict 
outbreak 
Finally, as noted above, the literature on why objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities may differ particularly highlight the effect of elite manipulation. The 
emphasis on elite influence resonates with the social movements and framing literature, 
which generally argue that people are less likely to react on existing asymmetries, and 
to rise up collectively to rectify them, without some degree of elite intervention 
(Benford and Snow 2000, Brass 1991). By establishing so-called collective action 
frames, which constitute a shared understanding of a problem, who’s to blame for it, 
and a call for collective action to rectify it (Benford and Snow 2000, 614), elites are able 
to garner widespread support for mobilization. However, empirical evidence also show 
that the effectiveness of collective action frames in creating mobilization varies, and 
that one important success-factor is to which extent the frame resonates with the 
population. This resonance in turn increases with the credibility of the frame and its 
relative salience. The closer to reality the frame is, and the more important it is to the 
population in question, the higher the success rate (Benford and Snow 2000). It follows 
from these empirical findings that one should expect the conflict potential of horizontal 
inequalities to be highest where objective and perceived inequalities run in the same 
direction: 
H3: Regions in which both objective and perceived ethnic economic inequalities 
run in the same direction have an increased risk of communal conflict outbreak 
3.5.2 Political ethnic inequality and communal conflict 
According to Horowitz’ (1985), political inequality between groups should create a 
stronger motivation for mobilization than economic inequality, since political inequality 
in the most extreme sense threatens a group’s existence. Results from studies of civil 
war and political exclusion back such an argument (see e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug 2013, Østby 2008a). Horowitz’ argument is not limited to civil war, however. It 
is perfectly plausible that a group feels subordinated and threatened by a neighboring 
group and acts to improve their relative position. Also, as argued above, groups subject 
to inequality might mobilize against a neighboring ethnic group perceived to have links 
with the government. I therefore propose a third hypothesis: 
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H4: Regions with politically excluded ethnic groups have an increased risk of 
communal conflict outbreak  
Furthermore, following this papers contribution highlighting the role of perceptions: 
H5: The higher the level of respondents in a region perceiving their ethnic group 
to have less political influence than other groups, the higher the risk of regional 
communal conflict outbreak 
And finally given the noted success of leadership intervention when the suggested 
framing overlaps with reality: 
H6: Regions in which both objective and perceived ethnic political inequalities 
run in the same direction have an increased risk of communal conflict outbreak  
3.6 Data and Research Design 
Lack of data is likely to have impeded cross-country analyses of both perceptions of 
inequality as well as communal conflict. However, the Afrobarometer Surveys include 
questions on both objective and perceived inequalities, and also specifically on 
perceived group inequalities. This data hence constitutes the best available source to test 
the link between perceptions and conflict. The surveys have been conducted in four 
rounds: Round 1 in 1999-2001 (12 countries), round 2 in 2002-2003 (16 countries), 
round 3 in 2005-2006 (18 countries) and round 4 in 2008-2009 (20 countries)
40
. A full 
list of surveys and countries is given in appendix 3.9.1. As can be seen from this list, it 
does not constitute a random sample of countries. Several of the most conflict ridden 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as The Democratic Republic of Congo, are not 
covered. The data is thus not representative for the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
the countries included experienced 70% of all communal conflict incidents in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the period 1989-2010 (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Furthermore, 
Africa was home to around 60% of the world’s communal conflict incidents from 1989 
to 2014 (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). Hence, with quantitative studies of 
horizontal inequalities and communal conflict largely missing in general, and totally 
lacking for perceived horizontal inequalities, this study provide a better basis for 
generalizations than extant literature. Another thing to keep in mind is that, if poor and 
                                                 
40
 Round 5 of the Afrobarometer Surveys unfortunately do not include the questions used in my analyses. 
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missing data is non-randomly linked to conflict ridden societies, which is likely to be 
the case, analyses of the link between inequality and conflict will have a bias towards 
inferring the link as weaker than it actually is (Gates 2004).  
The Afrobarometer Surveys were initiated by Michigan State University, but the 
administration has now been passed on to Ghana’s Center for Democratic Development. 
They adhere to rigorous sampling procedures, with stratification on subnational regions 
and random sampling within these regions
41
. Some regions do however have very few 
respondents. I censor those with less than 20, and run additional robustness tests where I 
only include regions with more than 40 respondents. While the results are robust to 
these tests, even 40 respondents may pose a threat to regional representativity. Once 
more, generalizations should be done with caution.  
To test the hypotheses presented above, I apply a logistic regression model on repeated 
cross sections from the Afrobarometer Surveys as well as on the UCDP Georeferenced 
Event Dataset v.1.5-2011 (UCDP GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013, Sundberg, 
Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010). Wealth, income distribution and political influence 
tend to vary considerably within countries (Fjelde and Østby 2014), and many conflicts 
have been demonstrated to have local roots (Kalyvas 2006). Furthermore, communal 
conflicts rarely affect the whole country. Hence the unit of analysis is region-years, with 
region being the first-level administrative units in the countries
42
. I combine the 
Afrobarometer and the UCDP GED datasets by matching region names (‘region’ in 
Afrobarometer, ‘adm1’ in GED). Some of the conflict incidents in GED did not have an 
‘adm1’ variable. For these, I used the variable ‘where_location’. Finally, 18 communal 
conflict incidents did not have neither ‘adm1’ nor ‘where_location’ identified. These 
conflict incidents are not included in the analyses.  
3.6.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is communal conflict, using non-state conflict outbreak data as 
collected by the UCDP GED, and defined as ‘violence between actors of which neither 
party is the government of a state’ (Sundberg and Melander 2013, 525). UCDP GED 
                                                 
41
 See http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principles for more information. 
42
 The Afrobarometer Surveys also include information on the District of each respondent. Wig and 
Tollefsen (2016), for instance, use a district level analysis of Afrobarometer data to study the effect of 
local institutions on conflict. I keep to the regional level, however, in order to not further reduce the 
number of respondents per unit of analysis. 
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tracks events, and such events are only included if they – at some point in time for the 
given conflict – reach a threshold of 25 battle related deaths in one year.  
For the 20 countries and 200 subnational regions covered by the study, there are 
altogether 572 regional non-state conflict events in the period 1999-2010. A close look 
at each event reveals that every single one has an ‘ethnic’ aspect. While 431 are clashes 
between named ethnic groups, 116 denote conflict between supporters of different 
political parties. Of these, for every case at least one of the political parties represents an 
ethnic group. Finally, 25 of the events are termed as religious conflict by the UCDP 
GED. All these conflicts are between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. As UCDP 
notes, they are a part of a broader context of ethnic and religious tensions, and a 
majority of the 200 ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria adhere to either Christianity or 
Islam. Religious identity should hence be ‘seen as one of many and possibly 
overlapping identities’ (UCDP Conflict Data Program). As ethnicity is stated as the 
main identity for the majority of the respondents in the most affected Nigerian regions 
(Afrobarometer round 2, author’s calculations), no changes have been made to the 
original dataset. However, only 6 of the 25 are separate annual events. The analyses are 
rerun for a dataset without these 6 incidents as part of the robustness checks.  
The dependent variable is coded with the value 1 for years with a communal conflict 
outbreak, and 0 otherwise. Since many of the regions experience several events – either 
of the same conflict or of different conflicts – within a year, and consecutive years of 
the same conflict is coded as missing, and finally, not all region-years have data on 
perceived ethnic inequality, the total number of regionyear conflict events is 61.  
3.6.2 Independent variables  
The measures for objective and perceived economic and perceived political ethnic 
inequality are based on Afrobarometer Survey data. The indicator for objective 
economic horizontal inequalities to test Hypothesis 1 is a basic needs variable generated 
based on the question ‘Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in 
your family gone without food/clean water/fuel/medicine/an income’43:  
                                                 
43
 Ideally, this measure should have been based on a more objective variable, such as asset ownership. 
However, the Afrobarometer Surveys only include questions on asset ownership in Round 3 and 4. I 
therefore use the basic needs variable instead, recognizing that it does hinge on subjective recollections. 
Importantly, Langer and Mikami (2013) compare asset based and basic needs based measures of 
economic ethnic inequality with data from Afrobarometer Round 3, and show that they largely overlap, 
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Obj_ec_HI  = g/G 
where g is the average basic needs variable for the biggest ethnic group in the region, 
and G is the basic needs variable for the rest of the country. Groups that have a score 
equal to the country average have a value of 1, and groups twice as poor as the country 
average have a value of 2. The choice of looking only at the biggest ethnic group in 
each region is taken to minimize issues of representativity, since many of the smaller 
groups have far too few respondents. This approach is in line with that of Fjelde and 
Østby (2014). As already noted, a few of the regions have very few respondents even 
for the biggest ethnic groups. Regions with less than 20 respondents for the relevant 
group have been coded as missing
44
.  
The question ‘Think about the condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Are their 
economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?’ is 
used to create measures of perceived economic ethnic inequality (Hypotheses 2). The 
response categories are much better (0), better (1), same (2), worse (3) and much worse 
(4). The numbers in parenthesis are assigned, and the measure is the mean figure for all 
the respondents in the biggest ethnic group in the region.  
I interpolate and extrapolate data between and after survey points. Extrapolations are 
not done back in time, and are limited to four years after the survey year. This is 
conservative compared to extant studies, who generally argue that objective horizontal 
inequalities is characterized  by a high level of inertia (see e.g. Stewart and Langer 
2008, Tilly 1999), and  consequently rely on extensive extrapolations. However, 
perceptions of inequality are far more prone to change than objective inequalities (see 
e.g. Langer and Mikami 2013), and this logically limit the time frame in which 
extrapolation is appropriate. To be even more prudent, the models are re-run with a 
dataset where the data from each survey is taken to be valid for a maximum of two 
years as part of the robustness checks. To avoid serious endogeneity issues I ensure that 
all data is gathered before any communal conflict outbreak in the region. Survey data 
                                                                                                                                               
and that both measures are very much in line with other available data on the socio-economic situation of 
the given ethnic groups. 
44
 The average number of respondents per ethnic group is 80. See appendix 3.9.2 for an overview of the 
biggest ethnic group per region.  
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gathered in a conflict year after the conflict outbreak is never used to analyze this 
conflict, but rather moved to the year after
45
. 
To test Hypothesis 4, objective political ethnic inequality is set to 1 if there are 
politically excluded ethnic groups in the region, and 0 if not – based on the Ethnic 
Power Relations (EPR) dataset. EPR identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and 
their access to state power (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Fjelde and von 
Uexkull (2012) have coupled this data with geographical information about the regional 
base and settlement patterns for each ethnic group included the EPR dataset using the 
GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011), and constructed a dummy variable for 
political exclusion per region based on this. This data is used in the analyses. 
The measures for perceived political ethnic inequality are constructed the same way as 
the perceived economic measures, with the question this time being ‘Think about the 
condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Do they have less, the same, or more influence 
in politics than other groups in this country?’ (Hypotheses 5).  
Finally, I create an interaction term between objective and perceived economic ethnic 
inequality and between objective and perceived political inequality to test Hypotheses 3 
and 6, respectively. 
3.6.3 Control variables and statistical model 
The most robust findings in the conflict literature indicate an association between high 
population, poverty and previous conflict and conflict outbreak (Hegre and Sambanis 
2006). Controls for all these factors are included, in terms of the log of regional 
population lagged one year, the log of regional per capita GDP lagged one year, and a 
variable counting the number of peaceyears since the last conflict – including civil, 
communal and one-sided conflict.  Regional population data stems from the Gridded 
Population of the World database from Columbia University (CIESIN, FAO, and CIAT 
2005), while regional GDP per capita is taken from Nordhaus (2006). I control for time 
dependencies by using three cubic splines based on a peaceyears variable (Beck, Katz, 
and Tucker 1998) which in turn is based on the UCDP GED dataset. To control for 
spatial dependencies, a dummy variable is set to 1 if there was communal conflict 
within 150 km of the region the year before, and 0 if not, the data taken from Fjelde and 
                                                 
45
 This is done by comparing the conflict start date in the UCDP GED to the survey interview time period 
reported for each country. 
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von Uexkull (2012). Natural resources combined with horizontal inequalities have a 
demonstrated effect on the risk of civil conflict outbreak, but the effect on communal 
violence remains untested. There are however clear examples of horizontal inequalities 
and natural resources leading to communal violence, such as in the Niger Delta. To 
cater for the effect of natural resources, a dummy variable is set to 1 if there are 
commercial oil or diamond resources in the region, and 0 if not. The data has been 
compiled by combining information from The Petroleum Dataset (Thieme, Lujala, and 
Rød 2007), The Diamond Dataset Codebook (Gilmore et al. 2005) as well as multiple 
sources such as the US Energy Information Administration, OECD, Reuters and other 
online media outlets. Finally, since ethnic mobilization is particularly relevant around 
elections (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010, Wilkinson 2004), a dummy variable is set to 
1 for regionyears with presidential or national assembly elections, and 0 if not. The 
source for this data is the African Elections Database (2015). 
I apply a logistic regression model, with clustered country codes to compensate for 
country-level dependencies. I have chosen this model over count models, which take 
into account several conflict incidents in one year, since the latter cannot properly 
account for time dependencies. A country fixed effects model is run as part of the 
robustness checks, but is not chosen as a main model since it restricts the number of 
countries to six (those that experience communal conflict). Descriptive statistics of all 
variables are given in appendix 3.9.3.  
3.7 Empirical Results 
I start this result section with a simple correlation matrix portraying the relationships 
between the main independent variables
46
. In line with the empirical evidence presented 
earlier in this paper, Table 19 shows that the correlations between objective and 
perceived ethnic inequality have the expected signs, but are far from perfect. Objective 
and perceived economic ethnic inequality have a correlation coefficient of 0.303, while 
perceptions of political ethnic inequality is even further away from objective figures, 
                                                 
46
 A full correlation matrix is given in appendix 3.9.3. 
109 
 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.175
47
. Perceived economic and political ethnic 
inequality have the highest correlation.  
Table 19. Correlation matrix main independent variables 
 Obj Ec HI Perc Ec HI Obj Pol HI Perc Pol HI 
Obj Ec HI 1.000    
Perc Ec HI 0.303 1.000   
Obj Pol HI 0.004 0.177 1.000  
Perc Pol HI 0.169 0.604 0.175 1.000 
 
Moving on to the empirical tests of the various hypotheses above, Table 20 includes the 
results for model 1 thorough 3. Model 1 tests the effect of objective economic ethnic 
inequality on communal conflict outbreak. As can be seen, regions where the biggest 
ethnic group is objectively economically deprived do not have a significantly increased 
risk of communal conflict outbreak. Moving on to perceptions, model 2 indicates that a 
high level of perceived economic ethnic deprivation is negatively, though not 
significantly associated with a higher risk of communal conflict outbreak. Moving on to 
model 3, I find suggestive evidence that regions in which both objective and perceived 
ethnic economic inequality for the biggest ethnic group are high, have an elevated risk 
of communal conflict.  
                                                 
47
 Note that the measures for objective and perceived political horizontal inequality are not fully 
comparable. While the measure for objective political inequality is binary (either there is or there is not 
one or more excluded group in the region) the measure for perceived political inequality is continuous 
(the higher the measure, the higher the number of respondents perceiving their ethnic group to have less 
political influence). 
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Table 20. The association between objective and perceived ethnic economic inequality and 
communal conflict outbreak in subnational regions in Africa, 1999-2010  
 
Country clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  
Figure 12 shows that the results from model 3 are substantive. In regions where the 
largest ethnic group scores low on both objective and perceived deprivation, the risk of 
communal conflict outbreak in any given year is less than 0.5%. On the other hand, in 
regions where the largest ethnic group is both objectively and subjectively deprived, the 
corresponding conflict risk is up to 8%. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209   
log-pseudolikelihood    -174.0912       -173.9598       -172.7684   
pseudoR-squared             0.261           0.262           0.267   
                                                                    
                          (3.756)         (4.100)         (3.833)   
Constant                  -22.773***      -22.481***      -20.046***
                          (0.297)         (0.293)         (0.302)   
electionyear                0.584*          0.581*          0.562   
                          (0.441)         (0.462)         (0.527)   
natural resources          -0.591          -0.591          -0.581   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.007)   
reg_spline_1                0.002           0.002           0.002   
                          (0.257)         (0.274)         (0.250)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.587*          0.568*          0.542*  
                          (0.218)         (0.207)         (0.218)   
population (logged)         1.256***        1.262***        1.279***
                          (0.220)         (0.205)         (0.218)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.158           0.143           0.166   
                          (0.263)         (0.205)         (0.201)   
peaceyears                 -0.137          -0.152          -0.149   
                                                          (0.588)   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.259*  
                                          (0.697)         (0.413)   
perceived ec HI                            -0.162          -1.498***
                          (0.497)         (0.345)         (1.634)   
objective ec HI             0.559           0.657          -2.087   
onsetnonstate_p                                                     
                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3   
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Figure 12. Risk of communal conflict for low to high values of combined objective and perceived 
economic ethnic deprivation in subnational regions in Africa, 1999-2010 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 90% confidence interval. The graph pictures the development in conflict risk 
with changes from the 5
th
 percentile to the 95
th
 percentile level of objective x perceived economic HI. 
Calculated by using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). 
 
The results from model 3 are fully in line with my theoretical expectations, which in 
short project that people act on perceived horizontal inequality, and that elites seeking to 
manipulate and use such perceptions are likely to garner more support if their framing is 
close to the objective reality. This altogether lends support to Hypotheses 3. However, I 
would have expected the results for both objective and perceived economic inequality to 
be significant as well. My results for objective economic ethnic inequality contrast that 
of Fjelde and Østby (2014), who find high economic ethnic deprivation to increase 
communal conflict risk in 34 Sub-Saharan African countries. One reason for the 
diverging results may be the fact that they use asset ownership while I use a basic needs 
variable to proxy for objective ethnic economic inequality. A plausible reason for both 
these null results is the fact that I only look at the biggest ethnic group in each region 
and therefore omit the status and attitudes of other groups in the region. Unfortunately a 
more comprehensive test is not possible with the current data, and I will have to leave 
such a test for future studies based on more extensive surveys.  
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On the other hand, the overall results are broadly in line with existing empirical studies 
of civil war, which have found the effects of political horizontal inequalities to be 
consistently strong, while the effects of economic horizontal inequalities are more 
mixed, with results having been found to be both insignificant and significant (Østby 
2008b, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009).  
I therefore proceed to look at the effects of political ethnic inequalities. The results are 
given in Table 21. 
Model 4 strongly supports that the presence of objectively excluded ethnic groups 
increases the probability of conflict outbreak (Hypotheses 3). Using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg, and King 2003) to interpret the results, it is revealed that if one changes 
from not having to having politically excluded groups in the region, while holding all 
other variables at their means, the risk of communal conflict outbreak increases by 
116% - from 0.49% to 1.06%.  
Model 5 tests the effect of perceived political ethnic inequality on conflict outbreak 
(Hypotheses 4). Regions with a high level of respondents perceiving their ethnic group 
to be less influential have a strongly increased risk of conflict outbreak, giving robust 
support to Hypothesis 4. The results are also substantively strong. Changing the level of 
perceived political ethnic inequality from the 5
th
 to the 95
th
 percentile, while holding all 
other variables at their means, increases the risk of conflict outbreak by 200%. The 
significance level of the objective measure is reduced to 10% once perceptions are 
accounted for.  
For the political dimension I find no interaction effects of combined political exclusion 
and perceived lack of political influence (Model 6). Apart from this, the results for 
political ethnic inequality are as expected. In isolation, the presence of one or more 
politically excluded groups in a region seems to increase the risk of communal conflict. 
However, this effect is reduced once peoples’ judgements of their ethnic groups 
political influence is taken into account. This may still be an indication that objective 
political exclusion matter through perceived inequalities. 
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Table 21. The association between objective and perceived political economic inequality and 
communal conflict outbreak in subnational regions in Africa, 1999-2010 
 
 
The relatively stronger results for perceived political ethnic inequality resonates with 
my theoretical starting point – people act on perceptions, and these may diverge 
substantially from objective facts. The correlation between objective and perceived 
political ethnic inequality is only 0.175 – once more noting that the measures are not 
fully comparable. The results are also in line with the most recent literature on good 
governance and conflict. As Hegre and Nygård (2015) point out, representative 
institutions do not automatically translate into ‘good governance’. Non-elected or non-
representative governments may promote policies that benefit the whole population, and 
elected, representative governments may fail to implement their chosen policies if for 
instance the quality of the bureaucracy is poor. Hence, if institutions can prevent 
conflict through a grievance reducing mechanism, they should do so not only based on 
the formal rules guiding them, but on how well they function (Wig and Tollefsen 2016, 
31). My analysis supports such a conjecture. The fact that there is seemingly no conflict 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1128            1128            1128   
log-pseudolikelihood    -121.0952       -119.5336       -119.2336   
pseudoR-squared             0.299           0.308           0.310   
                                                                    
                          (4.385)         (5.063)         (5.547)   
Constant                  -19.259***      -22.254***      -21.399***
                          (0.492)         (0.488)         (0.484)   
electionyear               -0.210          -0.242          -0.254   
                          (0.496)         (0.447)         (0.398)   
natural resources          -2.720***       -2.753***       -2.801***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3               -0.001*         -0.001*         -0.001*  
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2                0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
reg_spline_1                0.000          -0.001           0.000   
                          (0.218)         (0.216)         (0.216)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.735***        0.603**         0.557*  
                          (0.278)         (0.303)         (0.322)   
population (logged)         1.031***        1.102***        1.068***
                          (0.169)         (0.187)         (0.212)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.140           0.210           0.238   
                          (0.222)         (0.229)         (0.245)   
peaceyears                  0.033           0.032           0.047   
                                                          (0.818)   
obj x perc pol HI                                           0.656   
                                          (0.227)         (0.357)   
perceived pol HI                            0.764***        0.493   
                          (0.285)         (0.364)         (2.047)   
objective pol HI            0.827**         0.654          -0.718   
onsetnonstate_p                                                     
                                                                    
                          Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
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inducing effect of combined ethnic exclusion and perceived lack of influence may be 
linked to this. Possibly, political entrepreneurs focus on quality of governance rather 
than objective exclusion when creating collective action frames. This is however pure 
speculation, as the data cannot provide information on this aspect.  
When comparing the results from the economic and political analyses, an important 
difference between the two should be underlined. The political dimension analysis takes 
into account all politically excluded groups in a region, and also accounts for the 
average perception of political ethnic inequality for the whole region, not only the 
largest ethnic group. Hence, a broader specter of group dynamics is captured, and this is 
likely to strengthen the results. On the other hand, the relative stronger results for 
political ethnic inequality resonates with Horowitz (1985) argument that political 
inequality should constitute a more potent source of motivation. 
While economic and political ethnic inequalities are distinct concepts, and ideally I 
should have kept the economic measures as controls in the political models, the high 
correlation between perceived economic and political inequality (o.6) introduces 
multicollinearity issues and prevents me from doing so. This issue also prevents an 
analysis of the combined (interaction effect) of perceived economic and political 
horizontal inequalities, which would also have been theoretically interesting. 
The control variables behave more or less as expected across all models, with high 
regional population as well as a neighboring communal conflict significantly and 
consistently increasing the risk of communal conflict. A high regional GDP per capita 
does however not decrease the risk of communal conflict as one would expect based on 
country level empirical analyses. This is however in line with the results of Fjelde and 
Østby (2014), and might be explained by subnational studies finding pockets of wealth 
to experience more violence than poorer areas (Buhaug et al. 2011). The presence of 
natural resources has a significant and negative effect on the risk of conflict in most 
models. This contradicts findings in most of the empirical work on resource rich 
countries and conflict (see e.g. Ross 2015). However, some studies do find a similar 
negative relationship, such as Murshed and Gates (2005). The peaceyears variable is 
also insignificant. It is possible that the variable for neighboring communal conflict 
takes most of the explanatory power from the peaceyears measure. Finally, the variable 
for elections is significant in all models apart from the perceived political ethnic 
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inequality models. It is likely and in line with the theoretical framework that the effect 
of elections is instead accounted for by the perception variable in these models. 
The analyses are robust to changes in specifications
48
. A first alternative specification 
splits the measures for ethnic economic inequalities in separate high (privileged) and 
low (deprived) measures
49
. This is to check whether some effects of privileged vs. 
deprived groups are masked by my continuous measures. However, the outcome is fully 
in line with the analysis above and the results remain insignificant.  Second, since some 
studies indicate that conflict is more likely to happen in transitional regimes, a control 
for regime type is included by using the POLITY2 dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). 
The results are largely unchanged, however with the interaction between objective and 
perceived economic inequality now significant at a 10% level with a p-value of 0.073. 
Third, since the salience of ethnicity as an identity marker varies between countries, the 
analyses are rerun on a subset where all countries in which 50% or more of the 
respondents state that their national identity is more important than their ethnic identity, 
are censored. According to Afrobarometer round 4, this applies to Madagascar, Malawi, 
South Africa and Tanzania. Without these countries, the objective economic ethnic 
inequality becomes weakly significant when controlling for perceptions. Excluding 
Lesotho, which has a very homogenous ethnic mix, leaves the results unchanged. Next, 
since one may argue that the most relevant basis for economic comparison is the rest of 
the region in which the ethnic group lives rather than the rest of the country, I run model 
1 to 3 using a measure that compares the largest group in a region to the rest of the 
region rather than the country average. For this specification, objective economic ethnic 
inequality becomes negative, and perceived positive, but both remain insignificant. I 
refrain from using this metric in the main analysis, since several regions have few 
respondents outside the largest ethnic group, and these regions are coded with a value of 
1 in the analysis. Also, the question on perceived inequality inherently includes a 
comparison to other groups in the country, and I wish to keep the objective and 
perceived metrics as comparable as possible. Then, since Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug (2013) find that the risk of conflict increases with the size of the politically 
excluded group, the analysis of political ethnic inequality is run with data only for the 
                                                 
48
 All robustness test results are reported in appendix 3.9.4. 
49
 These are the measures used by for instance Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). High (privilege) 
is set to g/G if g>G, 1 otherwise. Low (deprivation) is set to G/g if G>g, 1 otherwise. G is country, g is 
group. 
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largest ethnic group in each region. While the measure for perceived political ethnic 
inequality is strengthened, the objective measure turns out insignificant for this 
specification. Similarly, since the data allows for taking into account perceived 
economic inequality regardless of group size, this variable is tested, and the results are 
the same as for the biggest ethnic group variable. To account for country specific 
factors, all models are run with country fixed effects included. The results are largely 
unchanged, but the sample is reduced to cover only six countries (those in the dataset 
who experience conflict). The results are also largely unchanged when omitting regions 
with less than 40 respondents rather than 20, censoring the religious conflicts in Nigeria, 
limiting extrapolation of survey data to two years rather than four, clustering errors on 
region rather than country, and when using country peaceyears rather than regional 
peaceyears.  
Despite the robustness to changes in specifications, some important limitations in the 
analyses should be highlighted. Arguably, since my unit of analysis is regionyears and 
not ethnic groupyears, it is not possible to know whether my measures indeed capture 
the inequality of the group that is actually rebelling. This is particularly the case for the 
economic models where I only look at the biggest ethnic group in each region. For the 
37 subnational regions in the dataset that experience communal conflict, I’m able to 
firmly establish that the largest ethnic group is involved in the conflict in 60% of them 
(see appendix 3.9.2 for an overview). For the remaining regions it is either unclear or 
not so. Censoring all the conflicts not specifically linked to the largest ethnic groups and 
rerunning the economic models give results that are largely unchanged, but the 
significance level of the economic/perceived ethnic inequality interaction is reduced to 
10%. Better data on perception of inequality for all ethnic groups, as well as non-state 
conflict data with agency, is needed to more comprehensively model this.  
As always in this type of analyses, despite controlling for previous conflict, endogeneity 
is an issue. While case examples do support that the direction of causality goes from 
grievances to conflict, I cannot rule out that those grievances are a result of previous 
conflict. As more data becomes available, it might be possible to investigate this further 
with data intensive methods such as matching.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
In this study I find supportive evidence that objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities significantly and substantially increase the risk of communal conflict 
outbreak. This concurs with similar work on civil war and horizontal inequalities, and 
shows that preventing inequality and exclusion is important also to combat a type of 
conflict that is claiming far more lives than civil war in several Sub-Saharan African 
countries. I further find support that perceptions of ethnic inequality matter more than 
objective facts. This is fully in line with theories of conflict and mobilization, which 
claim that people mobilize based on perceived injustices rather than on potentially 
unknown objective statistical figures (Gurr 1970, Stewart 2010). By analysing 
perceived in addition to objective horizontal inequalities, I provide a more direct test – 
and support for – of the grievance mechanism. I furthermore show that perceived 
horizontal inequalities can capture effects beyond the reach of objective figures. The 
findings have important implications for development policy, and indicate a needed 
change in focus from only structural issues to a more broad understanding of how 
identities and rival claims are formed. 
First, the study finds that politically excluded ethnic groups are associated with an 
increased risk of communal conflict. This is in line with previous research on horizontal 
inequalities, but broadens the scope beyond civil war. The result is valid for both 
objective and perceived political inequality, with the latter having the strongest effect.  
Second, my analysis suggests that when objective and perceived economic ethnic 
inequality run in the same direction – that is, both objective and perceived economic 
deprivation is high – the communal conflict risk is also higher than in subnational 
regions where both are low or one of them is low.  
Particularly the result for perceived political ethnic inequality is robust across a range of 
alternative specifications. The more consistently robust results for the political 
dimension compared to the economic mirror conclusions from the horizontal inequality 
and civil war literature. Apart from methodological issues potentially affecting the 
economic results, the relatively more robust results for the political dimension might be 
explained by leaning on Horowitz (1985), who argue political inequality has the power 
to threaten a groups whole existence, paving way for a much stronger motivation to 
defend own interests. 
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Lack of data has been a major obstacle to large-N analyses of communal conflict and 
inequality, as well as for studies of perceived rather than objective inequality. Data 
imposes limitations to my study as well, such as no firm link between group and 
agency. The study is further limited to – to some extent – less conflict ridden countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, I believe my results constitute a first step towards 
establishing the importance of horizontal inequalities in causing other types of conflict 
than civil war, and in pinpointing how the reasons for conflict might evade us if we 
restrict our analyses to objective facts rather than how these facts are perceived. In 
general, more attention should be directed at subjective views on inequality between 
identity groups – what they are, how they are formed and how they affect the 
willingness to mobilize for conflict.  
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3.9 Appendices Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.9.1 
Table 22. Overview survey countries and years 
   
Country Round Survey year
Benin 3 2005
Benin 4 2008
Botswana 1 1999
Botswana 2 2003
Botswana 3 2005
Botswana 4 2008
Burkina Faso 4 2008
Cape Verde 2 2002
Cape Verde 3 2005
Cape Verde 4 2008
Ghana 1 1999
Ghana 2 2002
Ghana 3 2005
Ghana 4 2008
Kenya 2 2003
Kenya 3 2005
Kenya 4 2008
Lesotho 1 2000
Lesotho 2 2003
Lesotho 3 2005
Lesotho 4 2008
Liberia 4 2008
Madagaskar 3 2005
Madagaskar 4 2008
Malawi 1 1999
Malawi 2 2003
Malawi 3 2005
Malawi 4 2008
Mali 1 2001
Mali 2 2003
Mali 3 2005
Mali 4 2008
Mozambique 2 2002
Mozambique 3 2005
Mozambique 4 2008
Namibia 1 1999
Namibia 2 2003
Namibia 3 2006
Namibia 4 2008
Nigeria 1 1999
Nigeria 2 2003
Nigeria 3 2005
Nigeria 4 2008
Senegal 2 2002
Senegal 3 2005
Senegal 4 2008
South Africa 1 2000
South Africa 2 2002
South Africa 3 2006
South Africa 4 2008
Tanzania 1 2001
Tanzania 2 2003
Tanzania 3 2005
Tanzania 4 2008
Uganda 1 2000
Uganda 2 2002
Uganda 3 2005
Uganda 4 2008
Zambia 1 1999
Zambia 2 2003
Zambia 3 2005
Zambia 4 2009
Zimbabwe 1 1999
Zimbabwe 2 2004
Zimbabwe 3 2005
Zimbabwe 4 2009
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Appendix 3.9.2 
Table 23: Overview biggest ethnic group per region, conflict in region and biggest ethnic group 
involvement.  
 
Note: Only includes conflicts for which there is survey data available. 
Country Region 
Biggest ethnic 
group
Conflict in 
region
Biggest 
group 
involved in 
conflict Country Region Biggest ethnic group
Conflict in 
region
Biggest 
group 
involved 
in conflict
Benin Alibori Bariba Namibia Caprivi Subia
Benin Atacora Ditamari Namibia Erongo OShiwambo
Benin Atlantique Fon Namibia Hardap Afrikaaner
Benin Borgou Bariba Namibia Karas Nama
Benin Collines Yoruba Namibia kavango Kavango languages
Benin Couffo Adja Namibia Khomas Oshiwambo
Benin Donga Yoa Namibia Kunene Oshiwambo
Benin Littoral Fon Namibia Ohangwena Oshiwambo
Benin Mono Adja Namibia Omusati Oshiwambo
Benin Plateau Yoruba Namibia Oshana Oshiwambo
Benin Queme Fon Namibia Oshikoto Oshiwambo
Benin Zou Fon Namibia Otjozunddjupa Oshiwambo
Botswana Central Setswana Nigeria Abia Igbo yes yes
Botswana Francistown Setswana Nigeria Adamawa Hausa/Fulani yes yes
Botswana Gaborone Setswana Nigeria Akwa-Ibom Ibibio yes yes
Botswana Kgatleng Setswana Nigeria Anambra Igbo yes
Botswana Kweneng Setswana Nigeria Bauchi Hausa yes yes
Botswana Lobatse Setswana Nigeria Bayelsa Ijaw yes yes
Botswana Ngamiland Setswana Nigeria Benue Tiv
Botswana North East Sekalanga Nigeria Borno Kanuri yes
Botswana North West Setswana Nigeria Delta Irobo/Urhobo yes yes
Botswana Selibe Phikwe Setswana Nigeria Ebonyi Igbo 
Botswana South Setswana Nigeria Edo Edo yes
Botswana South East Setswana Nigeria Ekiti Yoruba yes
Botswana Southern Setswana Nigeria Enugu Igbo yes
Burkina Faso Boucle du Mouhoun Bobo Nigeria Gombe Fulani
Burkina Faso Centre Mossi Nigeria Imo Igbo 
Burkina Faso Centre-East Mossi Nigeria Jigawa Hausa
Burkina Faso East Gourmatche Nigeria Kaduna Hausa yes
Burkina Faso Hauts-Bassins Mossi Nigeria Kano Hausa yes
Burkina Faso North Mossi Nigeria Kebbi Hausa yes yes
Burkina Faso Plateau Central Mossi Nigeria Kogi Igala
Burkina Faso Sahel Peul Nigeria Kwara Yoruba yes
Burkina Faso South West Dagari Nigeria Lagos Yoruba yes yes
Ghana Ashanti Akan Nigeria Ogun Yoruba yes yes
Ghana Brong Ahafo Akan Nigeria Ondo Yoruba yes
Ghana Central Akan Nigeria Osun Yoruba
Ghana Eastern Akan Nigeria Oyo Yoruba yes yes
Ghana Greater Accra Akan Nigeria Plateau Hausa yes yes
Ghana Northern Dagaati Nigeria Rivers Ikwere yes
Ghana Upper West Dagaati Nigeria Sokoto Hausa yes yes
Ghana Volta Ewe Nigeria Zamfara Hausa yes yes
Ghana Western Akan Senegal Dakar Wolof
Kenya Central Kikuyu Senegal Diourbel Wolof
Kenya Coast MijiKenda yes Senegal Fatick Serer
Kenya Eastern Kamba yes Senegal Kaolack Wolof
Kenya Nairobi Kikuyu yes yes Senegal Kolda Pulaar
Kenya North Eastern Somali yes Senegal Louga Wolof
Kenya Nyanza Luo yes yes Senegal Matam Pular
Kenya Rift Valley Kalenjin yes yes Senegal Saint Louis Pulaar
Kenya Western Luhya yes Senegal Tambacounda Mandinka/Bambara
Lesotho Berea Sesotho Senegal Thies Serer
Lesotho Butha-Buthe Sesotho Senegal Ziguinchor Diola yes yes
Lesotho Leribe Sesotho South Africa Eastern Cape Xhosa
Lesotho Lesotho Sesotho South Africa Free State Sesotho/Sotho/South Sotho
Lesotho Mafeteng Sesotho South Africa Gauteng Zulu
Lesotho Maseru Sesotho South Africa KwaZulu-Natal Zulu yes yes
Lesotho Mohales's Hoek Sesotho South Africa Limpopo Pedi/Spedi/North Sotho
Lesotho Mokhotlong Sesotho South Africa Mpumalanga Swazi
Lesotho Qacha's Nek Sesotho South Africa North West Setswana
Lesotho Quithing Sesotho South Africa Western Cape Coloured
Lesotho Thaba-Tseka Sesotho Tanzania Dodoma Mgogo
Liberia Bong Kpelle Tanzania Kigoma Muha
Liberia Grand Bassa Bassa Tanzania Kilimanjaro Mchaga
Liberia Grand Gedeh Krahn Tanzania Mbeya Mnyakyusa
Liberia Lofa Lorma Tanzania Morogoro Mluguru
Liberia Margibi Kpelle Tanzania Mtwara Mmakonde
Liberia Maryland Grebo Tanzania Mwanza Msukuma
Liberia Montserrado Kpelle Tanzania Rukwa Mfipa
Liberia Nimba Mano Tanzania Shinyanga Msukuma
Liberia River Gee Grebo Tanzania Singida Mnyaturu
Liberia Rivercess Bassa Tanzania Tabora Mnyamwezi
Madagascar Antananarivo Merina yes yes Uganda Central Muganda
Madagascar Antsiranana Tsimihety Uganda East Musoga yes
Madagascar Fianarantsoa Betsileo Uganda Kampala Muganda
Madagascar Mahajanga Betsileo Uganda North Luo yes yes
Madagascar Toamasina Betsimisaraka yes yes Uganda West Munyankole
Madagascar Toliary Antandroy yes yes Zambia Central Bemba
Malawi Central Chewa Zambia Copper Belt Bemba
Malawi North Tumbuka Zambia Eastern Chewa
Malawi Northern Tumbuka Zambia Luapula Bemba
Malawi South Lomwe Zambia Lusaka Bemba
Malawi Southern Chewa Zambia Northern Bemba
Mali Bamako Bambara Zambia North-western Kaonde
Mali Gao Sonhrai Zambia Southern Tonga 
Mali Kayes Sonink Zambia Western Lozi
Mali Kidal Tamasheq Zimbabwe Bulawayo Ndebele
Mali Koulikoro Bambara Zimbabwe Harare Shona
Mali Mopti Dogon Zimbabwe Manicaland Shona
Mali Segou Bambara Zimbabwe Mashonaland Central Shona
Mali Sikasso Bambara Zimbabwe Mashonaland East Shona
Mali Tombouctou Sonhrai Zimbabwe Mashonaland West Shona
Mozambique Cabo Delgado Makua Zimbabwe Masvingo Shona
Mozambique Gaza Changana Zimbabwe matabeteland north Ndebele
Mozambique Inhambane Bitonga Zimbabwe matabeteland South Ndebele
Mozambique Manica Ndau Zimbabwe Midlands Shona
Mozambique Maputo City Changana
Mozambique Maputo province Changana
Mozambique Nampula Makua
Mozambique Niassa Makua
Mozambique Sofala Sena
Mozambique Tete Cinyungwe
Mozambique Zambezia Lomue
121 
 
Appendix 3.9.3 
Table 24. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 25. Full correlation matrix 
 
  
Varable Obs (N) Mean Std.dev Min Max
Communal conflict onset 1280 0.05 0.21 0 1
Objective economic ethnic inequality 1286 1.02 0.27 0.3 2.14
Perceived economic ethnic inequality 1286 2.11 0.43 0.89 3.52
Objective political ethnic inequality 1170 0.3 0.46 0 1
Perceived political ethnic inequality 1182 1.91 0.44 0.23 3.47
Peaceyears 1286 23.45 19.17 0 53
Regional GDP per capita, logged, t-1 1215 6.69 1.21 0.89 9.61
Regional population, logged, t-1 1245 14.12 1.32 9.3 16.18
Communal conflict 150 km, t-1 1245 0.14 0.35 0 1
Natural resources 1286 0.16 0.37 0 1
Elections 1286 0.22 0.41 0 1
Obj ec Perc ec Obj Pol Perc Pol Peaceyears Reg GDP Reg pop Com confl Nat res Elections
Objective economic ethnic inequality 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perceived economic ethnic inequality 0.33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Objective political ethnic inequality 0.02 0.18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perceived political ethnic inequality 0.17 0.61 0.18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peaceyears -0.01 0.05 -0.18 -0.07 1 0 0 0 0 0
Regional GDP per capita, logged, t-1 0.07 -0.1 0.06 -0.16 0 1 0 0 0 0
Regional population, logged, t-1 -0.04 0.12 0 0.01 -0.25 -0.21 1 0 0 0
Communal conflict 150 km, t-1 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.15 -0.27 -0.01 0.31 1 0 0
Natural resources 0 -0.02 0.22 -0.01 -0.1 0.41 -0.06 -0.08 1 0
Elections 0 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.1 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 1
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Appendix 3.9.4 – Robustness tests 
Table 26. High and Low measures for Objective Economic Ethnic Inequality and Communal 
Conflict Outbreak 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209   
log-pseudolikelihood    -173.7678       -172.7216       -173.7138   
pseudoR-squared             0.263           0.267           0.263   
                                                                    
                          (3.895)         (3.728)         (3.908)   
Constant                  -22.927***      -23.631***      -22.855***
                          (0.296)         (0.286)         (0.290)   
electionyear                0.588*          0.562*          0.590*  
                          (0.468)         (0.527)         (0.494)   
natural resources          -0.617          -0.617          -0.624   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.000           0.001   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.002   
                          (0.008)         (0.006)         (0.007)   
reg_spline_1                0.003           0.001           0.003   
                          (0.248)         (0.312)         (0.246)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.580*          0.473           0.584*  
                          (0.222)         (0.216)         (0.220)   
population (logged)         1.243***        1.252***        1.236***
                          (0.213)         (0.194)         (0.211)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.155           0.127           0.164   
                          (0.258)         (0.196)         (0.212)   
peaceyears                 -0.119          -0.170          -0.111   
                                                          (1.287)   
perceived ec dis                                            0.232   
                                          (1.789)                   
perceived ec priv                           1.353                   
                          (0.834)         (0.853)         (0.687)   
objective ec dis            1.053           1.083           1.014   
                          (0.515)         (0.884)         (0.753)   
objective ec priv          -0.289           0.268          -0.378   
onsetnonstate_p                                                     
                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3   
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Table 27. Controlling for regime type by using polity2 data 
 
Table 28. Excluding countries where more than 50% state that their national identity is more 
important than their ethnic identity (Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania) 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209            1128            1128            1128   
log-pseudolikelihood    -173.1178       -173.0813       -171.9887        -121.095       -119.5336       -119.2336   
pseudoR-squared             0.266           0.266           0.270           0.299           0.308           0.310   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.636)         (3.703)         (3.550)         (4.392)         (5.102)         (5.642)   
Constant                  -23.148***      -22.967***      -20.590***      -19.250***      -22.247***      -21.404***
                          (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.011)         (0.011)         (0.011)   
politysquared              -0.010          -0.010          -0.009          -0.000          -0.000           0.000   
                          (0.306)         (0.301)         (0.311)         (0.493)         (0.495)         (0.488)   
electionyear                0.587           0.585           0.569          -0.210          -0.242          -0.254   
                          (0.444)         (0.485)         (0.547)         (0.481)         (0.430)         (0.381)   
natural resources          -0.681          -0.677          -0.669          -2.721***       -2.753***       -2.801***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.000           0.000           0.000          -0.001*         -0.001*         -0.001*  
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.007)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.005)   
reg_spline_1                0.001           0.001           0.001           0.000          -0.001           0.000   
                          (0.253)         (0.277)         (0.248)         (0.194)         (0.180)         (0.180)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.441           0.435           0.421           0.734***        0.602***        0.558** 
                          (0.225)         (0.220)         (0.234)         (0.276)         (0.303)         (0.328)   
population (logged)         1.248***        1.251***        1.266***        1.030***        1.101***        1.068** 
                          (0.278)         (0.232)         (0.223)         (0.139)         (0.149)         (0.181)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.284           0.271           0.288           0.142           0.211           0.237   
                          (0.251)         (0.201)         (0.200)         (0.198)         (0.197)         (0.210)   
peaceyears                 -0.159          -0.166          -0.164           0.032           0.032           0.047   
                                                                                                          (0.809)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.656   
                                                                                          (0.227)         (0.350)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.764***        0.493   
                                                                          (0.292)         (0.376)         (2.041)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.826**         0.654          -0.718   
                                                          (0.674)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.209                                                   
                                          (0.645)         (0.339)                                                   
perceived ec HI                            -0.087          -1.365***                                                
                          (0.500)         (0.344)         (1.823)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.581           0.632          -2.004                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1033            1033            1033             903             903             903   
log-pseudolikelihood    -148.8009       -148.7812       -147.9293       -106.0216       -104.0569       -103.7744   
pseudoR-squared             0.307           0.307           0.311           0.314           0.326           0.328   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.691)         (4.353)         (3.778)         (4.727)         (5.966)         (6.190)   
Constant                  -30.983***      -31.295***      -29.488***      -20.757***      -24.876***      -24.386***
                          (0.225)         (0.213)         (0.221)         (0.528)         (0.532)         (0.531)   
electionyear                0.731**         0.734***        0.715**         0.039          -0.010          -0.010   
                          (0.449)         (0.439)         (0.496)         (0.462)         (0.411)         (0.355)   
natural resources          -0.490          -0.490          -0.502          -2.618***       -2.642***       -2.700***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001*          0.001*         -0.001*         -0.001**        -0.001*  
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.002           0.001   
                          (0.008)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
reg_spline_1               -0.000          -0.000          -0.001          -0.001          -0.002          -0.002   
                          (0.073)         (0.078)         (0.067)         (0.188)         (0.176)         (0.158)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.141           0.145           0.133*          0.609**         0.460**         0.402*  
                          (0.214)         (0.223)         (0.233)         (0.299)         (0.339)         (0.347)   
population (logged)         1.613***        1.620***        1.634***        1.065***        1.155***        1.131** 
                          (0.122)         (0.135)         (0.170)         (0.112)         (0.123)         (0.171)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.588***        0.600***        0.644***        0.310**         0.459***        0.527** 
                          (0.278)         (0.220)         (0.219)         (0.242)         (0.251)         (0.266)   
peaceyears                 -0.174          -0.168          -0.174           0.006          -0.010           0.008   
                                                                                                          (0.750)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.676   
                                                                                          (0.273)         (0.327)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.898**         0.616   
                                                                          (0.264)         (0.369)         (1.952)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.782**         0.626          -0.808   
                                                          (0.628)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.053                                                   
                                          (0.634)         (0.232)                                                   
perceived ec HI                             0.067          -1.043***                                                
                          (0.556)         (0.317)         (1.502)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.738           0.702*         -1.541                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
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Table 29. Objective economic HI compared to region rather than country 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209   
log-pseudolikelihood    -174.5092       -174.5077       -170.9622   
pseudoR-squared             0.260           0.260           0.275   
                                                                    
                          (3.856)         (4.207)         (3.680)   
Constant                  -22.279***      -22.335***      -17.014***
                          (0.294)         (0.280)         (0.276)   
electionyear                0.582*          0.583*          0.559*  
                          (0.515)         (0.541)         (0.619)   
natural resources          -0.675          -0.676          -0.775   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.002   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.008)   
reg_spline_1                0.002           0.002           0.004   
                          (0.238)         (0.239)         (0.199)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.571*          0.571*          0.493*  
                          (0.217)         (0.219)         (0.217)   
population (logged)         1.239***        1.240***        1.254***
                          (0.223)         (0.229)         (0.212)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.229           0.231           0.284   
                          (0.267)         (0.210)         (0.229)   
peaceyears                 -0.130          -0.129          -0.092   
                                                          (1.029)   
obj ec HI x perc e~I                                        2.215*  
                                          (0.721)         (0.734)   
perceived ec HI                             0.017          -2.328** 
                          (0.074)         (0.086)         (2.700)   
objective ec HI            -0.094          -0.096          -5.699*  
onsetnonstate_p                                                     
                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3   
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Table 30. Country fixed effects 
 
Table 31. Censoring groups with less than 40 respondents 
 
Note: As can be seen from this table, objective economic ethnic inequality is significantly increasing the 
risk of communal conflict for this specification with a cut off at 40 respondents. However, since this 
result is not robust to robustness checks, and the N is substantially reduced, I keep it as a robustness test 
rather than a base case.   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                             459             459             459             404             404             404   
log-pseudolikelihood    -138.7868       -138.7462       -138.5573       -98.51564       -96.27306       -96.08674   
pseudoR-squared             0.049           0.049           0.050           0.076           0.097           0.099   
                                                                                                                    
                          (0.360)         (0.360)         (0.361)         (0.493)         (0.495)         (0.496)   
electionyear                0.736*          0.734*          0.722*         -0.121          -0.161          -0.165   
                          (0.520)         (0.522)         (0.520)         (1.078)         (1.100)         (1.111)   
natural resources          -0.450          -0.459          -0.445          -2.607*         -2.768*         -2.811*  
                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
reg_spline_3               -0.000          -0.000          -0.000          -0.001          -0.001          -0.001   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)   
reg_spline_2                0.001           0.001           0.001           0.002           0.003           0.003   
                          (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.009)         (0.010)         (0.010)   
reg_spline_1               -0.003          -0.003          -0.003          -0.003          -0.008          -0.006   
                          (0.333)         (0.334)         (0.334)         (0.406)         (0.418)         (0.425)   
com. confl. 150 km         -0.059          -0.062          -0.062           0.286           0.167           0.130   
                          (0.401)         (0.408)         (0.416)         (0.419)         (0.463)         (0.465)   
population (logged)         0.737           0.714           0.766           0.556           0.873           0.893   
                          (0.349)         (0.348)         (0.355)         (0.397)         (0.411)         (0.446)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.505           0.505           0.543           0.138           0.322           0.418   
                          (0.181)         (0.181)         (0.182)         (0.219)         (0.218)         (0.225)   
peaceyears                 -0.120          -0.122          -0.120           0.050           0.004           0.034   
                                                                                                          (0.923)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.561   
                                                                                          (0.483)         (0.617)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            1.013*          0.782   
                                                                          (0.468)         (0.474)         (2.029)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.987*          0.963*         -0.238   
                                                          (0.771)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            0.477                                                   
                                          (0.370)         (0.891)                                                   
perceived ec HI                            -0.105          -0.606                                                   
                          (0.495)         (0.564)         (1.733)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.762           0.839          -0.175                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                             925             925             925             952             952             952   
log-pseudolikelihood    -118.9176       -118.8287       -117.4834       -94.42996       -93.32522       -93.02272   
pseudoR-squared             0.304           0.305           0.313           0.341           0.349           0.351   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.388)         (3.604)         (3.303)         (5.191)         (6.189)         (6.830)   
Constant                  -25.780***      -26.040***      -22.956***      -22.428***      -25.045***      -23.883***
                          (0.432)         (0.429)         (0.442)         (0.583)         (0.587)         (0.585)   
electionyear                0.408           0.408           0.367          -0.170          -0.232          -0.242   
                          (0.473)         (0.438)         (0.558)         (0.508)         (0.474)         (0.438)   
natural resources          -1.067*         -1.061*         -1.122*         -2.471***       -2.500***       -2.542***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.000           0.000           0.000          -0.001*         -0.001**        -0.001** 
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.000          -0.000          -0.000           0.002           0.002           0.002   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.007)   
reg_spline_1               -0.003          -0.002          -0.002          -0.002          -0.003          -0.002   
                          (0.357)         (0.353)         (0.344)         (0.245)         (0.269)         (0.290)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.908*          0.920**         0.855*          1.205***        1.069***        1.032***
                          (0.230)         (0.222)         (0.247)         (0.322)         (0.357)         (0.377)   
population (logged)         1.423***        1.412***        1.469***        1.191***        1.236***        1.189** 
                          (0.229)         (0.222)         (0.245)         (0.222)         (0.266)         (0.283)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.124           0.144           0.196           0.182           0.268           0.304   
                          (0.307)         (0.261)         (0.260)         (0.251)         (0.264)         (0.281)   
peaceyears                 -0.300          -0.281          -0.279           0.014           0.017           0.038   
                                                                                                          (0.773)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.753   
                                                                                          (0.276)         (0.494)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.745**         0.367   
                                                                          (0.386)         (0.457)         (2.009)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.904*          0.684          -0.838   
                                                          (0.645)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.823**                                                 
                                          (0.597)         (0.711)                                                   
perceived ec HI                             0.170          -1.756*                                                  
                          (0.499)         (0.308)         (1.763)                                                   
objective ec HI             1.133*          1.003**        -3.168                                                   
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                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
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Table 32. Maximum extrapolation of survey data two years 
 
Table 33. Objective and perceived political ethnic inequality only for biggest ethnic group in region 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1180            1180            1180            1124            1124            1124   
log-pseudolikelihood    -139.5479       -138.6472       -138.5851       -115.3065       -113.8032       -113.5911   
pseudoR-squared             0.315           0.320           0.320           0.306           0.315           0.316   
                                                                                                                    
                          (4.129)         (4.611)         (4.435)         (4.775)         (5.628)         (6.129)   
Constant                  -25.328***      -26.315***      -25.506***      -19.582***      -22.613***      -21.842***
                          (0.332)         (0.328)         (0.323)         (0.482)         (0.482)         (0.478)   
electionyear                0.020           0.024           0.016          -0.136          -0.175          -0.184   
                          (0.632)         (0.585)         (0.621)         (0.527)         (0.483)         (0.447)   
natural resources          -0.969          -0.991          -0.999          -2.652***       -2.677***       -2.716***
                          (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3               -0.000          -0.000          -0.000          -0.001**        -0.001**        -0.001** 
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2                0.001           0.001           0.001           0.002           0.002           0.002   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.005)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
reg_spline_1               -0.005          -0.004          -0.004          -0.002          -0.003          -0.002   
                          (0.343)         (0.373)         (0.397)         (0.267)         (0.280)         (0.283)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.767*          0.798*          0.789*          0.818**         0.685*          0.645*  
                          (0.264)         (0.289)         (0.295)         (0.309)         (0.338)         (0.356)   
population (logged)         1.486***        1.480***        1.482***        1.050***        1.123***        1.093** 
                          (0.166)         (0.182)         (0.198)         (0.169)         (0.186)         (0.205)   
gdp/capita (logged)        -0.029           0.007           0.018           0.128           0.197           0.222   
                          (0.265)         (0.228)         (0.227)         (0.217)         (0.225)         (0.240)   
peaceyears                 -0.246          -0.213          -0.212          -0.025          -0.024          -0.012   
                                                                                                          (0.815)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.562   
                                                                                          (0.249)         (0.420)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.771**         0.526   
                                                                          (0.258)         (0.342)         (1.999)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.903***        0.724*         -0.449   
                                                          (0.998)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            0.370                                                   
                                          (0.540)         (0.564)                                                   
perceived ec HI                             0.478           0.080                                                   
                          (0.453)         (0.417)         (2.546)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.810           0.515          -0.344                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                             772             772             772   
log-pseudolikelihood    -96.94705       -95.11525       -93.22956   
pseudoR-squared             0.305           0.318           0.331   
                                                                    
                          (4.501)         (5.997)         (6.768)   
Constant                  -21.904***      -25.792***      -26.609***
                          (0.428)         (0.426)         (0.421)   
electionyear               -0.160          -0.204          -0.276   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)   
natural resources           0.000           0.000           0.000   
                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
reg_spline_3               -0.001**        -0.002**        -0.001** 
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2                0.004*          0.004*          0.004*  
                          (0.005)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
reg_spline_1               -0.008          -0.010          -0.007   
                          (0.241)         (0.314)         (0.342)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.683**         0.559           0.607   
                          (0.309)         (0.397)         (0.430)   
population (logged)         1.280***        1.419***        1.475***
                          (0.217)         (0.233)         (0.278)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.039           0.078           0.146   
                          (0.189)         (0.211)         (0.234)   
peaceyears                 -0.211          -0.216          -0.137   
                                                          (0.802)   
obj x perc pol HI                                           2.249** 
                                          (0.216)         (0.331)   
perceived pol HI                            0.734***        0.439   
                          (0.770)         (0.696)         (2.042)   
objective pol HI            0.981           0.612          -5.780** 
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127 
 
Table 34. Perceived economic ethnic inequality in whole region rather than for ethnic group 
 
 
Table 35. Excluding religious conflicts in Nigeria 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1303            1303            1303   
log-pseudolikelihood    -180.7083       -180.6875       -180.3777   
pseudoR-squared             0.257           0.257           0.259   
                                                                    
                          (3.587)         (4.027)         (3.998)   
Constant                  -21.870***      -21.760***      -20.281***
                          (0.284)         (0.277)         (0.276)   
electionyear                0.663*          0.661*          0.648*  
                          (0.581)         (0.618)         (0.644)   
natural resources          -0.827          -0.824          -0.827   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.000           0.000           0.000   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.007)   
reg_spline_1                0.002           0.002           0.002   
                          (0.270)         (0.275)         (0.271)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.644*          0.638*          0.623*  
                          (0.212)         (0.198)         (0.201)   
population (logged)         1.226***        1.230***        1.237***
                          (0.200)         (0.196)         (0.204)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.079           0.073           0.079   
                          (0.252)         (0.190)         (0.191)   
peaceyears                 -0.108          -0.115          -0.119   
                                                          (0.320)   
obj ec X perc ec                                            0.747*  
                                          (0.764)         (0.789)   
perceived ec HI                            -0.070          -0.858   
                          (0.477)         (0.362)         (0.539)   
objective ec HI             0.574           0.601          -0.950   
onsetnonstate_p                                                     
                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3   
                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209            1128            1128            1128   
log-pseudolikelihood    -166.6943       -166.6066       -165.3613       -105.2937       -104.3108       -104.0359   
pseudoR-squared             0.255           0.255           0.261           0.310           0.316           0.318   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.651)         (4.128)         (3.778)         (4.019)         (4.244)         (5.088)   
Constant                  -22.379***      -22.120***      -19.590***      -17.336***      -19.753***      -18.819***
                          (0.310)         (0.304)         (0.313)         (0.582)         (0.570)         (0.565)   
electionyear                0.558           0.555           0.533          -0.195          -0.222          -0.237   
                          (0.489)         (0.505)         (0.572)         (0.612)         (0.582)         (0.546)   
natural resources          -0.492          -0.492          -0.483          -2.551***       -2.572***       -2.615***
                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.002**        -0.002**        -0.002** 
                          (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.002          -0.002          -0.002           0.002           0.002           0.002   
                          (0.012)         (0.010)         (0.009)         (0.008)         (0.008)         (0.009)   
reg_spline_1                0.006           0.005           0.006          -0.000          -0.001          -0.000   
                          (0.247)         (0.263)         (0.238)         (0.212)         (0.198)         (0.189)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.584*          0.568*          0.542*          0.630**         0.500*          0.452*  
                          (0.223)         (0.212)         (0.222)         (0.263)         (0.277)         (0.308)   
population (logged)         1.213***        1.217***        1.233***        0.911***        0.969***        0.935** 
                          (0.222)         (0.201)         (0.211)         (0.172)         (0.175)         (0.187)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.172           0.160           0.188           0.105           0.155           0.182   
                          (0.325)         (0.258)         (0.255)         (0.268)         (0.274)         (0.291)   
peaceyears                 -0.079          -0.092          -0.086           0.025           0.024           0.037   
                                                                                                          (0.947)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.662   
                                                                                          (0.206)         (0.423)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.640**         0.341   
                                                                          (0.301)         (0.365)         (2.300)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.944**         0.798*         -0.581   
                                                          (0.555)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.308*                                                  
                                          (0.757)         (0.470)                                                   
perceived ec HI                            -0.135          -1.528**                                                 
                          (0.501)         (0.366)         (1.630)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.608           0.688          -2.169                                                   
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Table 36. Clustering on region rather than country 
 
Table 37. Country peaceyears and splines 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209            1128            1128            1128   
log-pseudolikelihood    -174.0912       -173.9598       -172.7684       -121.0952       -119.5336       -119.2336   
pseudoR-squared             0.261           0.262           0.267           0.299           0.308           0.310   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.880)         (4.100)         (4.414)         (4.591)         (5.154)         (5.125)   
Constant                  -22.773***      -22.481***      -20.046***      -19.259***      -22.254***      -21.399***
                          (0.332)         (0.330)         (0.336)         (0.499)         (0.506)         (0.509)   
electionyear                0.584           0.581           0.562          -0.210          -0.242          -0.254   
                          (0.401)         (0.400)         (0.433)         (1.042)         (1.059)         (1.080)   
natural resources          -0.591          -0.591          -0.581          -2.720**        -2.753**        -2.801** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.001   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.008)         (0.008)         (0.008)   
reg_spline_1                0.002           0.002           0.002           0.000          -0.001           0.000   
                          (0.327)         (0.340)         (0.335)         (0.380)         (0.385)         (0.409)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.587           0.568           0.542           0.735           0.603           0.557   
                          (0.244)         (0.243)         (0.245)         (0.286)         (0.299)         (0.291)   
population (logged)         1.256***        1.262***        1.279***        1.031***        1.102***        1.068***
                          (0.189)         (0.180)         (0.188)         (0.198)         (0.221)         (0.239)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.158           0.143           0.166           0.140           0.210           0.238   
                          (0.199)         (0.190)         (0.191)         (0.208)         (0.210)         (0.212)   
peaceyears                 -0.137          -0.152          -0.149           0.033           0.032           0.047   
                                                                                                          (0.727)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.656   
                                                                                          (0.361)         (0.429)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.764*          0.493   
                                                                          (0.340)         (0.351)         (1.657)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.827*          0.654          -0.718   
                                                          (0.715)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.259                                                   
                                          (0.465)         (0.771)                                                   
perceived ec HI                            -0.162          -1.498                                                   
                          (0.547)         (0.540)         (1.854)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.559           0.657          -2.087                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1209            1209            1209            1128            1128            1128   
log-pseudolikelihood     -162.264       -159.5554       -158.7201       -114.9455       -112.9975       -112.6364   
pseudoR-squared             0.312           0.323           0.327           0.335           0.346           0.348   
                                                                                                                    
                          (5.403)         (5.845)         (5.240)         (3.342)         (4.021)         (4.126)   
Constant                  -27.638***      -30.109***      -28.930***      -19.834***      -23.795***      -23.656***
                          (0.413)         (0.383)         (0.402)         (0.498)         (0.501)         (0.488)   
electionyear                0.455           0.492           0.462          -0.207          -0.245          -0.270   
                          (0.527)         (0.423)         (0.457)         (0.462)         (0.390)         (0.365)   
natural resources          -0.709          -0.734          -0.707          -2.564***       -2.588***       -2.654***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)   
spline_3                    0.002***        0.003***        0.003***        0.003***        0.003***        0.003***
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.003)   
spline_2                   -0.006***       -0.008***       -0.008***       -0.010***       -0.010***       -0.011***
                          (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.008)   
spline_1                    0.011*          0.017***        0.017***        0.025***        0.027***        0.028***
                          (0.328)         (0.291)         (0.258)         (0.277)         (0.203)         (0.163)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.219           0.183           0.162           0.603*          0.438*          0.382*  
                          (0.340)         (0.313)         (0.339)         (0.187)         (0.234)         (0.247)   
population (logged)         1.492***        1.491***        1.536***        0.966***        1.070***        1.063***
                          (0.181)         (0.199)         (0.216)         (0.129)         (0.111)         (0.131)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.284           0.460*          0.493*          0.376**         0.482***        0.554***
                          (0.123)         (0.114)         (0.125)         (0.089)         (0.125)         (0.139)   
Peaceyears                 -0.186          -0.093          -0.082           0.110           0.167           0.191   
                                                                                                          (0.559)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.732   
                                                                                          (0.176)         (0.126)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.859***        0.590***
                                                                          (0.370)         (0.430)         (1.487)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.862*          0.657          -0.888   
                                                          (0.634)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            0.975                                                   
                                          (0.482)         (0.393)                                                   
perceived ec HI                             0.752          -0.264                                                   
                          (0.520)         (0.233)         (1.420)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.816           0.398          -1.650                                                   
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Table 38. Dropping Lesotho 
 
Table 39. Excluding conflicts in regions where it is unclear or established that the largest ethnic 
group is not involved in the conflict incident. 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                                    
N                            1131            1131            1131            1068            1068            1068   
log-pseudolikelihood    -173.9999       -173.8708       -172.6878       -121.0561       -119.4984       -119.1934   
pseudoR-squared             0.249           0.250           0.255           0.291           0.300           0.301   
                                                                                                                    
                          (3.828)         (4.179)         (3.895)         (4.422)         (5.101)         (5.608)   
Constant                  -22.527***      -22.242***      -19.837***      -19.146***      -22.147***      -21.272***
                          (0.296)         (0.293)         (0.302)         (0.492)         (0.489)         (0.484)   
electionyear                0.581*          0.578*          0.559          -0.209          -0.242          -0.254   
                          (0.440)         (0.462)         (0.526)         (0.497)         (0.448)         (0.399)   
natural resources          -0.595          -0.595          -0.584          -2.721***       -2.754***       -2.804***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.001*         -0.001*         -0.001*  
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.001          -0.001          -0.001           0.001           0.001           0.001   
                          (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)   
reg_spline_1                0.002           0.002           0.002           0.000          -0.001           0.000   
                          (0.258)         (0.275)         (0.250)         (0.218)         (0.216)         (0.216)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.587*          0.568*          0.542*          0.735***        0.603**         0.557** 
                          (0.223)         (0.211)         (0.223)         (0.281)         (0.306)         (0.327)   
population (logged)         1.239***        1.246***        1.263***        1.022***        1.094***        1.059** 
                          (0.218)         (0.204)         (0.217)         (0.170)         (0.188)         (0.213)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.161           0.146           0.169           0.143           0.212           0.241   
                          (0.263)         (0.205)         (0.201)         (0.222)         (0.229)         (0.246)   
peaceyears                 -0.137          -0.152          -0.148           0.033           0.032           0.046   
                                                                                                          (0.823)   
obj x perc pol HI                                                                                           0.661   
                                                                                          (0.227)         (0.359)   
perceived pol HI                                                                            0.763***        0.489   
                                                                          (0.285)         (0.364)         (2.059)   
objective pol HI                                                            0.826**         0.654          -0.729   
                                                          (0.592)                                                   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.253*                                                  
                                          (0.696)         (0.414)                                                   
perceived ec HI                            -0.160          -1.490***                                                
                          (0.495)         (0.344)         (1.642)                                                   
objective ec HI             0.555           0.651          -2.079                                                   
onsetnonstate_p                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3         Model 4         Model 5         Model 6   
                                                                                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                            1211            1211            1211   
log-pseudolikelihood    -122.1701       -121.6918       -120.8079   
pseudoR-squared             0.229           0.232           0.238   
                                                                    
                          (5.516)         (5.505)         (5.809)   
Constant                  -24.472***      -23.792***      -21.174***
                          (0.326)         (0.328)         (0.340)   
electionyear               -0.029          -0.023          -0.052   
                          (0.506)         (0.528)         (0.603)   
natural resources          -0.431          -0.447          -0.444   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
reg_spline_3                0.000           0.000           0.000   
                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)   
reg_spline_2               -0.000          -0.000          -0.000   
                          (0.009)         (0.008)         (0.008)   
reg_spline_1               -0.001          -0.002          -0.002   
                          (0.227)         (0.297)         (0.261)   
com. confl. 150 km          0.493*          0.445           0.423   
                          (0.315)         (0.315)         (0.337)   
population (logged)         1.290***        1.305***        1.319***
                          (0.283)         (0.272)         (0.307)   
gdp/capita (logged)         0.252           0.218           0.252   
                          (0.337)         (0.300)         (0.293)   
peaceyears                 -0.181          -0.216          -0.213   
                                                          (0.860)   
obj x perc ec HI                                            1.333   
                                          (0.768)         (0.386)   
perceived ec HI                            -0.387          -1.832***
                          (0.824)         (0.514)         (2.055)   
objective ec HI             0.625           0.844          -2.059   
nonstate_ex_larges~v                                                
                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3   
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Abstract 
When does inequality lead to conflict? Despite recent studies highlighting the effects of group 
exclusion, this question has not been fully answered. In this paper we argue that objective 
group inequality is not sufficient to fuel unrest. Structural inequalities need to be perceived as 
unfair, and become grievances, in order to become a resource for mobilization. While most 
conflict scholars recognize this on a theoretical level, statistical tests of the effect of inequality 
on conflict almost exclusively rely on objective data. We argue that this limits their ability to 
distinguish when inequality is politically relevant and when it is not. Southern Tanzania is a 
case in point. Despite decades of marginalization, the population remained peaceful until 
natural gas was discovered, and the government broke their promises of local development. 
Demonstrating that objective regional inequalities have remained relatively constant, while 
group grievances seems to have increased, we argue that direct measures of grievances are 
needed to pinpoint when inequality becomes politically salient. Using novel survey data, we 
find that people who think that the region is treated unfairly are more likely to support and 
participate in civil unrest than people who do not hold this opinion. While our data is cross 
sectional and limited to Southern Tanzania, our results have implications for conflict studies in 
general, highlighting the importance of gauging perceptions and judgements, and how these 
are formed.   
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4.1 Introduction 
The age-old debate about whether inequality leads to conflict has been brought a 
substantial step forward by recent research on group inequality. Spearheaded by Frances 
Stewart and her theory of Horizontal Inequalities (2002, 2008), the core argument in 
this work is that inequality becomes a mobilization resource when it overlaps with 
salient group identities. This theoretical development has given rise to several 
quantitative studies supporting that horizontal inequalities induce conflict (e.g. 
Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, 
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Østby 2008b). Similarly, there is an emerging 
consensus that the presence of oil and gas increases the risk of civil war (Koubi et al. 
2014, Ross 2015), and potentially particularly so in combination with horizontal 
inequalities (Asal et al. 2015). In this article we address two gaps in these literatures. 
First, while structural asymmetries and natural resources can drive political violence in 
general, empirical studies commonly test – and find – an effect on civil war occurrence. 
The effect on the risk of civil unrest, as well as individual motivation for collective 
action, is far less investigated. Second, and most importantly, while all current studies 
of horizontal inequality and conflict postulate that group grievances drive conflict 
behaviour, none of them measure or test these grievances directly.  
We argue that in order for horizontal inequalities to become a mobilization resource, 
people have to be aware of them, react to them with frustration and/or consider them 
unjust. In short, they have to be politically relevant. Such a line of argument concurs 
fully with the postulated causal pathways underpinning existing studies, which 
generally assume that horizontal inequalities lead to group grievances through group 
comparison and an evaluation of injustice (see e.g.Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 
2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). However, contrary to these same 
studies we do not assume that structural inequalities and group grievances overlap. 
Rather than being constant, grievances are changing over time (Wood 2003), making 
them a better measure of conflict risk than objective horizontal inequalities, which are 
remarkably ‘sticky’ (Tilly 1999). Similarly, the mere presence of natural resources does 
not automatically create grievances – whether they do is closely linked to the 
government’s policies and the response by local elites. Our approach thus differs from 
132 
 
existing studies in that we isolate and analyse direct measures of group grievances 
rather than mere objective structural data, which may or may not be politically relevant. 
While our methods are mainly quantitative, we also conducted 35 semi-structured 
interviews to qualitatively probe the validity of some of our claims. To analyze the link 
between group grievances and conflict we use novel data from an 800 respondent 
survey conducted in the Mtwara and Lindi regions in Southern Tanzania in June 2015. 
These regions have been economically, politically and socially marginalized compared 
to the rest of Tanzania at least since independence (see e.g. Seppälä and Koda 1998). 
Despite grave, long lasting, objective horizontal inequalities, the population remained 
peaceful until very recently. From 2010 onwards a range of huge natural gas discoveries 
outside the regions’ coastlines, as well as some smaller onshore developments, created 
hopes of change among the locals – further fuelled by ambitious politicians. ‘Mtwara 
will be the new Dubai’ President Kikwete declared when visiting this region as part of 
his 2010 electoral campaign. In 2012 and 2013 riots erupted amid claims of broken 
promises. The construction of a 532-kilometre pipeline bringing onshore natural gas 
from Mnazi Bay in the Mtwara region to Dar es Salaam infuriated the local population, 
who had expected the gas to be used for local industries.  
Clearly, the mere existence of objective horizontal inequalities was not enough to 
trigger conflict in the region. So what did? And how was this related to the natural 
resources? At the time of the riots, production had not started and the large revenue 
streams commonly linked to resource conflicts were absent. In short, the case offers a 
good opportunity to investigate how perceptions and judgements – rather than objective 
structural asymmetries – affect mobilization. 
We are interested in whether group grievances increase the risk of individual civil 
unrest behavior, taken to include participation in demonstrations or protest marches, 
and actual use or willingness to use force or violence for a political cause. However, 
since recent work demonstrate that attitudes towards the use of political violence – more 
precisely the acceptance of the use of physical violence – is positively linked to 
subsequent actual conflict events (Linke, Schutte, and Buhaug 2015), we also test 
whether group grievances affect support for civil unrest. By using individuals as the 
level of analysis, we are able to establish a direct link between personal motivation and 
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conflict behaviour and attitudes – again in contrast to existing studies, which generally 
analyse the link between structural background patterns and events. 
We develop our measures of group grievances by taking as point of departure several 
proposed grievance-inducing mechanisms in the literature. In line with Gurr’s relative 
deprivation theory (1970), we postulate that frustrated expectations are a driver of 
grievances; however, we connect this to the horizontal inequality literature by looking at 
frustrated expectations on behalf of the group, not the individual. Furthermore, since it 
is uncontroversial that people act on perceived, and not objective, inequality (see e.g. 
Gurr 1970, Stewart 2008), we use a measure capturing perceived horizontal inequality. 
Finally, people may be aware of horizontal inequalities without considering them unjust 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Almas et al. 2010). We therefore apply a 
measure of perceived unfair group treatment.  
We find that group grievances are indeed associated with participation in and support 
for civil unrest. People who think that their region is treated unfairly by the government 
are significantly more likely to both support and participate in civil unrest than people 
who do not hold this opinion. Frustrated collective expectations and perceived 
economic regional inequality are also significantly associated with support for civil 
unrest, but not with participation. Interestingly, a perception of individual inequality is 
insignificant in all models – suggesting that perceptions on behalf of the group are 
indeed essential in motivating for mobilization. 
While our data is limited to southern Tanzania, our argument has a broader scope. We 
highlight the importance of measuring the grievances that actually drive mobilization 
rather than structural background patterns. The fact that structural asymmetries and the 
perceptions and judgements of them do not overlap, and that this is not a country 
specific issue, makes our results relevant to studies of the relationship between 
horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict in general.  
4.2 Inequality, natural resources and conflict  
In this section, we consult the literature on inequality, natural resources and conflict, 
and first establish that while existing quantitative studies mainly analyze civil war, civil 
unrest is just as relevant to look at. We then argue that in order to truly capture the 
effect of grievances on conflict, we have to unpack the causal chain and develop 
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relevant variables that actually measure how people perceive and judge horizontal 
inequalities and the management of natural resources.  
4.2.1 Civil war vs civil unrest 
After decades of debate, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that 1) 
Horizontal inequalities – or inequality between salient identity groups – increase the 
risk of civil war (e.g. Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, Østby 2008b) 
and 2) The presence of oil and gas, particularly onshore, increases the risk of civil war 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009, Fearon and Laitin 2003, 
Koubi et al. 2014, Lujala 2010, Ross 2015).  
Furthermore, while most studies of natural resources has neglected grievances (Koubi et 
al. 2014), some recent papers argue that natural resource wealth rarely spreads evenly, 
and is likely to both exacerbate existing as well as create new horizontal inequalities. 
Correspondingly, they find a link between the combined presence of horizontal 
inequalities and natural resources, and civil war (Asal et al. 2015, Basedau and 
Pierskalla 2014, Wegenast and Basedau 2014). 
Common to all these quantitative studies is that they analyze the risk of civil war events. 
Hence, they do not take into account that inequalities and resources may lead to other 
types of conflict than civil war, and they also miss individual level motivations for 
supporting and participating in conflict. The only study we are aware of that look at the 
combination of horizontal inequalities, natural resources and political violence is Rustad 
(2016), who find that individual perceptions of ethnic horizontal inequalities increase 
support for violence in the Niger Delta. This study is however limited to attitudes and 
does not take into account participation. Furthermore, its measures of perceived 
horizontal inequalities are based on each individual’s perceptions of own situation, 
which are then aggregated to a (ethnic) group level. Finally, the study is conducted in 
regions where revenues from oil production have been flowing for decades. 
The overwhelming focus on civil war is surprising, given that groups that are 
dissatisfied with their access to power, resources or their security can pursue different 
strategies to improve their situation (Cunningham and Lemke 2011). In fact, while civil 
war events are declining in Africa, protests and riots have surged, from 339 separate 
events in 1997 to 5339 in 2014, according to the ACLED dataset (Raleigh et al. 2010). 
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It is indeed only the empirical studies that have neglected civil unrest. The underlying 
theories of conflict have a much broader scope in terms of the types of conflict they aim 
to explain. Gurr (1970) developed his relative deprivation theory to account for the 
outbreak of a broad array of political violence, and his focus in the original work was 
race riots in the US. Similarly, Stewart (2008) developed her horizontal inequalities 
theory to explain political violence. As for oil and gas, in a review article Koubi et al. 
(2014, 238) note that civil war ‘may not even be the predominant’ type of violence 
associated with natural resources, and call for a broadening of the empirical scope to 
include for example demonstrations and riots.  
If we look to the literature on riots, it generally highlights the importance of state 
response – riots are less likely where participants anticipate coercive or violent 
responses and more likely if not (Horowitz 2001, Wilkinson 2004, Wilkinson 2009). 
However, there are some examples of horizontal inequalities leading to mobilization, 
with evidence mostly from large-N studies of U.S race riots (e.g. Olzak 1994), but also 
more recently from interethnic violence in Britain (Dancygier 2010). The importance of 
state actions is also emphasized by the emerging research agenda on nonviolent 
uprisings. Analyzing when and where such uprisings are most likely to take place, 
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015, 21) find that while political opportunity structures have 
the strongest explanatory power, grievances are also relevant. 
Recognizing, and by no means disregarding, the importance of political opportunity 
structures, we nonetheless focus on ‘push’ or motivation factors in this paper. The riots 
in Mtwara were met with brutal force and human rights violations (Domasa 2013, 
Interviews 2014/2015), and a fear of similar reactions is regarded by the locals to be the 
main reason for no further riots after 2013. The first round of mobilization was 
presumably less affected by such fears, since, by most local accounts, the conduct by 
the police and the army was surprising in its brutality.  
In summary, while the underlying theories of conflict suggest that horizontal 
inequalities and natural resources may induce a range of different responses, the effect 
on civil unrest is largely neglected, and the focus of this paper. We define civil unrest as 
demonstrations, protests and the use of political violence. By studying actual 
participation in civil unrest, we are able to establish a direct link between individual 
motivation and collective behaviour. However, the risk of civil unrest is also likely to be 
136 
 
affected by the amount of local support for mobilization (Kalyvas 2006). In fact, in a 
recent paper Linke, Schutte and Buhaug (2015) demonstrate that positive attitudes 
towards the use of political violence is linked to subsequent actual conflict events. We 
therefore expand our scope to include support for civil unrest. While we analyze 
individual level motivation for collective action, we look at how individuals are 
motivated by the situation of his/her group, and not the personal situation. 
4.2.2 Unpacking the causal chain 
While all current studies of horizontal inequality and conflict postulate that group 
grievances drive conflict behaviour, none of them measure or test these grievances 
directly. They also vary to the degree that they theorize around the relationship between 
structural inequality and grievances. Drawing on the broad literature within social 
psychology on social and intergroup comparison (e.g. Abrams and Hogg 1988, Tajfel 
and Turner 1979), Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011, 481-482) construct a 
causal pathway where objective political and economic asymmetries are translated into 
grievances ‘through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions’. The 
‘perception of injustice’ generates grievances that in turn facilitate recruitment and 
mobilization. Developing this further, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013, 35-44) 
base their analyses on a theoretical framework where objective horizontal inequalities 
are transformed into grievances through 1) group identification, 2) group 
comparison, 3) evaluation of injustice, 4) framing and blaming – as portrayed in 
Figure 13 below taken from their study. All these steps will have to be in place for 
latent objective inequalities to develop into politically salient grievances. Implicit – not 
all horizontal inequalities lead to conflict (ibid). Still, as the graph also shows, their 
empirical link bypasses the intermediate steps in the causal chain altogether. This is the 
case for all empirical studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict. 
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Figure 13. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) theoretical framework 
 
Similarly, the studies of horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict generally 
assume that resource revenues spread unevenly and generate grievances. For these and 
other studies of natural resources and conflict, natural resources are commonly included 
in the empirical analyses with a dummy variable or a revenue proxy. Which natural 
conflict induced mechanisms that in fact drive mobilization, and whether these are 
grievance related, once more remains untested.  
In order to establish that it is indeed group grievances that fuel conflict, empirical 
analyses should test them directly. We will develop a rationale for why and how in the 
theoretical framework section. But first we will elaborate on the rationale for choosing 
Tanzania as a case, and use our qualitative material to establish that while objective 
horizontal inequalities have remained close to constant in the southern regions, group 
grievances increased following the government’s natural gas management. 
4.3 Southern Tanzania – a case in point  
Our rationale for choosing Tanzania as a case is twofold. First, it offers a clear example 
that objective structural inequalities are not enough to fuel conflict. Second, the protests 
and riots in Tanzania occurred before production of the natural gas had started, and 
hence the large revenue flows most often linked to conflict in natural resource rich areas 
were absent. In summary, the case offers a unique opportunity to study when and how 
horizontal inequalities and natural resources lead to conflict. 
Lasting objective horizontal inequalities, yet peaceful  
Group Identification 
Group Comparison 
Evaluation of Injustice 
Framing and Blaming 
Empirical 
Link 
Conflict 
Objective 
horizontal 
inequalities 
Grievances 
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Tanzania stands out as a remarkably politically stable country on a continent plagued by 
political violence. A strong national identity resulting from Nyerere’s extensive policies 
to fight tribalism and ethnic affiliation is a frequently mentioned reason for this. 
Concurringly, horizontal inequality scholars highlight Tanzania as a case example of 
how the absence of ethnic asymmetries fosters stability (Østby 2008b). However, the 
horizontal inequality literature also find that regional inequality is a strong driver of 
conflict – when compared across Africa actually a stronger driver than ethnic inequality 
(Østby 2008a). And when it comes to regional inequality, the southern regions of 
Mtwara and Lindi have been relatively deprived and marginalized compared to the rest 
of the country for decades (Seppälä and Koda 1998). Data on household electricity 
access (Figure 14) and asset ownership (Figure 15)
50
 from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys from 1991 to 2012 clearly demonstrates that Mtwara and Lindi have 
persistently lagged both Dar es Salaam and the general country average. The asset score 
actually shows a decrease in regional horizontal inequality in 2012.   
Figure 14. Percentage households with electricity Mtwara and Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and 
Tanzania total: 
 
  
                                                 
50
The asset scores are the share of respondents owning a radio, a television, a refrigerator, and for the 
newest surveys, a mobile and a telephone, in Mtwara and Lindi divided by the same share in Dar es 
Salaam/the whole of Tanzania. The lower the score, the larger the inequality. 
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Figure 15. Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total: 
 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, accessed at http://beta.statcompiler.com/ 
This combination of historic objective horizontal inequalities and a peaceful population 
triggered our interest, as it is a clear indication that structural inequalities in themselves 
are not enough to spark conflict.  
Natural gas discoveries – increased expectations 
In 2010, the first of a range of large natural gas discoveries were made offshore the 
coast of Mtwara and Lindi. Today, the recoverable resources amounts to at least 57 
trillion cubic feet, and the natural gas developments have the potential to fundamentally 
change the politics and the economy of the country (Ng'wanakilala 2016). IMF (2014) 
simulations assuming development of only half of these resources indicate annual 
revenues of US$6 billion. By comparison, total government revenues in 2011-2012 
were US$ 4.4 billion (TEITI 2014). Such prospects naturally create expectations of 
increased benefits, particularly among the population in the southern regions. Extensive 
political promises of local industries and development fuelled expectations further: 
‘[T]he leaders themselves promised that Mtwara will change, Mtwara will be like 
Europe’51. 
The pipeline: dashed expectations 
While the large offshore fields remain in the planning phase, a smaller onshore gas field 
in Mnazi Bay, Mtwara, has now started production. After first debating using this gas to 
                                                 
51
 Interview 2015, male 20. 
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fuel a 300 megawatt power plant with the potential of truly boosting local economic 
development, and then a fertilizer plant, with little pre-warning the government decided 
to pipe the gas to Dar es Salaam (Africa Confidential 2013). The pipeline project was 
commissioned in November 2012. To the people of Mtwara, this policy decision was a 
clear sign of broken promises and no local development – as reflected in the quote 
below: 
‘[T]he president promised, he spoke here on Mashujaa Day in Mtwara that there has 
been discovered gas in plenty and I promise that I will build industries in Mtwara. Later 
he changed what he said that the gas will now be transported to Dar es Salaam.’ (..) ‘If 
the president wants it what will we get? He will get everything. He and his region will 
be the only ones benefiting’52. 
Mobilization 
In a region never previously marked by any kind of political uprisings, on 27 December 
2012 up to 4000 people attended a protest march in Mtwara Town (Africa Confidential 
2013). The protest followed a large public meeting orchestrated by opposition party, 
Christian and Muslim leaders with one unified message – the gas should not leave 
Mtwara. Further public meetings increased tensions before two days of riots on 26 and 
27 January. Several government offices and houses were torched, and nine civilians 
were allegedly shot by the police. In May 2013, after the Energy and Mineral Budget 
Announcement, a general strike to protest what was described as ‘unfair distribution of 
gas revenues’ was followed by yet another two days of riots, more loss of civilian lives 
and property violations (Mgamba 2013)
53. The police and army’s brutal force and 
severe human rights violations in the end put a stop to the uprisings, although 
sentiments remain unchanged (Domasa 2013, Interviews 2014/15).  
In summary, we see that while objective regional inequalities have been large and 
stable, and actually decreased following the natural gas discoveries, the government’s 
mismanagement of these new resources increased regional group grievances. We base 
this claim on individual testimonies which were quite remarkably repeated by all of our 
35 informants: the combination of years of neglect, newly raised hopes followed by 
                                                 
52
 Interview 2015, male 58. 
53
 The total number of fatalities is disputed – most locals claim that government figure is far too low. 
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broken promises, motivated and infuriated people and this led to the riots in 2012 and 
2013.  
4.4 Theoretical framework and testable hypotheses  
Our overall hypothesis is that group grievances are associated with civil unrest. In this 
section we develop three theoretically informed variables that we consider overlapping, 
although different, measures of these group grievances, and corresponding hypotheses. 
4.4.1 Perceived rather than objective horizontal inequality 
The notion that people act on perceived rather than objective inequality is 
uncontroversial. Gurr (1970) explicitly emphasizes that it is the perception of 
deprivation that matters, not the judgement of an objective observer. As we have 
already discussed, quantitative studies of horizontal inequalities and conflict generally 
assume that grievances arise when group members compare their situation to that of 
other groups and perceive their own position to be inferior. However, most likely due to 
lack of data, extant studies rely on objective figures and an assumption that objective 
and perceived horizontal inequalities more or less overlap (see e.g. Stewart 2008). Yet, 
if we turn to empirical evidence, it soon becomes evident that this is not the case. After 
conducting perception surveys in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 
Langer and Mikami (2013) conclude that there are large discrepancies between 
objective and subjective horizontal inequalities in all case countries. Analyzing 19 
countries covered by the Afrobarometer Surveys Round 4, Langer and Smedts (2013) in 
fact find evidence of a negative association between objective and perceived economic 
inequality between ethnic groups. Similarly, Rustad (2016) find large discrepancies 
between objective and perceived ethnic inequality in the Niger Data, and Miodownik 
and Nir (2015) analyse 13 countries based on Afrobarometer Surveys round 3 and 
conclude that fully 48.3% of the respondents misperceive their ethnic groups’ economic 
situation. As we will show in the result section, our own survey data provide further 
evidence that perceptions do not fully reflect the objective reality.  
This discrepancy between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities underscores 
the importance of using a measure that takes into account people’s subjective views 
when analyzing the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict. We know 
from the interviews that the regional identity is salient in southern Tanzania. People 
142 
 
mostly identify themselves as ‘Wakusini’ (southerners) or people from Mtwara/Lindi – 
likely a result of the decades of marginalization and relative isolation. Our informants 
also make frequent comparisons of the relative disadvantaged socioeconomic position 
of their region compared to other regions in the country. We thus propose a first set of 
hypotheses:  
H1a: The higher the perception of regional economic inequality, the higher the support 
for civil unrest 
H1b: The higher the perception of regional economic inequality, the higher the 
participation in civil unrest 
4.4.2 Judging Inequalities as Unfair and directing the blame 
While measuring perceptions helps us distinguish the cases where people are actually 
aware of horizontal inequalities from those where they are not, this awareness in itself 
does not necessarily generate grievances. For frustrations to arise, people will have to 
evaluate the inequalities and consider them unfair. This is not an automatic process. Tay 
(2013), for instance, finds substantial variation in inequality tolerance in 87 developed 
and developing countries. She furthermore finds no systematic relationship between 
objective inequality and inequality acceptance within countries. In general, a large body 
of work document how judgements of what constitutes a fair income distribution vary 
greatly among both individuals and groups, and depends, among other things, on 
existing norms and ideologies (see e.g. Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Alesina and 
Giuliano 2009, Almas et al. 2010, Williams 2003).  
Even more importantly, the process of determining what is unfair is often driven by 
political entrepreneurs (Wilkinson 2004). Within the social movements literature, such 
‘framing processes’ are regarded as instrumental in driving mobilization (see e.g. 
Benford and Snow 2000, Gamson 1992). These processes create collective action 
frames, which constitute a shared understanding of a problem, who’s to blame for it, 
and a call for collective action to rectify it (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). In addition to 
portraying the status quo as unfair, targeting the blame on a specific actor that it is 
possible to confront, constitutes an essential part of the mobilization process. 
Natural resources may provide a particularly useful tool for political entrepreneurs and 
thus become instrumental in framing processes. Their inherent local nature makes it 
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plausible for leaders to forward claims that the resources belong to the group living in 
the area where they are found, and not, for instance to the central government. In an 
influential study of the separatist conflict in Aceh, Aspinall (2007) demonstrates how 
natural resources are used by elites to create grievances and become a mobilization tool. 
However, he emphasizes the need for a pre-existing collective identity for such a 
framing strategy to work: ‘resource extraction will trigger conflict only if an appropriate 
collective action frame exists in the cultural toolkit of the group in question’ (Aspinall 
2007, 951). His argument resonates with findings in empirical studies of realistic group 
conflict theory. The original version of this theory posits that conflict between groups 
arise when there is intergroup competition over resources (Campbell 1965). However, 
empirical studies testing this relationship indicate that an emerging threat from 
competition over resources only generates in-group solidarity when this in-group 
solidarity is above a certain threshold before the threat arises, when the threat is 
affecting the whole group and when leaders seeks to mobilize solidarity (Brewer and 
Campbell 1976, Sherif et al. 1961).    
Such an explanation for natural resource driven conflict resonates with the situation in 
Mtwara before the riots in 2012 and 2013. First, as noted earlier, the historic 
marginalization and isolation from the rest of Tanzania have resulted in people 
developing a distinct regional identity. Second, the hopes created by the natural gas 
discoveries, and the following disappointment once it was decided to pipe the onshore 
gas to Dar es Salaam, were used deliberately by political entrepreneurs. Opposition 
party leaders from several different parties, and Christian and Muslim leaders, 
orchestrated large community meetings with a clear message: the gas should not leave 
Mtwara. People were encouraged to take to the streets and protest – and did – very 
much to the surprise of media observes highlighting the peaceful conduct characterizing 
the region for such a long time (Mgamba 2013).  
To summarize, framing and leadership intervention seem to be instrumental in creating 
a common perception of unfair inequality among group members, and consequently in 
turning horizontal inequalities into a mobilization resource. It is also evident that 
objective statistical figures on horizontal inequality will not capture the effect of such 
framing processes. Hence, we suggest a second set of hypotheses: 
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H2a: The higher the perception of unfair treatment of the region by the government, the 
higher the support for civil unrest  
H2b: The higher the perception of unfair treatment of the region by the government, the 
higher the participation in civil unrest  
4.4.3 Grievances arising from Frustrated Expectations 
Gurr’s (1970) classic work on relative deprivation is one of the main building blocks for 
Stewart’s horizontal inequality theory. Central in Gurr’s argument is the notion that 
people will get frustrated – and grievances will develop – when people get less than 
they originally expected. Thus, he follows in the footsteps of Davies (1962), who’s J-
Curve theory predicted that that revolutions will occur when a period of good times – 
and rising expectations of wealth – is followed by recession. Disappointment thus 
stands out as a key grievance inducing mechanism in the classic works that horizontal 
inequality theory are partly founded on. Even so, none of the empirical studies we are 
aware of theorize nor measure frustrated expectations. Frustrated expectations are also 
absent in Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug’s (2013) framework. 
Frustrated expectations might be particularly relevant for resource rich regions. Oil and 
gas discoveries are notorious in creating inflated expectations, which might turn into 
disappointment if and when they are not fulfilled (Ross, Lujala, and Rustad 2012).  
The powerful effect of frustrated expectations is illustrated by our case Tanzania. The 
large natural gas discoveries and the political promises of benefits created enormous 
expectations of local development. All our informants highlight that the government 
broke their promises of local development when deciding to pipe the gas to Dar es 
Salaam, and that this, on top of the years of neglect and underdevelopment, was what 
infuriated people. 
In summary, both the underlying theories of grievances and conflict as well as the 
potential prominence of frustrated expectations in natural resource rich areas call for a 
direct test of this mechanism. We hence propose a third set of hypotheses: 
H3a: The higher the collective frustrated expectations linked to the natural gas 
developments, the higher the support for civil unrest 
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H3b: The higher the collective frustrated expectations linked to the natural gas 
developments, the higher the participation in civil unrest 
We specifically test the effect of frustrated expectations on behalf of the people in the 
region rather than on behalf of the respondent as an individual – in line with horizontal 
inequality theory, and in line with Gurr’s (1970/2011) own criticism of his original 
work.  
4.4.4 Summary  
In this section, we have developed hypotheses to specifically test the association 
between group grievances and mobilization based on three different measures – as 
demonstrated in Figure 16 below.  While we expect all of them to capture some effects 
of group grievances, we also expect ‘unfair treatment by the government’ to be the most 
comprehensive measure since – as opposed to the perceived horizontal inequality 
measure – it also captures judgements and who is to blame. This also to some extent 
applies to the expectations measure, which captures frustrations, but not a targeting of 
the blame. 
With these three measures it also follows that we do not test all the relationships in 
Figure 16 in our quantitative analysis. However, we assume that natural resource 
mismanagement comes in as an intervening variable and foments grievances through 
increased perceived regional inequalities, evaluation of injustice, framing and blaming 
as well as frustrated expectations. Natural resource mismanagement – and not the mere 
presence of natural resources – thus acts as an important catalyst for group grievances54. 
We furthermore rely on our qualitative data to claim that objective horizontal 
inequalities in themselves did not cause conflict – as elaborated in the Tanzania section.  
We will have to leave for future studies to look more specifically at the link between 
objective asymmetries and group grievances. 
  
                                                 
54
 This is obviously not the only way this process could be triggered, but we leave for other studies to 
investigate other intervening events. 
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Figure 16. Framework for testing group grievances and conflict 
4.5 Research Design 
4.5.1 The survey 
To gather data to test our hypotheses we conducted an 804 respondent survey in Mtwara 
and Lindi covering 6 of the 13 districts in the regions. While Mtwara has been the hub 
for the offshore exploration activity as well as the site for the onshore gas development 
in Mnazi Bay, the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant to process the gas from the 
offshore fields is planned to be constructed in Lindi. Mtwara Municipality, Mtwara 
Rural, Lindi Rural and Lindi Municipality are thus the districts most affected by the 
current and planned gas developments, and were chosen due to this. Tandahimba and 
Newala are the main cashew nut producing districts. At the time of the riots, several 
people from these districts were allegedly bussed to Mtwara to take part in the protests. 
In order to cover these groups as well the two districts are included. The exclusion of 
the remaining seven districts is due both to their limited relevance and financial 
constraints. Importantly, the survey covered areas far enough from the gas discoveries 
to capture the sentiments of people totally unaffected by the new resources. The 
infrastructure in the area is very poor, and people outside the biggest towns in 
Tandahimba and Newala, and in some parts of Mtwara and Lindi Rural, live very 
isolated. In fact, 9% of the respondents had not heard about the gas discoveries at all. In 
the remaining sample with only people who had heard of the gas, 13% had not heard of 
the pipeline.  
147 
 
The survey was stratified according to district, urban, rural and mixed areas, and gender 
– but further to that the selection of wards, villages, and respondents was fully 
randomized. 67 wards were drawn, and subsequently two villages within each ward. We 
conducted six interviews in each village, selected households using random walking 
patterns and drew respondents within each household. The enumerators recorded the 
GPS location of each interview.  Figure 17 shows the selected districts and sampled 
villages (see appendix 4.8.2, as well as Supplementary Appendices, for more 
information on the survey). In addition to the survey data we draw on information from 
35 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015 (see Chapter 5 and 
Supplementary Appendices for more information).  
Figure 18 shows the gas blocks and the pipeline to Dar es Salaam. The offshore gas will 
be processed onshore in Lindi.  
Figure 17: Survey points and selected districts in Mtwara and Lindi.  
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Figure 18: Gas operations and pipeline in southern Tanzania 
4.5.2 Dependent variables 
We use the survey data to test hypotheses H1-H3. We define civil unrest as protests, 
demonstrations and the use of political violence. As noted earlier, attitudes towards the 
use of political violence are positively linked to conflict events (Linke, Schutte, and 
Buhaug 2015), and high levels of perceived horizontal inequalities increase the 
likelihood of supporting violence (Rustad 2016). Therefore, we also test whether group 
grievances affect attitudes towards civil unrest in addition to actual participation. We 
use four different dependent variables as measures of civil unrest
55
. Our first dependent 
variable – support for protest, is based on a question on whether the government’s 
natural resource management is a reason to protest. The respondent was given the 
alternative to agree with two different statements, and then asked to state how strongly 
he/she agreed with the statement: 
Statement 1: Taking to the streets to protest against the government’s management of 
the natural gas resources is not acceptable. 
Statement 2:  Sometimes, it might be necessary to take to the streets to protest against 
the government’s management of the natural gas resources. 
All those supporting statement 2, i.e. supporting protest, are coded 1 (43%), all those 
supporting statement 1 are coded 0 (41%), the rest are coded missing. 
                                                 
55
 See appendix 4.8.1 for descriptive statistics. 
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Our second dependent variable – support for violence - is based on a similar question 
replicated from Afrobarometer Surveys round 5. Once more those agreeing with 
statement 2 are coded 1 (40%) and those agreeing with statement 1 coded 0 (48%): 
Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in Tanzanian politics today. 
Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a 
just cause. 
The distribution of the support for protest and violence variables is fairly similar, 
however the correlation between the two is only 0.365. 
Our third and fourth dependent variables – participation in protest and demonstrations, 
and actual/willingness to use political violence – are based on the question:  
I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like 
you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you 
might do it or would never under any circumstances do it 
E. Participated in a demonstration or protest march (1 have done, 2 might do, 3 would 
never do) 
F. Used force or violence for a political cause (1 have done, 2 might do, 3 would never 
do) 
The variables are coded into two dummy variables: participated in protest and might or 
have used violence. For the variable participated in protest all those who answered have 
done are coded 1 (47 respondents) and those who answered might do or would never are 
coded 0. Only 6 respondents reply that they have participated in violence, impeding a 
proper test of participation in violence. However, rather than skipping this variable 
altogether, we include those who say they might use violence as well (in total 56 
respondents), emphasizing that this is a different test than for the protest variable. 
4.5.3 Independent variables  
To test our three sets of hypotheses we use three different independent variables. To test 
H1 – The higher the perception of regional economic inequality, the higher the support 
for (H1a)/ participation in (H1b) civil unrest, our independent variable is ‘perceived 
regional economic inequality’, based on the question: 
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Think about the condition of people living in this region. Are their economic conditions 
worse, same as or better than for those living in other regions in this country? (much 
worse is coded 5 and much better is coded 1). 
To test H2: The higher the perception of unfair treatment by the government of the 
region, the higher the support for (H2a)/participation in (H2b) civil unrest, the 
independent variable is ‘region treated unfairly’, based on the question:  
How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the government 
(Never is coded 1 and Always is coded 4). 
Figure 19 portrays the average for the treated unfairly variable (H2) for the 6 covered 
districts, as well as actual participation in protests. As expected, Mtwara Municipality, 
home to the riots, has the highest number of respondents perceiving their region to be 
treated unfairly, followed by Mtwara Rural (home to the onshore developments). The 
share of respondents having participated in protests is mostly higher where perception 
of unfairness is also high.  
Figure 19: Mean valures for variables ‘region treated unfairly’ and ‘participation in protest’, by 
District 
  
Protest/Riot events 2012 and 2013 
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Finally, for H3: The higher the collective frustrated expectations linked to the natural 
gas developments, the higher the support for (H3a)/participation in (H3b) civil unrest, 
we use the variable ‘frustrated regional expectations’ which measures how satisfied 
people are with the development of the living conditions for the people in their region 
compared to the expectations they had before they had heard of the pipeline
56
: 
How satisfied are you with the development in the living conditions for the people in 
your region – compared to what you expected? (very dissatisfied is coded 5 and very 
satisfied is coded 1). More than 60% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied and less than 
10% satisfied or very satisfied. 
4.5.4 Controls 
To control for other factors identified by the literature to affect conflict behaviour, we 
include variables for age, gender (man coded 1), and education. We also add a variable 
measuring how often the respondent has ‘gone without food’, as a poverty indicator. 
Furthermore, since the previous rounds of riots were all in Mtwara and not in Lindi, we 
add a dummy variable capturing whether the respondent lives in Mtwara or not. We also 
include a dummy for whether the respondent lives in a rural area or not. We add two 
variables measuring the respondent’s perception. One measures the respondent’s 
perception of one’s own economic situation compared to other Tanzanians, as this is 
likely to influence the respondent’s perception of his/her region’s situation (1= very 
satisfied and 5=very unsatisfied). Second, we ask whether the respondent feels unsafe 
when walking in the neighborhood (0=never and 4=always). The descriptive statistics 
for all the variables are given in appendix 4.8.1.  
4.6 Results 
Since a difference between objective and perceived horizontal inequality is such a 
central part of our argument, we start this result section by looking at some descriptive 
statistics. We have already noted that it is the regional identity that is most salient in 
Mtwara and Lindi, with people identifying themselves largely as ‘Southerners’. We also 
demonstrated in the Tanzania section that objective regional inequality – both compared 
                                                 
56
 The respondents were first asked when they heard of the pipeline, and then on their expectations to 
improved living conditions before and after they had heard of the pipeline, before they were asked to 
assess their satisfaction with the development so far. Only those that had heard of the pipeline got these 
questions, hence the number of respondents is 634, not 804. 
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to Dar es Salaam and the rest of Tanzania – has been high for decades. All the 
respondents in the survey belong to the same regional group, and are by definition 
equally objectively deprived. Still, the perceptions of regional deprivation vary to a 
great extent in the sample. 53% of the respondents think their region is worse or much 
worse off than other regions in the country, 19% think their economic situation is the 
same, and 14% think it is better or much better. The rest of the respondents replied that 
they do not know. Once more we see that the objective situation and the perceptions of 
it do not overlap. On the other hand, 42% hold that the region is never treated unfairly, 
while 43% hold that this happens sometimes, often or always.   
We then move on to test our three sets of hypotheses. All our dependent variables are 
coded so that the highest value indicates high level of frustrated expectations, 
perception of inequality, or unfairness. Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, 
we use logit regressions. 
 In Table 40 we test H1a and H1b. The coefficient for perceived economic horizontal 
inequality is significant in models 1 and 2 testing support for civil unrest, giving some 
support to hypothesis 1a. Models 3 and 4 test whether perceived economic horizontal 
inequalities affect the likelihood of participation in civil unrest. The variable is not 
significant in either of the models.  
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Table 40: Logistic regression perceived economic horizontal inequality on support and 
participation in civil unrest 
 
In Table 41 we test H2a and H2b. We see that the treated unfairly variable is significant 
and positive in all four models. This suggests that the perception of being treated 
unfairly is highly correlated with both support of civil unrest (models 5 and 6), 
participation in protests and demonstrations (model 7), and willingness to use/actual use 
of violence for a just cause (model 8).  
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Table 41: Logistic regression unfair treatment on support and participation in civil unrest 
 
In Table 42 we test H3a and H3b, that frustrated expectations will lead to increased 
support and participation in civil unrest.  The model testing support for protest, (Model 
9), is positive and significant, suggesting that the more frustrated someone is with the 
development for the people in their region, the more likely they are to support the use of 
protest. We do not see the same for support of violence, hence H3a is partly supported. 
For participation on civil unrest, we do not get any significant results. H3b is not 
supported. 
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Table 42: Logistic regression frustrated expectations on support and participation in civil unrest
57
 
 
 
Figure 20 indicates the likelihood of supporting protest against the government’s natural 
resource management for each value of the independent variables, based on Model 1 
(Perceived economic regional inequality), 5 (Region treated unfairly) and 9 (Frustrated 
expectations). All other variables are set at their means. The highest likelihood of 
supporting civil unrest - 77% - is among those who score highest on the Region treated 
unfairly variable. The likelihood is increasing with more than 30 percentage points from 
someone answering never to someone answering always.
58
 The frustrated expectation 
variable has the highest overall increase going from 29% for those who answered ‘very 
satisfied’ to 66% for those who answered ‘very dissatisfied’. Perceived economic HI 
has a similar trend, but the slope is less steep. 
  
 
                                                 
57
 The ‘frustrated expectations’ question was only asked to the subset of respondents who had already 
heard of the pipeline. The number of observations is therefore much lower. 
58
 Note that Region treated unfairly only had 4 answer categories, while the other two have 5.  
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Figure 20: Substantive effects of ‘perceived economic horizontal inequality’, ‘region treated 
unfairly’ and ‘frustrated expectations’ on support for protest (models 1, 5 and 9) 
 
 
Figure 21 shows the substantive effects for ‘region treated unfairly’ on participation in 
civil unrest, as this is the only one of the dependent variables that significantly affect 
this independent variable (models 7 and 8). The figure indicates that the likelihood of 
participating in protest is approximately the same as for expressing willingness and 
using violence. For both variables, the risk increases threefold from respondents feeling 
that the region is never treated unfairly to respondents holding the region is always 
treated unfairly.  
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Figure 21: Substantive effects of ‘region treated unfairly’ on participation in civil unrest (models 7 
and 8) 
 
Most of our control variables behave as expected. Age is significant and negative in all 
models, suggesting that younger people are more likely to support and participate in 
civil unrest. Poverty seems to have little effect on both support and participation, since 
the variable Gone without food is insignificant in most of the models. Unsafe, the 
variable measuring whether the participant feels safe or not in their neighbourhood, is 
consistently significant and positive for the models testing support for violence – which 
seems plausible. For the remaining control variables, we find little effect. Most notable 
is the variable Perception of own situation, which measures perceived 
vertical/individual inequality. The lack of any effect of individual inequality resonates 
well with the findings of Rustad (2016), and in general lends support to the premise of 
horizontal inequality theory – inequality matters when it overlaps with salient group 
identities.  
Since we postulate that our three independent variables are different measures of group 
grievances, as an alternative specification we include all three of them in one model to 
test which of them have the strongest effect (see appendix 4.8.4). For this combination, 
the effects of frustrated expectations and Region treated unfairly are largely unchanged, 
but the effect of perceived economic horizontal inequality disappears. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that we miss many respondents when including Frustrated 
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expectations
59
. When running an analysis with only Perceived horizontal inequality and 
Region treated unfairly, both of the variables are significant. This suggests that the three 
variables to some degree measure the same, but not completely. The correlation 
between them ranges from 0.2 to 0.3. 
That Region treated unfairly is most strongly associated with both use of political 
violence and participation in civil unrest is in line with our theoretical expectations. 
This measure captures both a feeling of being treated unfairly and a direction of the 
blame for this treatment – factors identified by the social movements literature to be 
vital in facilitating mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000). In that sense the Perceived 
horizontal inequality measure is weaker, and hence it may not be surprising that it is 
only correlated with support for protests, and not the other independent variables. It is 
likely to be easier – and potentially require less frustration – to offer support for an act, 
than to follow up on it. The most surprising results are those linked to Frustrated 
expectations. We would have expected this variable also to affect participation in civil 
unrest and support for the use of political violence. The correlation to support for 
protests is however strong also when Region treated unfairly is included in the same 
model. One reason for these results may be that the support for protest independent 
variable is the only one which is explicitly linked to natural resources, which is also the 
case for the Frustrated expectations measure.  
Our data is cross-sectional, and hence we cannot make any causal claims based on it. 
An inherent limitation to our quantitative analysis is that we cannot establish whether 
the grievances we attempt to measure came before the civil unrest and helped fuel it, or 
were rather created by the civil unrest – and the human rights violations committed by 
the army and the police. We do however believe that the accounts from our semi-
structured interviews, with all informants emphasizing that group grievances motivated 
people to mobilize, strengthens our findings and limits the endogeneity issues.  
Since relatively few respondents report that they have actually participated in protests 
and demonstrations, we run a separate model where we, equally to the use/might use 
violence model, also include those who state that they might participate in protests and 
demonstrations. The results remain the same (see appendix 4.8.4 for the Treated 
unfairly variable). The survey also included a question on support for protest against the 
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 Only those who had heard of the pipeline previously got this question.  
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government in general, and not specifically linked to the natural gas management. The 
results are largely unchanged when using this question instead of the natural gas protest 
question. For the use of violence variable, the results for perceived unfair treatment of 
the region actually stays significant if we only code those 6 that responded that they had 
used violence as 1, and code those who answered that they might as 0. However, 6 
incidents are far too few base any conclusions on.  
Since our measure for poverty – gone without food – implies a subjective evaluation, 
we also tested other, more objective, measures for poverty (asset ownership, access to 
water/latrine, connection to electricity grid). Similarly to the gone without food measure 
they are all insignificant. Furthermore, Tanzania sees increasing tensions between 
Christians and Muslims. In our sampled districts the majority are Muslim, while in 
Tanzania total the opposite is the case. We therefore included a dummy controlling for 
Muslim versus other religions (mainly Christian) as a robustness test. The dummy 
proved insignificant and results unchanged. Dummies for unemployment, and whether 
the respondent live in areas directly affected by the gas developments, are also 
insignificant. Finally, as it has often been a challenge to interview survey respondents, 
particularly women, without other people being present, we also tested whether the fact 
that village ward and/or spouse were present during the interview affected the results 
(this was the case for 7% of the respondents). The dummy for this is also insignificant, 
and results unchanged.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Current studies of horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict have largely 
neglected civil unrest. Furthermore, despite postulating that group grievances drive 
conflict behaviour, they never measure or test these grievances directly. This is 
problematic, since group grievances are highly subjective phenomena that will not be 
reflected in the statistical figures currently used to measure their effect. In essence, 
structural inequalities may or may not be politically relevant, and natural resources may 
or may not cause frustration. Moreover, while structural inequalities are relatively 
constant, group grievances vary depending on how people interpret their group’s 
situation. Hence, empirical studies using objective data as a proxy for group grievances 
have limited power to evaluate where the conflict risk is greatest.  
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In line with this, our analysis lends clear support to the notion that structural horizontal 
inequalities lead to participation in, and support for, civil unrest when they are 
perceived as unfair. Objective horizontal inequalities have been persistent in for decades 
in Mtwara and Lindi without causing conflict. On the other hand, group grievances 
increased and fuelled riots following the government’s mismanagement of the natural 
gas resources – as confirmed by overlapping accounts from all our informants. 
In general, we find that group grievances are associated with support for civil unrest. All 
of our three measures – perceived horizontal inequality, frustrated collective 
expectations and perceived unfair treatment of the region by the government – are 
significantly linked to support for protests, while perceived horizontal inequality and 
perceived unfair treatment is significantly linked to support for violence for a just cause.  
When we turn to actual civil unrest participation, on the other hand, it is only those who 
find that the region has been treated unfairly by the government that are more likely to 
have both participated in demonstrations and protest marches, and that are willing to use 
or have used violence for a just cause. The effect of frustrated collective expectations 
and perceived horizontal inequalities is in fact negative, but not significant. From this 
we can draw two conclusions. First, in line with what one would expect, judging 
inequalities as unfair seems to be a stronger indicator of grievances than being aware of, 
or perceiving, horizontal inequalities, and also than frustrated expectations. Second, 
since our results are inconsistent for attitudes and participation in civil unrest, using 
attitudes as a proxy for behaviour has some limitations. However, it cannot be ruled out 
that a general high acceptance of civil unrest actually increases the risk of such incidents 
by providing support for the participants – as Linke, Schutte and Buhaug (2015) indeed 
find.  
Our results speak to two different literatures. First, our findings have implications for 
the study of horizontal inequalities and conflict in general. While our data is from 
Southern Tanzania, the discrepancy between objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities is demonstrated to apply for a whole range of Sub-Saharan African 
countries by other empirical works. It is unlikely – though remains untested – that this is 
different in other parts of the world. Hence, conflict studies should start to gauge 
perceptions and judgements, and how these are formed, in order to better determine 
when and how horizontal inequalities lead to mobilization. That said, our results support 
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the postulated causal chains underpinning current studies of horizontal inequalities and 
conflict (e.g. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug 2013). Our results also lend support to Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation theory 
when applied on a group level – frustrated collective expectations linked to natural gas 
developments are associated with civil unrest support. 
Second, several conflict researchers highlight the risk of natural resources being a 
catalyst for political entrepreneurs to exacerbate – or create – grievances when they are 
found in areas inhabited by marginalized groups (e.g. Aspinall 2007, Collier 2015). This 
corresponds to empirical studies of realistic group conflict theory, emphasizing how 
competition over resources increases in-group solidarity and out-group hostility when 
an existing group identity precedes the resource discovery. Our qualitative data indicate 
that the Mtwara riots are a good example of such dynamics, and hence serve as a 
warning signal for a range of other Sub-Saharan African countries facing very similar 
situations. A critical feature of new resource discoveries is that they are frequently made 
in remote areas inhabited by marginalized groups – just as in our Tanzanian case. Kenya 
has made discoveries in the land of the impoverished Turkana people (Johannes, Zulu, 
and Kalipeni 2015), Uganda’s oil discoveries overlap with the territory of the 
marginalized Kingdom of Bunyoro (Vokes 2012), Ghana’s large Jubilee discovery is 
outside the coast of the underdeveloped Western Region, just to mention some other 
examples. In fact, leading scholars warn that a combination of strong sub-national 
identities and new oil and gas discoveries constitute a substantial future security threat 
on the continent (Collier 2015). 
While we believe our results have implications for the broader study of horizontal 
inequalities, natural resources and conflict, our data remains limited to Southern 
Tanzania. Also, our data is cross sectional, making our results subject to potential 
endogeneity. The accounts of what actually happened in Tanzania helps mitigate this, as 
they emphasize that group grievances led to mobilization. However, we cannot rule out 
that the same mobilization – and the harsh government response – also created some of 
the grievances we measure. Further analyses based on a larger set of countries as well as 
time-series data are needed to fully establish the scope and validity of our argument.  
In summary, objective horizontal inequalities may or may not lead to conflict depending 
on their political relevance and how they are perceived and judged by group members. 
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Similarly, the mere presence of natural resources does not automatically create 
grievances and conflict – whether they do is closely linked to the government’s policies 
and the response by local communities. However, when people judge their group’s 
position and benefits as unfair, this constitutes a very strong mobilization resource.   
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4.8 Appendices Chapter 4  
Appendix 4.8.1 – Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix all variables 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
Support protest nat res 669 0.513 0.5 0 1
Support violence 701 0.454 0.498 0 1
Participated protests 760 0.062 0.241 0 1
Might/have used violence 763 0.073 0.261 0 1
Frustrated expectations 549 3.792 0.89 1 5
Perceived HIs 685 3.59 0.96 1 5
Treated unfairly 673 1.776 0.907 1 4
Male 804 0.504 0.5 0 1
Age 789 3.188 1.576 1 7
Education 802 2.483 1.581 0 8
Mtwara 804 0.746 0.435 0 1
Gone without food 803 1.132 1.16 0 4
Perception of own situation 770 3.543 0.956 1 5
Rural 804 0.84 0.367 0 1
Unsafe 783 0.338 0.75 0 4
Support protest nat resSupport violenceParticipated protestsMight/have used violenceFrustrated expectationsPerceived HIsTreated unfairlyMale Age Education Mtwara Gone without foodPerception of own situationRural Unsafe
Support protest nat res 1
Support violence 0.39 1
Participated protests -0.003 0 1
Might/have used violence 0.117 0.099 0.179 1
Frustrated expectations 0.201 0.071 0.025 0.036 1
Perceived HIs 0.164 0.105 0.019 0.008 0.259 1
Treated unfairly 0.224 0.15 0.128 0.16 0.181 0.223 1
Male 0.086 -0.058 0.012 0.074 0.107 0.1 0.137 1
Age -0.217 -0.183 0.043 -0.069 -0.025 -0.061 -0.11 0.133 1
Education -0.051 0.027 -0.031 0.043 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.068 -0.278 1
Mtwara -0.168 -0.05 0.049 0.049 -0.088 -0.24 0.022 -0.034 0.028 -0.087 1
Gone without food 0.098 0.146 0.078 0.07 0.182 0.236 0.058 0.078 0.116 -0.129 -0.118 1
Perception of own situation 0.036 0.014 0.026 0.057 0.262 0.391 -0.008 -0.055 0.1 -0.16 0.012 0.339 1
Rural -0.034 -0.029 -0.136 -0.057 -0.046 -0.081 -0.037 0.023 0.128 -0.236 0.245 -0.033 -0.03 1
Unsafe 0.108 0.175 0.116 0.103 0.051 0.018 0.225 0.065 -0.04 0.048 0.024 0.168 0.045 -0.136 1
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Appendix 4.8.2 Survey Documentation 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire comprised 3 parts. The first introductory part included guidance and 
geographical information to be filled in by the enumerator (GPS coordinates, location, 
etc.). The second and main part contained 55 questions to be answered by the 
respondent. The third and final part contained 5 questions on the conditions during the 
interview to be completed by the enumerator (attitude of respondent, presence of others, 
etc.). A trained enumerator spent 35-40 minutes finalizing the whole survey. 
Altogether 8 people with extensive survey and/or local experience provided thorough 
feedback on early drafts of the questionnaire and helped improve the overall quality. 
The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into Swahili by Yulli 
Jeremia at the University of Dar es Salaam. The translation was proofread and improved 
in several rounds – first following the pilot, then by lecturers at the Stella Maris Mtwara 
University College (STEMMUCO), and finally and most comprehensively during the 
enumerator training (see below).    
Some of the questions are replicated or adapted from the Afrobarometer Surveys for 
Tanzania. 
The full questionnaire is included in the Supplementary Appendix at the end of the 
dissertation 
Pilot 
To test the questionnaire and to get data for power calculations we conducted a pilot 
survey in the Mtwara region in May 2015. The pilot covered 96 respondents in both 
rural and urban areas. It was conducted by 4 lecturers from STEMMUCO on the same 
Android devices that were later used for the actual survey.  
Several changes were made to the questionnaire after the pilot – ranging from 
improving questions the respondents found hard to understand to changing the sequence 
of questions to improve the flow and place the most sensitive questions at the end.  
Sampling and Power calculations.  
As described in the main text, we first chose 6 of the 13 districts in the Mtwara and 
Lindi Regions by taking into account relevance and exposure to natural gas activities, 
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involvement in the 2012 and 2013 riots, as well as financial constraints. In addition to 
district, the survey was stratified according to urban, rural and mixed areas, and gender. 
Based on the main dependent/independent relationships from the pilot data, power 
calculations were conducted to establish the necessary number of respondents. The 
power calculations and sampling was done by Keith Weghorst, Post-doctoral Research 
Fellow, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, US, who has extensive 
experience with both sampling and conducting surveys in Tanzania. An initial target of 
600 respondents (based on advice from organizations doing surveys in the area) was 
adjusted to 800 following the results of the power calculations.  
In Tanzania, the districts are divided into wards, which in turn have an average of 
around five villages. We chose to cover two villages in each ward, with 6 interviews in 
each village. Apart from the stratification on urban/rural/mixed and gender, the 
selection of wards, villages, and respondents was fully randomized. The first round of 
the sampling was based on 2012 Census Data for Tanzania, giving population down to 
ward level split on urban/rural/mixed. Number of urban/rural/mixed wards per district 
was calculated based on population weights. Next, the given number of wards per 
district were drawn using computer software – altogether 67 to reach 800 respondents 
(or 804 – since we did 12 interviews per ward and six per village). 
The second round of sampling was done by the principal investigator and the survey 
manager in Mtwara during the survey preparations. The 2012 Census do not include 
data on village level, so in essence we had to call around to all the ward leaders to get 
the full list of villages per ward. With all the villages established we drew two for each 
ward by using a randomizer at random.org.   
A full list of drawn wards and villages per district is given in the table below. 
166 
 
 
Region District Ward Village 1 Village 2
Lindi Lindi Mchinga Mchinga 1 Mchinga 2
Lindi Lindi Kilolambwani Mnang'ole Dimba
Lindi Lindi Kilangala Mtumbikili Kilangala B
Lindi Lindi Mnolela Lukokwe Simana
Lindi Lindi Mtama Nangaka Mihogoni
Lindi Lindi Nyangao Nyangao Namupa
Lindi Lindi Mandwanga Chiuta Lindwandwani
Lindi Lindi Chiponda Chiponda Mtakuja
Lindi Lindi Longa Tulieni Mtua
Lindi Lindi Mtumbya Mtumbia Kilimanjaro
Lindi Lindi Matimba Kikomolela Komolo
Lindi Lindi Nangaru Mkumbamosi Nangaru
Lindi Lindi Municipality Mikumbi Mikumbi Uganda Mikumbi Shuleni
Lindi Lindi Municipality Rahaleo Rahaleo Kariakoo
Lindi Lindi Municipality Matopeni Matopeni Risti
Lindi Lindi Municipality Wailes Angola Majani Mapana
Lindi Lindi Municipality Chikonji Nanyanje Moka
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaMajengo Gezaulole Guine
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaChikongola Mwera Sabasaba
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaLikombe Mtepwezi Mlimani
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaMitengo Mnaida Mnazimmoja
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaMtonya Haikata Singino
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaMagengeni Bomani Magengeni
Mtwara Mtwara Mikindani MikindaNailendele Mkangala Namlongo
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Madimba Namidondi Mitambo
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Ziwani Msakala Majengo
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Mahurunga Kilombelo Mahurunga
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Kiromba Mjimwema Kiromba
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Njengwa Majengo Hinju
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Nitekela Maendeleo Migombani
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Nanyamba Mibobo Kilimanjaro
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Mtiniko Mtiniko mbambakoji
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Mayanga Msijute Hiyari
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Chawi Mkomo Chawi Sokoni
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Namtumbuka Namtumbuka Kilimahewa
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Mbawala Makome a Mkobe b
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Msanga Mkuu Majengo Msanga Mkuu B
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Tangazo Kirambo Mnaida
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Milangominne Milangominne Nyahi barabarani
Mtwara Newala Luchingu Mzalendo Mahakama
Mtwara Newala Mcholi I Mpilipili Rihungira
Mtwara Newala Namiyonga Msimamo Manduma
Mtwara Newala Chitekete Namkonda Mchangani
Mtwara Newala Malatu Mpanda Malatu
Mtwara Newala Mchemo Mkupete Mchebegua
Mtwara Newala Chiwonga Kihwinda Mmulunga
Mtwara Newala Maputi Mtongwele chini Likwaya
Mtwara Newala Makonga Kilidu Mashariki Ofisini
Mtwara Newala Nakahako Mpalu Mnauki
Mtwara Newala Chihangu Idamnole Chihangu A
Mtwara Newala Nambali Nambali A Mlachi
Mtwara Tandahimba Tandahimba Malamba Malopokeno
Mtwara Tandahimba Michenjele Mpunda Michenjele
Mtwara Tandahimba Mihambwe Mkaha Kisagani
Mtwara Tandahimba Mkoreha Dinyeche Chikongo
Mtwara Tandahimba Maundo Namahonga Maundo
Mtwara Tandahimba Namikupa Chihang Pemba
Mtwara Tandahimba Mnyawa Jangwani Umoja
Mtwara Tandahimba Nanhyanga Nanhyanga A Mnaida
Mtwara Tandahimba Chingungwe Mkupete Chingungwe
Mtwara Tandahimba Mdimbamnyoma Mdimbanyoma Tukuru
Mtwara Tandahimba Milingodi Milingodi Namkomolela
Mtwara Tandahimba Lyenje Mwembe 1 Mahona
Mtwara Tandahimba Ngunja Ngunja Mkuti
Mtwara Tandahimba Mkwiti Likolombe Mkwiti
Mtwara Tandahimba Mihuta Mihuta Ngongolo
Mtwara Tandahimba Chikongola Horofea Kilidu
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To stratify on gender, the enumerators were instructed to always alternate between male 
and female respondents.  Due to lack of household data, we used random walking 
patterns to draw households within each village. The enumerators were given a starting 
point in each village by the supervisors, and instructed to pick the third household on 
the right and then the third after that and so on for rural areas, and correspondingly but 
every fifth household in urban areas. Finally, the person opening the door was asked to 
make a list of all household members over 18, and draw a respondent from the list. 
Empty households and households where the drawn respondent was not at home were 
revisited two times. If still not at home, a new household was chosen. All no_calls were 
logged and reasons noted. Altogether 1042 households were visited to get the 804 
respondents. Consent was given before starting all interviews. ‘Did not fit gender quota’ 
is the most frequent reason for no_calls, followed by ‘empty premises’ and ‘respondent 
never at home’. Only 18 persons refused to be interviewed.  
Organization and Training 
The Principal Investigator led all planning and execution of the survey. A survey 
manager and two supervisors were recruited – all of them lecturers at STEMMUCO. All 
three of them participated in the pilot and were already familiar with the research 
design, the questionnaire, the Android devices and the survey software.  
We recruited a pool of 24 potential enumerators that were first trained for two days by 
the principal investigator. The training included background and rationale for the study, 
random sampling, how to ask questions, sampling procedure, and a range of exercises 
on the actual questionnaire. In addition to making the enumerators familiar with the 
questions and the procedures, this process also lead to a final quality check of the 
English versus the Swahili version of the questionnaire. We conducted both paper based 
and device based test-interviews, and the results were used to evaluate the accuracy of 
each enumerator. At the end of day two, we evaluated the results, and chose 16 
enumerators based on test results as well as observed skills during training. Of these, 11 
were alumni from STEMMUCO, 1 alumni from the University of Dar es Salaam, and 4 
where experienced enumerators previously employed by the Aga Khan Foundation. Of 
the alumni, most of them where secondary schoolteachers in the area. The 16 where 
trained for one more day, first in class (mostly by acting out the within household 
selection procedure in groups), and then in the field in an area not covered by the survey 
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sample to get real household sampling and interview training before the actual survey 
started. 
The survey was conducted on Samsung Tablets with Open Data Kit Software (ODK). 
Each enumerator had the same tablet during the whole fieldwork period.  
Logistics and field procedures 
Each enumerator was assigned one village and 6 interviews per day. Including 1 rest 
day, we spent altogether 10 days in the field. The survey manager and the supervisors 
led the fieldwork. The principal investigator stayed in Mtwara Town, keeping in touch 
with the survey manager every morning and evening. Each evening the survey manager 
and the supervisors uploaded the finalized surveys to the ODK app. That way, data was 
always secure, and the principal investigator could download data directly into excel 
each day and monitor data quality.  
The enumerators were divided into three teams, with one car per team. Different people 
were put together each day.  
Permits 
The study was covered by research permit No. 2015-18-NA-2014-238 provided by 
COSTECH, Tanzania. In addition, permissions from the Regional and District 
authorities covering all survey areas were obtained. In each village, the project was 
introduced by the supervisors to the village ward who then granted access.  
Data Processing 
The data was directly uploaded to the ODK internet application, and downloaded to 
excel from the same application. Only minor data cleaning was necessary. 
Appendix 4.8.3. Detailed responses on questions used for dependent and 
independent variables 
Question 51: Support protest natural res management Freq. Percent 
Agree strongly with Statement 1  203 25.70 
Agree with Statement 1 123 15.57 
Agree with Statement 2 154 19.49 
Agree strongly with Statement 2 189 23.92 
Agree with neither 40 5.06 
Refused to answer 13 1.65 
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Don’t know 68 8.61 
Total 790 100.00 
 
Question 43: Support for use of violence for a just cause Freq. Percent 
Agree strongly with Statement 1  252 31.82 
Agree with Statement 1 131 16.54 
Agree with Statement 2 125 15.78 
Agree strongly with Statement 2 193 24.37 
Agree with neither 28 3.54 
Refused to answer 7 0.88 
Don’t know 56 7.07 
Total 792 100.00 
 
Q40 e and f Participate in protest Use violence 
Have done 47 6 
Might do 176 50 
Would never 537 707 
Total 760 763 
 
Q31c Satisfaction 
development region 
Frequency Percent 
Very dissatisfied 109 17.19 
Dissatisfied 274 43.22 
Neither 115 18.14 
Satisfied 45 7.10 
Very satisfied 6 0.95 
Dont’t know 85 13.41 
Total 634 100.00 
 
Q15 Perc regional ec ineq Frequency Percent 
Much Worse 103 12.81 
Worse 319 39.68 
Same 150 18.66 
Better 105 13.06 
Much Better 8 1.00 
Don’t know 119 14.80 
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Total 804 100.00 
 
Q50 Region treated 
unfairly 
Frequency Percent 
Never 335 42.41 
Sometimes 188 23.80 
Often 116 14.68 
Always 34 4.30 
Don’t know 113 0.51 
Refused to answer 4 14.30 
Total 790 100.00 
 
Appendix 4.8.4 Robustness tests 
Table 43: Logistic regression perceived economic horizontal inequality, unfair treatment and 
frustrated expectations on support and participation in civil unrest 
ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INCLUDED IN ALL MODELS 
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Table 44: Might or have particpated in protest marches 
 
Figure 22. Substantive effects of ‘region treated unfairly’ on have or might participate in protest 
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5 From Silence to Storm. Investigating Mechanisms Linking 
Structural Inequality and Natural Resources to Mobilization in 
Southern Tanzania 
 
 
Abstract 
Following large offshore discoveries, Tanzania is set to become a major natural gas 
producer. Widespread political pledges first fuelled popular expectations of local 
development in the southern regions close to the discoveries. In 2012 and 2013, riots erupted 
amid claims of broken promises. In this paper I argue that structural inequalities are not 
enough to trigger conflict. For such inequalities to become a mobilization resource, they 
have to be translated into politically relevant grievances. Southern Tanzania remained 
peaceful for five decades despite grave economic and political marginalization. The 
discovery of natural resources triggered a mobilization process, mainly through increased 
group competition, frustrated expectations, evaluation of injustice, and leadership framing. 
Using accounts from semi-structured interviews supplied with new survey data, I find support 
that a feeling of injustice is particularly salient in motivating riot participants, while greed as 
an alternative mechanism has little explanatory power. Finally, both group grievances and 
favourable opportunity structures need to be in place for mobilization to materialize. My 
study points to important gaps in existing literature on inequality, natural resources and 
conflict, which generally measures how structural background patterns increase conflict risk 
without properly identifying the intermediate mechanisms in the causal chain.  
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5.1 Introduction 
’Long before the frenzy of the natural gas boom in Tanzania’s southern region(s) 
of Mtwara and Lindi, which has been marginalized in terms of development 
during the past five decades, no one imagined that the natives in these regions, 
once considered the dullest and non-violen(t) would one day riot against the 
government’. (Mgamba 2013) 
Following a range of large natural gas discoveries Tanzania is set to become a major 
petroleum producer within the coming decades. Recoverable resources of at least 57 
trillion cubic feet pave way for the largest investments in the country’s history, and even 
modest forecasts indicate annual revenues far exceeding total current government 
inflows (IMF 2014, TEITI 2014). While this has created hopes of a brighter future for 
most of the population in a country currently among the world’s poorest, expectations 
of development are particularly high in the two regions home to the discoveries – 
Mtwara and Lindi. With a history of lagging economic development and general 
marginalization, political promises of change fuelled hopes among the locals. ‘Mtwara 
will be like Europe’ President Kikwete declared in 2010. ‘You have broken your 
promises’, was the general claim during several protests and riots in 2012 and 2013. 
The riots followed a government decision to pipe the gas from a smaller onshore 
discovery in Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. The locals found this hard to reconcile with the 
story of local development based on industries fuelled by the same gas. 
Conflict scholars now largely agree that inequalities between salient identity groups – 
so called horizontal inequalities – increase the risk of political violence (Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Østby 2008b, Stewart 2008). Similarly, the presence of 
non-renewable resources, particularly petroleum, is considered to increase conflict risk 
(Ross 2015). Common to the studies establishing these associations is a lack of focus on 
the intermediate steps in the causal process from structural background patterns to 
mobilization. Horizontal inequality studies generally assume that group inequalities 
create grievances, which in turn drive mobilization, but never measure these grievances. 
Rather, their analyses focus on the association between objectively measured horizontal 
inequalities and conflict outbreak, thus circumnavigating the point that objective 
economic facts and ‘on the ground’ subjective perceptions of these facts, are often very 
different (Langer and Smedts 2013). In the natural resource literature, grievances 
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stemming from unequal distribution of resource revenues is just one among many 
debated causal mechanisms. Again, empirical analyses are limited to studying the 
association between the mere presence of resources and conflict, while the process in 
between remains assumed. In this paper, I address these gaps, and take an in-depth look 
at the causal process leading up to the protests and riots in Mtwara in 2012 and 2013.  
Horizontal inequality theory posits that marginalized identity groups are likely to rebel 
to improve the group’s position. The ‘Wakusini’ (‘Southerners’) inhabiting the 
marginalized Mtwara and Lindi regions in Tanzania remained peaceful for at least 50 
years before riots erupted. Clearly, structural inequality was not enough to spark 
conflict. This combination of long lasting horizontal inequalities and peace, followed by 
riots after the natural gas discoveries, is the main motivating factor for this study. So 
rather than whether, I ask when and why horizontal inequalities and natural resources 
lead to conflict.  
I investigate this question using data gathered in Mtwara and Lindi during two field 
work periods. Based on 35 semi-structured interviews from 2014 and 2015, and an 800 
respondent survey from 2015, my analysis supports that 1) Group grievances fuelled 
mobilization, 2) Both group grievances and opportunity structures need to be in place 
for mobilization to happen, 3) While elite framing and blaming is a central mechanism 
on the pathway from structural background patterns to group grievances, the most 
salient mechanism is evaluation of injustice, 4) Greed as an alternative mechanism to 
grievance has little explanatory power in the case of the Mtwara riots and 5) Natural 
resources, and especially natural resource mismanagement, are particularly likely to 
trigger the mechanisms leading to group grievances, and seemingly acted as an 
intervening variable between objective horizontal inequalities and group grievances. 
5.2 Background: A history of marginalization, and sudden natural riches  
Southern Tanzania, comprising the Mtwara and Lindi regions, has been marginalized 
and underdeveloped compared to the rest of the country at least since independence 
(Seppälä and Koda 1998). While neglect by, and isolation from, the more prosperous 
north has been the norm since the late-70s, the regions still bear scares from two post-
colonial incidents in which the southerners had to bear a particularly heavy burden. 
President Nyerere’s support of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 
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during the Mozambique civil war in the late 60s and early 70s proved costly to the 
population close to the border, who, in addition to loss of civilian lives, saw what 
existed of infrastructure destroyed by Portuguese counterinsurgency (Mampilly 2013). 
During the same period Nyerere pushed forward his socialist ‘Ujamaa’ or ‘villagisation’ 
project, in which he aimed to move the country’s huge rural population into government 
constructed villages. Partly to protect the locals from the ongoing war, the resettlement 
was far more grand scale in the south than in the rest of the country
60
. The project is 
infamous for destroying social structures and moving people far away from existing 
infrastructure.  
The lack of infrastructure has persisted. It was not until 2015 that the road to Dar es 
Salaam was completed and the final parts paved. Before the inauguration of the Mkapa 
Bridge in 2003, the regions were effectively cut off from the rest of Tanzania during 
rainy season. 
The economic marginalization of the southern regions is evident in data from different 
sources. A World Bank Report from 2008 concludes that while Tanzania as a whole 
experienced growth in the period from the mid-1990s to 2005, close to stagnant 
transfers from central to local governments (in percent of GDP) led to an increase in 
inequality between regions and a substantially greater poverty reduction in Dar es 
Salaam than in the rest of the country. Figure 23 shows the share of the population in 
the Southern Tanzania, Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total living under the poverty line 
defined by the World Bank. 
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have data for a longer time period, and 
confirms the relative economic deprivation of the southern regions. Data on asset 
ownership (Figure 24) from 1991-2012, shows how Mtwara and Lindi have persistently 
lagged both Dar es Salaam and the country average – although with a slight relative 
improvement from 2010-2012
61
. 
  
                                                 
60
 By 1971, more than 44% of the population in Mtwara lived in an ‘Ujamaa’ village, while the national 
average was 10-12% (Jennings 2008) 
61
The asset scores are the share of respondents owning a radio, a television, a refrigerator, and for the 
newest surveys, a mobile and a telephone, in Mtwara and Lindi divided by the same share in Dar es 
Salaam/the whole of Tanzania. The lower the score, the larger the inequality. 
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Figure 23: Per cent of population under World Bank poverty line (Utz 2008)  
 
Figure 24: Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total     
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, accessed at http://beta.statcompiler.com/ 
From 2010 and onwards, huge natural gas discoveries have brought the impoverished 
regions to the center of the whole petroleum world’s attention. Most of the estimated 57 
trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas reserves are located in deep-sea offshore 
blocks outside Mtwara and Lindi, and are planned to be processed in a Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) plant onshore in Lindi (Ng'wanakilala 2016).  
While the large offshore fields remain in the planning phase, a smaller onshore gas field 
in Mnazi Bay, Mtwara
62
, has now started production. A decision to pipe this gas to Dar 
es Salaam was first made official in July 2012, before a full commission of the pipeline 
project in November 2012 (2013).  
In a region never previously marked by any kind of political uprisings, on 27 December 
2012 up to 4000 people attended a protest march in Mtwara Town (ibid). Riots 
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continued on 26 and 27 January. Several government offices and houses were set on 
fire, and nine civilians allegedly shot by the police. In May 2013, after the Energy and 
Mineral Budget Announcement, a general strike was followed by yet another two days 
of riots, more loss of civilian lives and property violations (Mgamba 2013)
63
. The police 
and army’s brutal force and severe human rights violations in the end put a stop to the 
uprisings (Domasa 2013, Interviews 2014/2015).  
According to the conflict literature, such grave horizontal inequalities as demonstrated 
above are strongly associated with mobilization. However, in southern Tanzania there 
were no signs of conflict until the natural resources were discovered – or, more 
precisely – after the government decision to build the pipeline. Tanzania thus offers a 
good opportunity to look into the causal mechanisms linking structural background 
patterns and conflict, and to address the question when and why horizontal inequalities 
and natural resources lead to conflict. To do so I will take as a starting point current 
conclusions and limitations in the literature on inequality, natural resources and conflict 
– as set out in the next section. 
 
  
                                                 
63
 The total number of fatalities is disputed – most locals claim that the government figure is far too low. 
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Figure 25: Map of pipeline, planned LNG site and gas blocks in southern Tanzania (discoveries are 
done in all) 
5.3 Horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict 
After decades of debate, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that horizontal 
inequalities – or inequality between salient identity groups – increase the risk of 
conflict. Frances Stewart’s ground-breaking work based on the notion that it is groups 
that rebel, not individuals (Stewart 2002, 2008), has paved way for a range of empirical 
studies confirming that such inequality leads to conflict. Economic, social or political 
inequality between ethnic groups (Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, 
Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 
Østby 2008b), between regional groups (Østby 2008a, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009), 
and between religious groups (Østby 2008a) significantly increases the risk of civil war, 
communal conflict (Fjelde and Østby 2014), riots (Dancygier 2010, Wilkinson 2009) as 
well as non-violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  
At the same time, the natural resource/conflict literature has provided relatively robust 
evidence that the presence of oil and gas, particularly onshore, increases conflict risk 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Koubi et al. 2014, Lujala 2010, 
Ross 2015). Furthermore, while most studies of natural resources have neglected 
grievances as a motive for mobilization (Koubi et al. 2014), some recent papers argue 
that natural resource wealth rarely spreads evenly, and is likely to exacerbate existing as 
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well as create new horizontal inequalities. Correspondingly, they find a link between the 
combined presence of horizontal inequalities and natural resources, and civil war (Asal 
et al. 2015, Basedau and Pierskalla 2014, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). 
Common to both the natural resource/conflict and horizontal inequality/conflict 
empirical studies is a lack of focus on the intermediate steps in the causal process from 
the presence of natural resources and/or horizontal inequalities to mobilization. Natural 
resources are largely included in analyses as a dummy variable. As a result, the studies 
can infer whether a presence of non-renewable resources increases conflict risk, but 
have little to say on why this is happening. Greed (participants’ incentives to enrich 
themselves), feasibility (financing to organize a rebel group), limited state capacity to 
fight rebels, and popular grievances are all suggested – but largely untested – 
mechanisms (Koubi et al. 2014). Similarly, the horizontal inequality studies analyse 
structural economic data such as the Demographic and Health Survey data presented in 
the previous section. The implied underlying assumption is then that objective 
horizontal inequalities automatically create grievances, and then mobilization. More 
precisely, they take for granted that the objective reality and the subjective perceptions 
and judgements of this reality fully overlap. This is not the case. Studies of the 
correlation between objective horizontal inequalities and subjective perceptions of the 
same asymmetries conclude that the relationship is weak (Langer and Mikami 2013, 
Holmqvist 2012), or even negative (Langer and Smedts 2013). People may not even be 
aware that their group is marginalized, let alone consider the marginalization unjust, and 
to be blamed on a certain actor (Gamson 1992). Hence, a closer investigation of the 
process leading from structural background patterns to conflict seems necessary. 
Empirical studies vary in the degree to which they theorize this process. Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) have developed the most thorough framework, in which 
they argue that objective horizontal inequalities are transformed into grievances through 
1) group identification, 2) group comparison, 3) evaluation of injustice, 4) framing 
and blaming – as portrayed in Figure 26. All these steps will have to be in place for 
latent objective inequalities to develop into politically salient grievances. Once 
grievances have developed, there has to be some sort of mobilization, coupled with 
favourable opportunity structures (ranging from available financing to limited state 
repression depending on the scale of mobilization) for conflict to materialize. Still, as 
Figure 26 also shows, their empirical link bypasses the intermediate steps in the causal 
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chain altogether – as is the case for all empirical studies of horizontal inequalities and 
conflict. This opens up for questions on whether it is in fact grievances that drive 
mobilization. 
Figure 26: Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) conflict framework 
 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug developed this framework to account for the outbreak 
of civil war. Still, all the underlying conflict theories they build on aim to explain a 
broad range of conflict. For instance, they draw on key concepts from social identity 
theory, which encompasses all types of group incompatibilities (e.g. Abrams and Hogg 
1988, Tajfel and Turner 1979), and from the contentious politics and social movements 
literature, which focus on collective political struggles ranging from protests and riots to 
civil war (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001, Benford and Snow 2000). Finally, as 
noted above, several studies also find an association between horizontal inequalities and 
civil unrest. Hence, the framework should be relevant for conflict in general, and will 
serve as a basis for my analyses. In the following I will take an as in-depth look as 
possible at each proposed step in the chain, in order to investigate 1) whether grievances 
– and the proposed mechanisms – are actually relevant in driving mobilization, 2) which 
of the mechanisms are most salient and 3) what the role of natural resources is.  
5.4 Data and Methodology 
To gather data on the process leading up to mobilization I conducted two rounds of field 
work in Southern Tanzania. The work comprised 35 semi-structured interviews (15 in 
May 2014 and 20 in June 2015), and an 800 respondent survey (June 2015). The 
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interviews serve as a tool to get insights into personal attitudes, emotions and 
motivations linked to the gas issues and the civil unrest, as well as recounts of the 
process leading up to the mobilization, and are the primary source of granular 
information on causal chain mechanisms. The survey has the advantage of providing 
representative data on the covered sample.  
Interviews were conducted in Mtwara Town and Mikindani (Mtwara Mikindani 
District), Msanga Mkuu (Mtwara Rural District) and Lindi Town (Lindi Municipality 
District), with 10 women and 25 men aged 18 to 58. The interviewees include a 
Christian Religious Leader, a highly ranked government party official, a journalist, 6 
participants in the riots, students and both unemployed and employed people. I applied 
maximum variation sampling, where interviewees were selected to represent variation 
in factors identified by the literature to affect conflict. These include age (Urdal 2006), 
gender (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000), urban/rural location (Horowitz 2001), education 
and employment/unemployment (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Finally, I was especially 
interested in the views of those who participated in the riots. This skewed the whole 
sample to include more men than female, since the majority of the participants were 
men. While 35 interviews were needed to reach diversity on all the mentioned factors, 
saturation was reached well before the 35 were finalized – with people regardless of 
background and demography giving very similar accounts
64
. The interviews from 2014 
provided several insights that helped in the design of the survey, both linked to which 
districts to cover and to particular views and expectations that I wished to test on a 
representative sample. 
The survey covered 804 respondents from 6 of the 13 districts in the regions. Mtwara 
Mikindani, Mtwara Rural, Lindi Rural and Lindi Municipality are the districts most 
affected by the current and planned gas developments, and were chosen due to this. 
Tandahimba and Newala are less affected, although several people from these districts 
were bussed to Mtwara to take part in the protests and riots. In order to cover these 
groups as well, while at the same time capturing sentiments of people very little affected 
by the new resources, the two districts are included
65
. The exclusion of the remaining 
seven districts is due both to their limited relevance and the project’s financial 
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constraints. The survey was stratified according to district, urban, rural and mixed areas, 
and gender – but further to that the selection of wards, villages, and respondents was 
fully randomized. 134 villages were drawn. We conducted six surveys in each village, 
selected households using random walking patterns and drew respondents within each 
household – who were then surveyed upon consent66.  Figure 27 shows the selected 
districts, sampled villages as well as interview sites.  
Figure 27. Selected districts, sampled survey points and selected interview sites. 
 
I designed both the survey and the interviews to let people speak as freely as possible 
and express their priorities and attitudes in their own terms. Several of the survey 
questions were open ended (with no reading of response categories), and the interviews, 
in addition to containing only open ended questions also let the respondent freely talk at 
the end by asking ‘is there anything you want to add to what we have already talked 
about’. Most of the interviewees took this opportunity, and used it to both emphasize 
what he/she saw as most important of the issues already covered, and to add new 
insights.  
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While the interview sample might be biased, particularly due to the fact that all 
interviewees lived relatively close to the natural gas developments, but also due to the 
fact that it is not representative on other important variables, the survey data can to 
some extent be used to test whether individual responses are in line with the view of the 
larger population. Several questions were replicated in the survey and the interviews, 
and responses are compared in the analyses.  
Both in the interviews and in the survey people were encouraged to talk about highly 
sensitive political issues, which may have biased the responses. That said, most 
interviewees proved very eager to share their views and to make their voice heard. 
Finally, both the survey and the interviews to some extent encourage people to talk 
about the past, introducing a recall bias in the parts of the material.  
5.5 Analysis 
5.5.1 Group Identification and Comparison 
The first mechanisms that have to be in place for group grievances to arise is that people 
identify themselves as a member of the relevant group, and compare their group’s 
situation to that of other groups. So which group identities and comparisons prevail in 
Mtwara and Lindi? And have the natural gas discoveries led to marked changes in these 
parameters?  
Let me start with available group categories – of which there are several. First, despite 
Nyerere’s extensive policies to fight tribalism and ethnic affiliation, resulting in a strong 
national identity (see e.g. Green 2011), ethnic identity is not totally absent. The largest 
group in Mtwara and Lindi – the Makonde – are claimed to be ethnically self-conscious 
and to fiercely defend their culture (Seppälä and Koda 1998). Second, the historic 
marginalization has paved way for a distinct regional identity, with both people from 
the region and people from other parts of the country identifying Mtwarans and 
Lindians as ‘Wakusini’ – the Swahili word for ‘Southerners’ (Seppälä and Koda 1998). 
Finally, religious tensions between the slight Christian over Muslim majority is 
becoming increasingly frequent in Tanzania (Mampilly 2013). In coastal Mtwara and 
Lindi, the majority are Muslim
67
. 
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This mix of identities is evident in the interview responses. When asked how they prefer 
to be identified by other people, while some stated ‘Wakusini’ only, most interviewees 
mention two or more identities. The most frequently mentioned identities are Tanzanian 
and ‘Wakusini’ – alone, together or in combination with the other identity groups 
(Muslim, the respondent’s tribe).  
The relative importance – and political relevance – of the regional identity become 
more evident when people are asked to assess the economic and political situation. Even 
when given an open question on whether the Tanzanian government treat all the people 
the same, several interviewees highlight the relative disadvantage of the southern 
regions compared to other regions – and particularly to the north. None mention their 
ethnic or religious group. On direct question on the economic situation of people in 
Mtwara and Lindi compared to other regions, all interviewees emphasize their 
marginalization.  
‘Mtwara region has no rights and is not treated the same as other regions’68. 
‘When you compare, the leaders continue to despise the south. Regions like Lindi and 
Mtwara mostly they continue to neglect these regions in comparison to other regions. 
That’s the reason why we’re not developing’69.  
The interviews were in areas close to the natural gas discoveries, and all responses 
reflect a high awareness of the marginalization of the South. In contrast, the survey 
includes less affected areas and offers two important nuances to the interview responses. 
First, people geographically farther away from the gas discoveries are more positive 
about the relative economic situation of the region. When asked to assess the economic 
condition of people in their region (Mtwara or Lindi) – if it is worse, same as or better 
than for people in other regions in the country – 20 % in Newala and 21% in 
Tandahimba answer ‘better’ or ‘much better’. Only 9% hold this in the remaining, 
costal districts. Furthermore, discontent is higher among those who had prior knowledge 
of the gas discoveries. For this group, 54% hold that the economic situation is ‘worse’ 
or ‘much worse’ in Mtwara/Lindi. For those with no prior knowledge, the figure is 38%. 
These are all indications – though not conclusive evidence – that the natural gas 
discoveries has affected the way people view regional horizontal inequalities.  
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Second, the survey also reveals a difference in perceptions between Mtwara and Lindi. 
A larger share of people in Lindi than Mtwara regard the regional economic condition 
as worse or much worse compared to other regions (see Figure 28). 
Figure 28: Response distribution Mtwara and Lindi on question: ‘Think about the condition of 
people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. Are their economic conditions worse, 
same as or better than for people in other regions in this country?’ 
 
On the other hand, the survey data reveals that Mtwara and Lindi are on par in terms of 
objective economic conditions – with Lindi actually better off on some parameters70. 
This once more highlights how subjective views can differ from objective facts
71
.  
In summary, the political relevance of a regional identity is evident through the frequent 
comparisons made between Mtwara and Lindi and other regions. The perception of 
regional inequality is also stronger among those who live closer to the gas discoveries, 
and among those who had already heard of the gas at the point of the study. Still, 
perceptions of regional inequality cannot fully explain the conflict outbreak. People 
rioted in Mtwara, not in Lindi, and, more importantly, the regional group identification 
and perception of marginalization compared to other regions existed before the natural 
gas discoveries. The ‘Wakusini’ has historically been regarded as backward (see e.g. 
Seppälä and Koda 1998), something that is also highlighted by the interviewees. On the 
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college and improved infrastructure. Lindi on the other hand, has not gotten anything yet. 
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other hand, while the group identification and comparison was not triggered by the 
natural gas discoveries or management, their pre-existence may have been important to 
support the next two mechanisms in the chain – as I will elaborate in a later section.   
5.5.2 Evaluation of injustice  
A perception – and awareness – of horizontal inequalities do not necessarily generate 
grievances. For frustrations to arise, people will have to evaluate the inequalities and 
consider them unfair. It is well documented that inequality acceptance varies greatly 
among both individuals and groups, and depends, among other things, on existing 
norms and ideologies (Almas et al. 2010, Williams 2003). The next suggested step on 
the causal pathway from objective conditions to group grievances is thus ‘evaluation of 
injustice’. In essence – what made people go from accepting relative deprivation 
compared to the rest of the country, to becoming frustrated enough to stand up against 
the government? 
A first insight is linked to Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation, and, before him, 
Davies (1962) J-Curve theory: when people get less than they expect, frustrations will 
arise and grievances develop. In the initial euphoria following the first discoveries, 
government promises of local development were plentiful. A particular emphasis was 
put on the development of local industries, which would bring benefits to the whole 
southern population. The government officially debated a 300 megawatt power plant, 
and then a fertilizer plant – both meant to be situated in the southern regions (2013). 
However, with little pre-warning the decision to pipe the gas to Dar es Salaam was 
made official. 
Nearly all of my 35 interviewees strongly emphasize how frustrated expectations – or 
more directly – broken promises of local development – was what infuriated them. The 
frustration was particularly linked to speeches made by then President Kikwete when he 
visited the region as part of the 2010 election campaign: ‘The reason was the lies that 
the president told, because the president promised, he spoke here on Mashujaa Day (..) 
If he had built the industries just like he had promised then these problems would have 
been avoided. There would have been no one who died’72. 
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The survey responses reflect this feeling of dashed expectations. When asked how 
satisfied they are with the living conditions for the people in the region – compared to 
what they expected BEFORE they had heard of the pipeline, 57 % in Mtwara and 70% 
in Lindi report that they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.  
Moving on to a more direct measure of unfair treatment, the survey included the 
question: ‘How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the 
government’. 42% hold that this never happens, while 43% think it happens sometimes, 
often or always
73
. As expected, once more the share of people answering sometimes, 
often or always is higher in the coastal districts closer to the gas developments than in 
the districts further inland, and among those who have heard about the gas for a long 
time. However, opposed to what I found in the previous section, the share holding that 
the region is sometimes/often/always treated unfairly is higher in Mtwara than in Lindi. 
While frustrated expectations are likely to be linked to a perception of unfair treatment, 
the interviews provide further insights into what fuels a feeling of unfairness and 
injustice. Generally, it seems that a notion of injustice is strongly linked to a perception 
of being robbed of something that belongs to them. Two contrasting interviews 
highlight this. First, a participant in the riots with high political awareness and strong 
views on the marginalization of Mtwara – both in general, and after the natural resource 
discoveries – answered the following to a question of how many times injustice has 
been done to the people of the South: ‘I see this as the first time because there has never 
been discovered anything before here in Mtwara that has been stolen, that was robbed 
from us’74. Implicitly, the years of marginalization and lack of development, while 
resented, is not considered an injustice. On the other hand, another informant – 
extremely poor even compared to southern standards – displayed an equally high 
awareness of the marginalization of the south: ‘In short the living conditions here in 
Mtwara, life is hard. We’re not all right. [..] It’s different from other regions’. [..]‘To be 
honest I don’t think we have any political influence whatsoever75. Still, on the direct 
question on how often injustice has been made towards the people of Mtwara, she 
answers ‘That has never happened’. Once more, the marginalization is not seen as an 
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injustice. And she has seemingly no basis to judge the natural gas management as 
unfair, as she is clear that she knows nothing about the gas issues – she’s not even sure 
if there have been any discoveries. 
In general, each time respondents state that an injustice exists, it is linked to a feeling of 
other – often richer – people taking what is not rightfully theirs. None of the informants 
highlight the lack of development as an injustice, while several highlight the 
management of the gas discoveries as one. This feeling of injustice is also strongly 
linked to land rights, with several emphasizing how injustice was made when the 
government ‘grabbed’ land and did not pay a proper price for it: ‘they have taken 
Mtwara corridor which is a big area. The government has grabbed and our elders have 
not been paid’76.  
Those who participated in the riots furthermore link this feeling of injustice directly to 
their motivation to participate: ‘[I participated] To defend the interest of Mtwara’77. 
Most of them hold that their rights have been violated, and that they had to stand up for 
them. ‘I participated because I’m someone from Mtwara and the resources being 
grabbed belong to the people of Mtwara I cannot accept to be robbed of my property’78 
This link between frustrated expectations as well as injustice linked to land rights, and 
demonstrations and protest, is also evident in the survey data, where almost 70% of the 
respondents hold that broken promises of local development justifies such civil unrest, 
followed by sale of land rights and displacement. Lack of electricity, on the other hand, 
gets a far lower score (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29: Percentage of ‘yes’ responses to which issues justifies a demonstration/protest march 
 
The above accounts are fully in line with Williams’ (2003) distinction between a ‘real 
grievance’, as opposed to mere deprivation and dissatisfaction. While the former ‘rests 
upon the claim that injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving victims’ and ‘are 
normative protests, claiming violations of rights or rules’, the latter might be accepted 
as ‘just the way things are’ (ibid, 131). 
In summary, while group identification and comparison preceded the gas discoveries, 
the feeling of injustice is new, and claimed to be the main motivating factor for the 
participants in the protests and riots.  
Before I move on, it is important to note that in retrospect, most interviewees hold that 
they would not have become so angry if they had only been given information and 
education on the rationale for the pipeline decision at the same time as it was taken. To 
them, this decision was tantamount to no local benefits and development, and at least a 
part of their anger was linked to a feeling of not being consulted or informed.  
5.5.3 Framing and blaming – and mobilization 
Making people aware of injustices often requires leadership intervention (Brass 1991). 
Particularly the social movements literature emphasize how people may live silently 
with severe inequality unless elites actively highlight the injustices and pins the blame 
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on a specific actor – very often the government (Benford and Snow 2000, Gamson 
1992). Such leadership intervention took place in Mtwara. Several public meetings were 
held throughout the last months of 2012 – one of the largest allegedly attended by more 
than 10 000 people (Mampilly 2013). The meetings were organized by political party 
leaders from altogether 9 opposition parties, of which the biggest were Chama Cha 
Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (Chadema), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha 
Mageuzi na Ujenzi wa Taifa (NCCR–Mageuzi)79. In addition, both Christian and 
Muslim religious leaders participated, as did some local representatives of the 
incumbent party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The main message at these meeting 
was very clear: the gas should not leave Mtwara
80
. The government had broken their 
promises of local development, and the locals were encouraged to take to the streets to 
show that they did not accept it. In addition to the meetings, people were mobilized via 
extensive text messages and flyers
81. ‘Gesi haitoki’ – the gas should not come – became 
the slogan that could be seen written on surfaces all across Mtwara, and that in the end 
even school girls chanted (Mampilly 2013)
82
. 
Despite this relatively massive mobilization, many of my informants – including most 
of those participating in the riots – claim that there were no leaders, and that it was only 
the people themselves that decided to take to the streets. ‘[T]here was no leader, we 
were one’83. Rather than indicating that no mobilization took place – which is well 
documented – this is likely to be a sign on how widespread the sentiments became, and 
how the message travelled by word of mouth to those who did not take part in the 
meetings. This resonates with the riot literature, which has long proposed that ‘no riot 
ever occurs without rumours to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence’ (Allport 
and Postman 1947, 193). Equally important, as I will discuss in a later section, it is also 
likely to be an indication on how well the message from the leaders resonated with the 
population.  
                                                 
79
 Journalist, Mtwara and Student, female, 25 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Journalist, Mtwara 
82
 Both the interviews and media articles leave little doubt that moving the gas was the main mobilization 
issue. However, the opposition party leaders appear to have been relatively pragmatic and strategic – 
picking the topic most likely to fuel support. For the population further inland, where cashewnut farming 
is the main source of income, people were allegedly mobilized based on frustrations linked to missing 
subsidies and under-pricing. (Journalist, Mtwara) 
83
 Male, Student, 22, participant in riots 
191 
 
In terms of blaming, it was clearly the government that became the culprit. The 
government took the decision on the pipeline, and is responsible for the natural gas 
management specifically and the lack of development in general. Hence, blaming the 
government for the injustice appears to have been relatively straightforward
84
.  
It is clear that the opposition party leaders have their own agenda linked to the overall 
political landscape in Tanzania, with the dominance of the incumbent party and the 
struggle to get to power in a country were elections are far from free and fair. In that 
sense, the case is a perfect example of what Stewart (2008) describes as a situation 
particularly likely to fuel conflict: when the political horizontal inequalities experienced 
by the elites align with the economic horizontal inequalities felt by the masses – 
creating a forceful common ground for mobilization.   
The framing and blaming and the actual mobilization is hard to distinguish into separate 
steps in the case of the Mtwara riots. The community meetings, flyers and text messages 
served to trigger all these mechanisms at the same time. It is hard to say whether there 
would have been any protests and riots if the framing, blaming and mobilization had not 
taken place. The way it all unfolded, with the first protests starting right after the 27 
December public meeting, and the second round of riots following more meetings and 
text messages, this part seems to have played a crucial role.  
A timeline with main incidents leading up to the protests and riots is given in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Gas discoveries, political decisions and mobilization timeline 
 
 
5.5.4 Opportunity/Claims and repression 
Historically, scholars have engaged in debates concerning the relative importance of 
grievances and motivational factors (Davies 1962, Gurr 1970, Wood 2003) vs. 
opportunity and feasibility factors (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, 
Tilly 1978) in inducing conflict. However, recent work tends to regard both motivation 
and opportunity as necessary conditions for conflict to materialize (e.g. Bara 2014, 
Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). The importance of opportunity structures are clearly 
demonstrated by the case of Mtwara. According to many of my informants, before the 
first round of protests, the political leaders first went to the Regional Commissioner and 
asked him to join the meetings to discuss their claims. Allegedly, he refused to listen to 
their message. With no conventional political channel to handle their interests, the 
leaders then saw no other options to protesting. Several sources also emphasize that the 
initial protests were approved and supported by other local government officials, of 
which some also attended the public meetings (Mampilly 2013, Interviews 2014/2015)  
In terms of resources, protests and riots require little beyond motivated participants, and 
feasibility is thus very much governed by the expected government response to a 
mobilization. At the time of the first protests, no one expected brutal government 
repression, and in this sense opportunity was unrestricted. Correspondingly, the crack-
down by the police and the army came as a surprise to most of the protesters, according 
to my informants. This same brutal response and human rights violations – ranging 
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from killings and torture to rape (Mampilly 2013, Interviews 2014/2015) in the end 
effectively put a stop to further protests. In addition, a total ban on public meetings was 
only lifted during the election campaign in 2015, and the local radio – by far the most 
frequently used source of information
85
 – was until recently not allowed to broadcast 
any gas related information. While the killings and the abuse served to increase local 
grievances – now visible in the annual Memorial Day in the name of the victims – 
opportunity to stand up against the injustices is very restricted. My first visit to the 
region coincided with the first year anniversary of the May 2013 riots, and the fear of 
new riots – and efforts to contain them – was visible in armed roadblocks, army 
presence with tanks and personnel, closure of all shops and business and a curfew 
starting at 09:00 pm.  
In summary, the opportunity to protest is now restricted by the expected high cost and 
low reward of participating: ‘Since that time things have come and gone for the people 
of Mtwara. The people here are looking at the president so that they can see what he’s 
going to do. If he wants to take it, then let him take it, what can we do? Get beaten 
again and killed? We’re just silent, we don’t have the power’86.  
5.5.5 The relationship between objective horizontal inequalities, group 
grievances and natural resources 
This paper started with a critique of how empirical studies of horizontal inequalities 
assume that objective structural asymmetries and grievances overlap and that the former 
thus can be used as a proxy for the latter. The mostly qualitative data reported in this 
paper support the conjecture that grievances and a newly acute sense of injustice and 
indignation stimulated the mass mobilisations that gripped southern Tanzania during 
2012 and 2013.  Indeed, all of the proposed mechanisms – group identification and 
comparison, injustice frames and identification of who is to blame – were all clearly 
observed during my fieldwork. Yet, it remains to be established whether the existing 
objective horizontal inequalities helped fuel the grievances, or whether the natural gas 
mismanagement drove the grievances irrespective of the historical marginalization. In 
other words, was the natural gas-mismanagement an intervening or an independent 
variable?  This is very hard to conclusively test without much more extensive data, but 
the literature and the interviews offer some indications. 
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In a rare but much cited study of the relationship between natural resources, grievances, 
leadership framing and conflict, Aspinall (2007) looked at the separatist conflict in the 
Aceh province in Indonesia. He concluded that natural resources can be used as a 
mobilization tool by elites, but only if a relevant collective identity is already in place. 
This concurs with realistic group conflict theory, for which empirical studies find that 
an emerging threat from competition over resources increases in-group solidarity, but 
only when this in-group solidarity is above a certain threshold before the threat arises 
(Brewer and Campbell 1976, Sherif et al. 1961). Earlier empirical studies thus point to 
the importance of a pre-existing identity – without linking this to inequality. Looking 
then to the framing literature, more clues to the importance of historic marginalization 
emerge. This literature claims, and finds, that the effectiveness of collective action 
frames in creating mobilization varies from case to case, and that one important success-
factor is the degree to which the frame resonates with the population. This resonance is 
in turn driven by the credibility of the frame and its relative salience – how close to the 
reality and the available evidence is the frame, and how relevant is its scope for the 
population to be mobilized? (Benford and Snow 2000) In the case of Mtwara – clearly 
very close and highly relevant. Hence, from existing theory and empirical evidence one 
should expect that the historical marginalization, or the objective horizontal inequality, 
helped support the narrative of the mobilizer, and hence played a part in inducing 
conflict.  
This overlaps with the accounts of the interviewees. The previous neglect by the 
government and the recent mismanagement is so intertwined in the accounts that it is 
hard to conclude that the historic objective inequalities played no part. In general, it 
seems that the various variables reinforced the same overall story: first they gave us 
nothing, then they promised us change, and then they went back on their word and 
instead took what rightfully belongs to us: ‘It has taken 50 years to build the road, and 
it still isn’t finished. Now they are building the pipeline in 18 months87’ 
Natural resources – or more specifically – natural resource mismanagement, seem to 
have acted as an intervening variable, not an independent variable in the case of 
southern Tanzania. If we look back at the mechanisms driving grievances, it is not very 
surprising that natural resource mismanagement may serve as such a potent intervening 
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variable. Natural resources are inherently local, which makes them likely to induce 
competition between the group(s) living in the resource rich area and the rest of the 
country (Collier 2013, Koubi et al. 2014). Furthermore, natural resources very often 
lead to unrealistic expectations of local gains and future revenues – driven both by 
politicians, media coverage and expert reports from external bodies such as the IMF 
(Weszkalnys 2008, Ross, Lujala, and Rustad 2012). Once these hopes are broken, 
frustrations and a feeling of injustice are likely to arise. The fact that the resources are 
discovered in the group’s land and are thus interpreted as ‘belonging to us’, further fuels 
a feeling of injustice. Finally, historic neglect by the government of the group in 
question coupled with perceived mismanagement of the resources makes framing and 
blaming by elites straightforward and ‘credible’. In Mtwara, the fact that the 
government first made extensive promises, and then were perceived to break these, 
made the fuelling of group grievances particularly strong.  
5.5.6 Summary 
Objective horizontal inequalities were clearly not enough to trigger conflict in southern 
Tanzania – such asymmetries have been present for 50 years or more, and actually show 
a decline after the first gas discoveries
88
. So while the years of marginalization 
seemingly helped enforce the group grievances in the end, they did not by themselves 
constitute a sufficient condition for conflict. According to my sources, it was group 
grievances that motivated people to take part in the protests and riots. These group 
grievances were not entirely absent before the pipeline decision, but increased 
substantially after it. Overall, my analyses indicate that protests and riots materialized in 
the period in which both opportunity and grievances were high. After the riots, the 
grievances are still high – potentially even higher than before due to the human rights 
violations and losses of civilian lives – but opportunity is low mainly due to the fear of 
the police and the army.  
On a more granular level, the four mechanisms suggested by Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Buhaug (2013) all contributed to fuel group grievances. But rather than being four 
independent steps, my analysis reveals the following: First, group identification and 
competition seems to have increased following the natural gas mismanagement, but was 
present before the decision on the pipeline. Second, evaluation of injustice is likely to 
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be partly a result of the framing and blaming, rather than a step before it. As noted 
earlier, framing campaigns may succeed or fail, and the ultimate measure of a 
campaign’s success lies in gauging whether it has actually created a sense of injustice. 
In Mtwara, this sense of injustice was present, and the participants in the protests and 
riots directly linked this feeling to their motivation to participate. While some of this 
perception of injustice is likely to be a direct result of the broken promises, the framing 
presumably served to get the message out to a large share of the population. Hence, for 
the case of Mtwara, instead of the four steps to grievances as stipulated by Cederman et 
al, the process unfolded as portrayed in Figure 31:  
Figure 31: The process from marginalization to mobilization in Mtwara 
5.5.7 Alternative mechanisms – greed 
Critics of grievance based explanations of conflict rightly claim that the studies 
investigating this relationship never measure the grievances directly. Hence, they cannot 
rule out that inequalities – on individual or group level – rather fuels motivation based 
on self-interest and greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Regardless of the fact that 
academics may have grown tired of the greed vs. grievance debate, greed remains a 
recurring explanation for mobilization. In fact it is precisely what the participants in the 
Mtwara riots were accused of – both by government officials and academics. Rather 
than addressing people’s questions about how they would benefit from the gas 
discoveries, in a televised address to Parliament, President Kikwete denounced the 
protesters and warned that the natural resources were the property of all Tanzanians, 
regardless of where they were found (Mampilly 2013). The Minister for Minerals and 
Energy, Professor Sospeter Muhongo, agreed and labelled those rioting naïve and non-
patriotic (Mgamba 2013). The only academic work on the riots I have come across 
paints a picture of a population with ‘imagined rights’ with their pockets full of future 
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money: ’Like the hoboes in the Punch cartoon, local youth quickly started claiming that 
they no longer needed to work (Collier 2013, 52)’.   
Claiming that the locals in Mtwara and Lindi do not want to work stand in stark contrast 
to the wishes and priorities revealed both in the interviews and the survey. In the 
interviews, local industries and employment is precisely what people ask most 
frequently for. ‘If this gas is discovered they should look into it that we get employment 
because our youths do not have any other way to progress their lives
89’.  
In the survey, when asked what the most important thing they think the government 
should do for the local population, basic services like health, clean water, electricity, 
education, as well as industries and jobs, not money, or riches, are most frequent. 
Turning once more to the motivations as stated by the participants in the protests and 
riots, the rights of the group and the development of the region are emphasized, never 
individual gain: ‘That’s why I was supporting them because I being a south person I 
also value the development of this place’90. 
Such a group motivation may not have been the main incentive for the all leaders of the 
mobilization – given that their campaign must be seen as a part of the overall struggle 
for power in Tanzania. Still, some local incumbent party leaders openly supported the 
campaign on the grounds that the south should no longer be exploited or marginalized
91
.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Current studies of horizontal inequalities, natural resources and conflict analyse the link 
between structural background patterns and conflict risk without taking into account the 
relevant steps in the causal process. While the general assumption behind these studies 
is that grievances drive conflict, they never explicitly observe these grievances, and 
rather assume that they overlap with the measured objective inequalities. This leaves 
them vulnerable to two sets of criticism: First, they cannot prove that it is in fact 
grievances, and not an alternative mechanism, that drives conflict. Second, and most 
importantly, since people’s subjective views and judgements differ substantially to 
                                                 
89
 Unemployed, male, 22 
90
 Student, male, 22. Participant in riots 
91
 Journalist, Mtwara 
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objective facts, current analyses based on the latter to a certain extent miss the target in 
their evaluation of conflict risk. 
In this paper I take an in-depth look at the causal mechanisms driving group grievances, 
and how these in turn drive mobilization. My analyses support the view that group 
grievances do indeed induce conflict if favourable opportunity structures are in place. 
The group aspect is vital – people are motivated to defend their region, the development 
of it and the rights of the people living there. On the other hand, greed as an alternative 
mechanism to instigate conflict has little explanatory power for the Mtwara case.  
Framing and blaming is central for group grievances to arise, while an evaluation of 
injustice is partly a sign that the framing campaign has succeeded, and that group 
grievances have indeed developed. Such a feeling of injustice is in turn closely linked to 
perceptions of being robbed of something that belongs to the group, and to have been 
deceived by politicians breaking their promises of local development. While Mtwara 
and Lindi’s decades long marginalization and relative underdevelopment were accepted 
with resignation and thus not framed as a tangible ‘injustice’, the mismanagement of the 
natural gas discovery ‘felt’ like an injustice. This was powerfully symbolised by the 
new resource being literally piped from its source in the southern periphery to the 
wealthier north without ‘payment’. In the words of many of the interviewees: we were 
“robbed”. This is what in the end transitioned many people from accepting their fate to 
mobilizing to try and improve it.  
The long lasting objective horizontal inequalities, and the pre-existing group identity 
and comparison, made the narrative of the mobilizers resonate well with, and be 
credible to, the population – factors demonstrated to positively affect the success of 
framing campaigns. Natural resource mismanagement apparently acted as an 
intervening variable between objective horizontal inequalities and group grievances 
triggering framing and blaming and a feeling of injustice, while also to some extent 
enforcing existing group comparisons.  
My findings have several implications for the existing literature. Current empirical 
studies analysing the effect of structural background patterns on conflict risk elide the 
question of whether these cleavages are politically relevant or not. In a sense they leave 
out agency: whether there are people and events that spark conflict. To avoid this, future 
studies should aim to measure perceptions and grievances more directly. Second, the 
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mobilization around a regional identity in Tanzania, coupled with the multiple identities 
actually present, show that large-N studies should make an effort to establish which 
group identity is relevant before embarking on their analyses. Most current studies start 
with an assumption that it is the ethnic identity that is salient for all the countries 
included in the analysis, without testing this bold conjecture. Such an overall approach 
would totally miss the perception of regional inequality in Mtwara and Lindi. 
For policy makers in emerging petroleum regions, the importance of realistic 
information as opposed to lofty promises must be underlined. Frustrated expectations 
and a perception that the central government is ‘grabbing’ what rightfully belongs to the 
local population was a strong grievance and conflict driver in Mtwara. For policy 
makers and government officials working with other recent petroleum discoveries in 
areas with marginalized groups, such as in Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, this is an 
important lesson. 
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5.7 Appendices Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.7.1 Semi structured interviews 
Lecturers at Stella Maris Mtwara University College were of great help in providing 
access to leaders. Other than that, people were recruited from the streets, outside their 
houses and at their working places. Participants in the riots were recruited mostly via 
snowballing. All interviewees where given information on the aim of the study, and the 
name and affiliation of the principal investigator. One person declined to be 
interviewed, while one interview was disrupted towards the end due to a gathering 
crowd which made the interviewee feel uncomfortable. 
Apart from five interviews, all interviews were tape recorded (The five included four 
students as well as the high ranking government official, who all preferred not to be 
recorded). For the five unrecorded interviews, extensive notes were taken and 
immediately cleaned once the interviews were done. Some of the interviews with 
students, as well as all the leader/journalist interviews were done in English – 11 in 
total. 14 were done in Swahili and English together with an experienced interpreter. 
Finally, 10 were done by an experienced research assistant in Swahili. All the recorded 
interviews have been transcribed by a professional fluent in both Swahili and English 
based in Kenya. The interviews were coded in excel using the codes listed in. Table 45, 
which also includes an example of coding. 
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Table 45: List of interview codes and coding example  
List - Codes
attitude companies
benefit
Broken promises
cashewnuts
change
Companies done
education
Expectations
Expectations companies
Expectations government
fatalities
fomented grievances
Government done
grievance
group
heard of gas
heard of pipeline
Horizontal Inequality
Identity
Inequality
Information
Involvement
Jobs
land
Leaders
Marital status
Mobilization
motivation
Opportunity
Participants
Participation
police violence
political party
poverty
Promises
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Appendix 5.7.2: Objective economic indicators Mtwara vs. Lindi – relatively on 
par 
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Appendix 5.7.3 – Religious and ethnic affiliation, survey sample 
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6 Concluding remarks 
After decades of debate, recent work on horizontal inequalities and conflict has been 
able to establish that inequality do indeed lead to conflict when it overlaps with salient 
group identities. Economic (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Østby 2008b) and political (Cederman, Weidmann, and 
Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013) horizontal inequality increases 
the risk of civil war as well as other types of political conflict (e.g. Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder 2015, Fjelde and Østby 2014). Important as these studies are, they still cannot 
fully answer when and how horizontal inequalities lead to conflict. Providing a better 
answer to this question has been the main aim of this dissertation project. 
My first conclusion is that people act on perceived horizontal inequality, and such 
perceptions do not always reflect the objective reality. The discrepancies between 
objective and perceived structural asymmetries are documented by extant studies and 
confirmed throughout my own analyses. I find the correlation between objective and 
perceived regional economic deprivation to be 0.22 based on World Values Survey. 
Objective and perceived ethnic economic inequality have a correlation of 0.33 based on 
Afrobarometer Survey data. Also based on Afrobarometer data and the Ethnic Power 
Relations data I find the correlation between objective and perceived ethnic political 
influence to be as low as 0.18. Finally, in my survey of 800 respondents in Southern 
Tanzania, I find a large spread in the perceptions of regional economic inequality 
despite the fact that all the respondents live in the same marginalized regions and are by 
definition equally objectively deprived
92
. In line with my – and existing studies’ – stated 
theoretical expectations, my analyses further suggest that perceived horizontal 
inequalities increases the risk of conflict. My evidence indicates that perceived regional 
economic inequality increases the risk of civil war (Chapter 2), that the combination of 
high objective and perceived ethnic economic inequality, and more so objective and 
perceived political ethnic inequality, increases the risk of communal conflict (Chapter 
3), and that perceived regional economic inequality and perceived unfair treatment of 
the region increases support for and participation in civil unrest in Southern Tanzania 
(Chapter 4 and 5). With these analyses, I believe I provide a better test of the grievance 
                                                 
92
 In Mtwara and Lindi, 53% of the respondents think their region is worse or much worse off than other 
regions in the country, 19% think their economic situation is the same, and 14% think it is better or much 
better. The rest of the respondents replied that they do not know.  
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mechanism assumed to motivate people to mobilize for conflict. While extant studies 
based on objective data cannot rule out that structural horizontal inequalities lead to 
conflict via alternative mechanisms such as expectations of material gains, my analyses 
indicate that the grievance mechanism is indeed crucial in inducing conflict.   
Second, and also in line with my theoretical expectations, I find support that the conflict 
potential is strongest when horizontal inequality is also considered unfair. In my 
Tanzania study, I first find a relatively stronger link between perceived unfair group 
treatment by the government and conflict attitudes and participation – compared to the 
effect of perceived horizontal inequality. While I do consider perceived horizontal 
inequality and perceived unfair treatment of the group by an actor as two different 
measures of group grievances, that may capture some of the same effects, I do expect 
the feeling of unfairness to be the most comprehensive and direct measure. The fact that 
this measure gives the strongest results is in line with this assumption. The importance 
of judging horizontal inequalities as unfair is particularly evident in my last article 
(Chapter 5). Riot participants in Mtwara link their motivation to participate directly to a 
feeling of their region being treated unfairly and to being victims of injustices. These 
feelings are in turn directly linked to the government’s management of the natural gas 
resources. Dashed expectations following broken promises of local development, and a 
feeling that the central government ‘takes’ what rightfully belongs to the people of 
Mtwara and Lindi, is what most informants highlight as ‘unjust’. The long lasting 
economic marginalization, on the other hand, though resented, is never explicitly stated 
as unjust.  
This is all fully in line with my theoretical framework, in which I expect the overall 
grievance level to be higher once people are aware of horizontal inequalities, and 
highest once these same horizontal inequalities are considered unfair and the fault of an 
identified actor. This resonates with Williams’ (2003, 131) distinction between a ‘real 
grievance’ which, as opposed to ‘mere’ deprivation, is linked to a notion of being the 
victim of an injustice, and rests on claims that rights or rules have been violated. It also 
resonates with earlier studies showing that people may blame economic inequalities on 
themselves and their own lack of capabilities. Given such attitudes, they are less likely 
to mobilize to rectify their situation.  
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Third, I argue that the discovery of large non-renewable natural resources – and the 
management of these resources – is particularly potent in creating group grievances. 
This is not surprising if we look at factors established by former studies to affect both 
perceptions and a feeling of unfairness. Natural resources introduce competition 
between local groups where they are found and the rest of the country, creates enormous 
expectations of future wealth that are unlikely to be fulfilled, and gives political 
entrepreneurs ample room for portraying the central governments management as 
unjust. All these factors played a role in intensifying grievances and fuel conflict in 
Mtwara.  
Fourth, I find support that group grievances – measured as perceived horizontal 
inequalities (Chapter 3 and 4) and as perceived unfair treatment of the group (Chapter 4 
and 5) also increases the risk of other types of conflict – such as communal conflict, 
riots, and non-violent protest marches and demonstrations – in addition to civil war 
(Chapter 2).  
Fifth, in Chapter 2, and particularly in Chapter 4 and 5 based on my Tanzania study, I 
find region to be an important group identity around which mobilization can be centred. 
While ethnicity remains salient, especially in many African countries, Tanzania is an 
example of a country where ethnicity is less politically relevant, and where high level 
analyses hinging on this particular identity marker would not capture the conflict 
potential rising in the southern regions.  
Sixth, my analysis also supports the importance of the group aspect. My focus on 
perceptions and judgements led me to ask whether also individual inequality matters, 
and that the reason previous quantitative studies have not been able to pin down its 
effect is the objective measures they apply. In Chapter 2 and 4 I test this, and find no 
association between perceived individual inequality and civil war (Chapter 2) or civil 
unrest (Chapter 4). Also, the qualitative accounts from riot participants in Chapter 5 all 
highlight a motivation grounded in a defence of the rights of the group, never the 
individual.  
Finally, I do not disregard the effect of objective horizontal inequalities in inducing 
conflict. While I have not been able to fully investigate all the links between structural 
asymmetries, perceptions and judgements of these, and their motivational strength, I 
have gathered some clues to their relationship. In Chapter 3 I find that ethnic economic 
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inequality leads to a higher risk of communal conflict only if both objective and 
perceived deprivation is high. This resonates with findings from the social movements 
literature which link the efficiency of framing by political entrepreneurs to how close it 
is to reality. In other words, it is easier to mobilize people to rectify group inequalities 
that actually exist. This is also what I find in my Tanzania studies, particularly in 
Chapter 5. While it seems to be the perceived injustices linked to the natural gas 
management that finally push the long marginalized locals to mobilize, and the regional 
economic deprivation alone never did, the new injustice seems to have added to old 
perceptions of inequality and made them stronger. In this case, the natural resource 
management seemingly acted as an intervening variable between objective regional 
inequality and group grievances – substantially increasing the latter, and hence paving 
the way for mobilization. 
In summary, while objective horizontal inequalities may or may not be politically 
relevant, and will not lead to mobilization unless they are, perceived horizontal 
inequalities, and even more so perceived unfair group treatment, are better measures of 
the group grievances assumed to drive mobilization. In line with this, I find their effect 
on conflict risk to be more pronounced.  
While the motivation to participate in conflict has been the main focus of this 
dissertation, conflict will only arise where it is actually possible to organize. In short – 
opportunity to mobilize also matters. My final article (Chapter 5) highlights this for the 
case of Tanzania.  However, this article also emphasizes that it is not opportunity alone 
that triggers when horizontal inequalities lead to conflict – as contentious politics 
scholars may argue (e.g. Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). The opportunity to protest 
and riot was only restrained by the government after the civil unrest in 2012 and 2013 – 
before that it had remained unrestrained for decades. Both opportunity and motivation is 
needed, but it was a group grievance-induced motivation that changed after the natural 
gas management, and that in the end sparked the mobilization. 
Returning to the research questions presented in the introductory chapter, I answer yes 
to number 1 and 2 – group grievances increase the probability of both civil war as well 
as other types of political mobilization. I furthermore conclude that objective and 
perceived horizontal inequalities do not amount to the same thing, although existing 
objective asymmetries may make it easier for political entrepreneurs to fuel perceptions 
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of inequality and unfairness (research question 3). Finally, large non-renewable natural 
resources are particularly likely to trigger group grievances, especially through dashed 
expectations, and a feeling that the central government is taking something that 
rightfully belongs to the local population (research question 4). 
As more thoroughly described in the introductory chapter, my analyses come with 
certain limitations. The two first papers (Chapters 2 and 3) are subject to a risk of 
ecological fallacy. No matter how well group measures are constructed, as long as there 
is no direct link between the groups and conflict incidents analysed, one cannot fully 
establish that the measured objective and perceived horizontal inequalities reflect the 
grievances of those group members that mobilize. This problem is however not present 
in my two final articles (Chapters 4 and 5). In Chapter 4 I use the individual as unit of 
analysis and link personal perceptions to personal participation in, and attitudes 
towards, civil unrest. Both this analysis and the direct accounts from the semi-structured 
interviews presented in Chapter 5 support the overall conjecture that group grievances 
drive mobilization for conflict. 
The two first chapters are also particularly vulnerable to potential endogeneity issues, as 
it cannot be firmly established that the observed objective and perceived horizontal 
inequalities are causing the conflict incidents or are instead products of previous 
conflicts. Particularly my last Tanzania article (Chapter 5) once more supports my 
overall conclusion that group grievances cause conflict, given the personal accounts 
highlighting precisely this. Finally, the problem with missing data and lack of 
representativity to some extent affecting the two first articles is also handled in my 
quantitative Tanzania paper, which is based on rigorous and random sampling fully 
representative of the population in both natural resource affected and unaffected parts of 
Mtwara and Lindi. 
In summary, I can with reasonable confidence conclude that horizontal inequalities lead 
to conflict – in various forms – when people are aware of them and consider them 
unjust. Or, as the theoretical causal chains underpinning extant studies also postulate: 
horizontal inequalities lead to conflict when they have developed into politically 
relevant group grievances. I have identified the mismanagement of large non-renewable 
natural resources as a potent trigger for such group grievances, although several other 
factors may have the same effect. Identifying and testing relevant triggers constitutes 
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one interesting route for future research – along with others that I will further elaborate 
on in the next section. 
6.1 Future research 
Following from my conclusions, the noted limitations of my studies, and also from the 
gaps identified in the introductory chapter, five particularly relevant routes of future 
research stand out. First, while my analyses constitute a first step towards capturing the 
role of perceptions and judgements in facilitating mobilization, cross-country studies 
with a clear link between the groups that mobilize and the conflict incidents would 
provide an even more rigorous tests of the relationship between group grievances and 
conflict.  
Second, horizontal inequality studies in general should pay more attention to the 
salience of the identity categories that are applied in their analysis. Ideally, proper tests 
of which identity group people in each country feel most associated with should be 
undertaken, and the analyses of the link between horizontal inequality and conflict 
should then be based on the outcome of this test. Existing cross-country studies of 
horizontal inequalities and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa – including my own – tend to 
analyse ethnic groups, while a regional or a religious identity may be more relevant in 
many countries
93
. My Tanzania study underlines the importance of this – ethnicity has 
low political relevance, while a regional identity, and also increasingly a religious 
identity, have more.  
Third, the association between religious horizontal inequalities and conflict is 
understudied, and more analyses taking this particular identity dimension into account 
would be welcome. This also to some extent holds for the regional group identifier – 
especially for analyses of the political dimension of horizontal inequality. 
Fourth, my own (Chapter 3) as well as other studies’ (Bormann et al. 2016, Kanbur and 
Venables 2005) conclusion that also objective horizontal inequalities vary over time 
calls for analyses of time-variant data. 
                                                 
93
 I do however perform robustness tests where I exclude countries in which more than 50% of the 
population hold that their national identity is more important than their ethnic. 
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Most importantly, the link between objective horizontal inequalities and group 
grievances deserves more scrutiny. Future studies should further investigate when and 
how objective asymmetries turn politically relevant, which factors triggers group 
grievances – other than non-renewable natural resource mismanagement – and whether 
mobilization mostly happen where the objective reality and the perceptions and 
judgements of it overlap. We need to fully understand these relationships in order to be 
able to recommend efficient conflict risk reducing measures and policies in countries at 
threat.  
6.2 Policy implications 
While rectifying objective horizontal inequalities remains a vital policy task, my 
dissertation first and foremost points to the importance of also taking into account how 
structural asymmetries are perceived and judged, and which incidents shape and form 
such judgements. According to my analysis, this should add to our understanding of 
when and how conflict breaks out, and hence provide some guidance on how to reduce 
the risk of serious political violence.  
Furthermore, according to the UN, ‘The challenges associated with preventing, 
managing and resolving natural resource-induced conflicts may well come to define 
global peace and security in the 21st century.’94 This is particularly the case for Africa. 
Recent high-impact discoveries in a range of countries, and especially along the east 
coast, have made leading scholars warn that natural resources constitute a substantial 
security threat on the continent (Collier 2015), especially when combined with identity 
group tensions (e.g. Basedau and Pierskalla 2014). My analyses underline this 
challenge. I have identified the discovery and management of large non-renewable 
natural resources in a historically marginalized region as a particularly potent driver of 
group grievances. With new large oil and gas discoveries in areas inhabited by 
marginalized groups in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana, the 
importance of policy recommendations on sound management of these resources are 
urgent.  
Managing expectations stands out as a main priority. Grand promises of future wealth at 
early stages of resource development are likely to backfire – just as they did in 
                                                 
94
 http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/ 
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Tanzania. Dashed expectations have repeatedly been identified as a grievance inducing 
mechanism (e.g Davies 1962, Gurr 1970), and proved to be so in Mtwara as well. The 
way to handle overall expectations is straight forward, although not necessarily easy to 
carry out in practice: If a realistic or even a deliberate understatement of potential future 
outcome is given, the risk of frustration is greatly reduced, while at the same time 
unexpected positive results could be welcomed as an ‘over performance bonus’ 
(Lindstadt and Staton 2010, 14). More specifically, people in resource rich regions and 
countries should be informed about realistic future consequences of the resources – both 
negative and positive – as early as possible in the development phase. This is the 
responsibility of governments and the media, but also of international experts and 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, who often release reports on 
future revenue scenarios without much regard to how such reports may also drive 
expectations (Weszkalnys 2008). 
However, managing expectations also entails implementing local development 
initiatives targeting what people want and need. This is challenging in areas where there 
exist no data on the priorities, needs and attitudes of the local population, and where one 
have limited knowledge of which information sources are used and trusted. Such lack of 
representative data was an issue in Tanzania, and is likely to be one reason that key 
stakeholders have invited me to present, and proven very interested in, my results. In 
September 2015 I presented the main conclusions to the Tanzanian Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals, represented by the Head of Government Communication Mrs. Badra 
Masoud. I further made a presentation to Statoil Tanzania’s Management Team, to 
Oxfam Tanzania, to the Friedrich Eibert Stiftung and to the Norwegian Embassy in Dar 
es Salaam. All these presentations were mostly focused on descriptive statistics from 
my survey, as my data constitutes the first representative sample with information on 
the actual situation as well as perceptions and attitudes among people in Mtwara and 
Lindi. Later in September I also presented overall findings at the Annual Army Summit 
for the Norwegian Army. 
Some of my results surprised the stakeholders. For instance, the demand among the 
Southerners for local industries is well known. However, that most locals are happy 
with their current job, or want a minor upgrade, and rather want their children to get 
education and skills sufficient to work in these industries, surprised most. While this 
does not solve challenge of employing enough Tanzanians to fulfil government 
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established local content quotas, it makes it easier to manage expectations. Meeting a 
collective expectation of immediate high level local employment in the petroleum 
production facilities is close to impossible. Working to provide improved health care, 
infrastructure, education and information, which is what the locals ask for, is, if not 
easy, at least possible. Statoil did in fact change some of their social investment 
programs to focus on health and information after my presentation
95
.  
The Head of Government Communication Mrs. Badra Masoud was surprised by the low 
share of Southerners that had access to a television, and the very high share that listened 
to, and trusted, the local radio. Previous government natural gas information campaigns 
had, according to her, been broadcasted on television and hence had limited reach. 
On the other hand, much of my descriptive data confirmed what the stakeholders 
assumed to be true, but, according to for example Oxfam Tanzania, they were not 
sufficiently confident about to initiate efforts based on it. My representative data helped 
bring such assurance.  
I include these examples because they highlight how also the most straightforward 
results of academic research – in this case descriptive statistics based on representative 
data – can be useful for practitioners. This is particularly the case when oil or gas is 
discovered in remote regions where such lack of data is endemic. Targeted data 
collection hence stands out as a key task in order to create a sound basis for local 
development and sustainable natural resource management. 
In the next decades, the majority of the world’s oil and gas supplies are projected to 
come from developing countries (Ross 2012). This will add to the already discovered 
resources in sub-Saharan Africa. For these resources to foster peace and development 
rather than unrest and political violence, it is paramount that the rights, attitudes and 
opinions of the groups living close to them are properly taken into account. 
 
  
                                                 
95
 Information given in a follow up meeting with amongst others Sustainability Manager Juliet Mboneko 
in June, 2016. 
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8 Supplementary Appendices 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
First part  
Note: The survey was done with Samsung Tablets and Open Data Kit (ODK) Software. 
Much of the procedures in the following were automatic (i.e. if the enumerator noted a 
‘no’ on consent from the respondent, the questionnaire would go to the end and the 
enumerator would have to save it and open a new one for a new respondent). 
Please collect the GPS coordinates of this location 
GPS coordinated can only be collected when outside 
Latitude 
Longitude 
Altitude 
Accuracy  
Enumerator information:  
Please select the enumerator number that 
has been assigned to you 
E  
 
The respondent number consists of your enumerator number and two additional digits. 
If you are enumerator E1 your first respondent will get the number E101, your second 
respondent will be E102. If you are enumerator E11 your first respondent will be 
E1101, your second respondent will be E1102 and so on. 
Remember to check your control sheet when you have used a respondent number 
Respondent number 
E  
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Region 
Mtwara 1 
Lindi 2 
 
District 
Mtwara Municipal 1 
Mtwara Rural 2 
Lindi Municipal 3 
Lindi Rural 4 
Tandahimba 5 
Newala 6 
 
Ward  
Village  
 
Please introduce yourself using the following script. Please learn the introduction so that you 
can say it exactly as it is written below:  
Hello, my name is _______________________. I represent Elise Must, a PhD student 
at the London School of Economics in the UK. Her PhD is on the governance of 
natural resources, expectations, inequality, and civil unrest. We would like to discuss 
these issues with a member of your household. We do not represent the government or 
any political party, or any religious organizations.  
All information will be kept confidential. Your household has been chosen by chance.  
We would like to choose an adult from your household.  Would you help us pick one?  
Note:  The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively.  If 
participation is refused, walk away from the household and record this in the below 
table on “Reasons for Unsuccessful Calls.”  Substitute the household using the next 
household to the right. If consent is secured, proceed to Respondent Selection 
Procedure 
Do you consent to help us pick one? yes/no 
If no: 
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NOCALL - Reasons for unsuccessful calls NOC_1 
Refused to be interviewed 1 
Person selected was never at home after at least two visits 2 
Household/Premises empty for the survey period after at least two visits 3 
Not a citizen/Spoke only a foreign language 4 
Deaf/Disability/Did not speak a survey language 5 
Did not fit gender quota 6 
No adults in household 7 
Other, specify__________________ 888 
Not Applicable 9997 
 
If yes:  
 
Respondent Selection Procedure 
Enumerator: Within the household, it is your job to select a random (this means any) 
individual.  This individual becomes the interview Respondent.  In addition, you are 
responsible for alternating interviews between men and women. For the very first 
interview, start with a male. 
 Male  Female 
Previous interview was with a  1 2 
This interview must be with a 1 2 
 
Enumerator read: Please tell me how many males / females [select correct gender] who 
presently live in this household.  Only include males / females [select correct gender] 
who are citizens of Tanzania and who are 18 years and older. Count only men/women 
[select correct gender]. Count all eligible household members of this gender who are 18 
years or older, even those not presently at home but who will return to the house at any 
time that day.  Include only citizens of Tanzania. I will then give you the corresponding 
number of lottery tickets. Please write the names of the males / females [select correct 
gender] on the lottery tickets – one name on each. You will keep the tickets, so we are 
not asking you to give us the names.  
Put the corresponding lottery tickets in a box. Ask the person who is selecting 
respondents to draw, by saying: Please draw a lottery ticket. The person who 
corresponds to the number drawn will be the person interviewed.  
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The person I need to speak to is number [insert number] 
_______________________________.  Is the person with this number presently at 
home? 
If yes: May I please interview this person now? 
If yes: Move to next question 
If no: Please record reason in table below 
NOCALL - Reasons for unsuccessful calls NOC_2 
Refused to be interviewed 1 
Person selected was never at home after at least two visits 2 
Household/Premises empty for the survey period after at least two 
visits 
3 
Not a citizen/Spoke only a foreign language 4 
Deaf/Did not speak a survey language 5 
Did not fit gender quota 6 
No adults in household 7 
Other, specify__________________ 888 
If no: Will this person return here at any time today? 
If yes: Please tell this person that I will return for an interview 
at [insert convenient time].   If this respondent is not 
present when you call back, replace this household with the 
next household to the right. 
If no: Thank you very much.  I will select another household.  
Substitute with the next household to the right and repeat the 
respondent selection procedure.  (NOTE:  YOU CAN ONLY 
SUBSTITUTE HOUSEHOLDS NOT INDIVIDUALS.) Please 
record reason in table below. 
NOCALL - Reasons for unsuccessful calls NOC_3 
Refused to be interviewed 1 
Person selected was never at home after at least two visits 2 
Household/Premises empty for the survey period after at least two 
visits 
3 
Not a citizen/Spoke only a foreign language 4 
Deaf/Did not speak a survey language 5 
Did not fit gender quota 6 
No adults in household 7 
Other, specify__________________ 888 
 
If the selected respondent is not the same person that you first met, repeat Introduction: 
Hello, my name is _______________________. I represent Elise Must, a PhD student 
at the London School of Economics in the UK. Her PhD is on the governance of natural 
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resources, expectations, inequality, and civil unrest. We would like to discuss these 
issues with you. We do not represent the government or any political party, or any 
religious organizations.  
 
TO ALL RESPONDENTS: 
Your answers will be kept confidential. They will be put together with 800 other people 
we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from 
what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about 
50 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. Do you wish to proceed?  
 
Do you consent: yes/no 
Note:  The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively.  If 
participation is refused, walk away from the household and record this in the below 
table on “Reasons for Unsuccessful Calls.”  Substitute the household with the next 
household to the right. If consent is secured, proceed with the interview. 
NOCALL - Reasons for unsuccessful calls NOC_4 
Refused to be interviewed 1 
Person selected was never at home after at least two visits 2 
Household/Premises empty for the survey period after at least two visits 3 
Not a citizen/Spoke only a foreign language 4 
Deaf/Did not speak a survey language 5 
Did not fit gender quota 6 
No adults in household 7 
Other, specify__________________ 888 
 
 
Second Part – Questions 
Let’s begin by recording a few facts about yourself. 
1. a. How old are you? [Interviewer: If respondent is aged less than 18, 
stop interview and use cards to randomly draw another respondent in 
the same household] 
 
1b. If the respondent doesn’t know, make and estimate and fill in the categories  
18-24 years 1 
25-34 years 2 
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35-44 years 3 
45-54 years 4 
55-64 years 5 
65-74 years 6 
75 years or older 7 
Don’t know  999 
Refused to answer 777 
 
2. Are you the head of the household?  
 
3. How many people live in your household?  
 
4. What is your marital status? 
Single  1 
Married 2 
Divorced 3 
Widowed 4 
Refused to answer 777 
 
5. How many children do you have, if any? [If no children add 0]  
 
 
6. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?  [Do NOT read options. Code 
from response]  
Wanyakyusa 740 Wakurya 752 
Wachaga 741 Wagogo 753 
Wahaya 742 Waluguru 754 
Wangoni 743 Wafipa 755 
Wakwere 744 Wamanyema 756 
Wapare 745 Wanyiramba 757 
Wahehe 746 Wanyaturu 758 
Wamakonde 747 Mixed 759 
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Wanyamwezi 748 Tanzanian only, or “doesn’t think of 
self 
in those terms” 
9990 
Wasukuma 749 Refused to answer 777 
Wamasai 750 Don’t know 999 
Wameru 751 Other [If other, please specify]: 
________________________________ 
888 
 
7. What is your level of education?  [Code from answer.  Do not read options]   
No formal schooling 0 
Informal schooling only  1 
Some primary schooling 2 
Primary school completed 3 
Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school 4 
Secondary school / high school completed 5 
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or 
degree from a polytechnic or college 
6 
Some university 7 
University completed 8 
Post-graduate 9 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
8. Do you have a job that pays a cash income?  [If yes, ask:] Is it full-time or part-time?  [If 
no, ask:] Are you presently looking for a job? 
No (not looking) 0 
No (looking) 1 
Yes, part time 2 
Yes, full time 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know (Do not read) 999 
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9. What is your main occupation?  (If unemployed, retired or disabled, what was your last 
main occupation?) [Do not read options.  Code from responses.] 
Never had a job 0 
Student 1 
Housewife/Homemaker 2 
Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry 3 
Trader / hawker / vendor 4 
Retail / Shop 5 
Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, 
unskilled manufacturing worker) 
6 
Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, 
mechanic, machinist or skilled manufacturing worker) 
7 
Clerical or secretarial 8 
Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager 9 
Security services (police, army, private security) 10 
Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government 
officer) 
11 
Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, 
engineer, accountant, professor, senior-level government officer) 
12 
Other 95 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
10. Do you work for yourself, for someone else in the private sector or the non-
governmental sector, or for government? [Read out options]    
Works for self 1 
Private sector 2 
Non-governmental Organizations or civil society sector 3 
Government 4 
Not applicable [i.e., if answer above was unemployed, or student] 7 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
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11. Which type of job would you like to have if you could choose? [Do not read options.  Code 
from responses.] 
No job 0 
Student 1 
Housewife/Homemaker 2 
Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry 3 
Trader / hawker / vendor 4 
Retail / Shop 5 
Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled 
manufacturing worker) 
6 
Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, mechanic, 
machinist or skilled  
manufacturing worker) 
7 
Clerical or secretarial 8 
Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager 9 
Security services (police, army, private security) 10 
Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer) 11 
Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, engineer, 
accountant, professor, senior-level government officer) 
12 
Other 888 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
12. What is main occupation of the household head? [Do not read options.  Code from 
responses.] 
Never had a job 0 
Student 1 
Housewife/Homemaker 2 
Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry 3 
Trader / hawker / vendor 4 
Retail / Shop 5 
Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, 
unskilled manufacturing worker) 
6 
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Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, 
mechanic, machinist or skilled manufacturing worker) 
7 
Clerical or secretarial 8 
Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager 9 
Security services (police, army, private security) 10 
Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government 
officer) 
11 
Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, 
engineer, accountant, professor, senior-level government officer) 
12 
Other 95 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
Let’s now discuss economic conditions 
13. In general, how would you describe: [Read out options] 
 Ver
y 
Bad 
Fairl
y 
Bad 
Neither 
good 
nor bad 
Fairl
y 
Good 
Very 
Good 
Refu
sed 
Don’
t 
kno
w 
[Do 
not 
read
] 
A. The present economic 
condition of this country? 
1 2 3 4 5 777 999 
B. The present economic 
condition of this region? 
[State if Mtwara or Lindi 
Region] 
1 2 3 4 5 777 999 
C. Your own present living 
conditions? 
1 2 3 4 5 777          
999 
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14. In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other 
Tanzanians? [Read out options] 
Much Worse 1 
Worse 2 
Same 3 
Better 4 
Much Better 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
 
15. Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. 
Are their economic conditions worse, same as or better than for people in other regions 
in this country? [Probe for strength of opinion] [read options] 
Much Worse 1 
Worse 2 
Same 3 
Better 4 
Much Better 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
16. Over the past 12 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your household: 
[Read out options] 
 Neve
r 
Just 
once or 
twice 
Severa
l  
times 
Man
y 
times 
Alwa
ys 
Don’t 
know 
[do 
not 
read] 
A. Gone without enough food to 
eat?   
0 1 2 3 4 999 
B. Gone without enough clean 
water for home use?  
0 1 2 3 4 999 
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C. Gone without medicines or 
medical treatment?   
0 1 2 3 4 999 
D.  Gone without enough fuel to 
cook your food 
0 1 2 3 4 999 
E.  Gone without a cash 
income?   
0 1 2 3 4 999 
 
17. Which of these things do you or someone in your household own? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
Don’t know  
[DNR] 
A. Radio 1 2 999 
B. Mobile phone 1 2 999 
C. Television 1 2 999 
D. Bicycle 1 2 999 
E. Motor vehicle or motorcycle 1 2 999 
 
18. How often do you use: [read out options]  
 Every 
day 
Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Mobile phone? 4 3 2 1 0 999 
B. The Internet? 4 3 2 1 0 999 
 
19. Please tell me whether each of the following are available inside your house, inside your 
compound or outside your compound: [read out options] 
 None, 
no 
latrine  
available 
[DNR] 
Inside 
the  
house 
Inside the  
compound 
Outside 
the  
compound 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Your main source of 
water for household 
use 
 1 2 3 999 
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B. A toilet or latrine 0 1 2 3 999 
 
20. [Interviewer: If it is 100% clear that there is no electricity supply to the home, e.g., in an 
unserved rural area, do not ask the question of the respondent.  Just select 0=No electricity 
supply and continue to the next question.] Do you have an electric connection to your 
home from TANESCO? 
No mains electric supply or connection to the home 0 
[If yes] How often is electricity actually available? 
Never 1 
Occasionally 2 
About half of the time 3 
Most of the time 4 
All of the time 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
21. How often do you get news and information  from the 
following sources: [read out options] 
 
 Daily Weekly Monthly  Yearly Never Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Newspapers 4 3 2 1 0 999 
B. Local radio 4 3 2 1 0 999 
C. National radio 4 3 2 1 0 999 
D. TV 4 3 2 1 0 999 
E. Local Government 4 3 2 1 0 999 
F. National Government 4 3 2 1 0 999 
G. Opposition Parties 4 3 2 1 0 999 
H. Oil/Gas Companies 4 3 2 1 0 999 
I. Religious organizations 4 3 2 1 0 999 
J. International/Donor 
organizations 
4 3 2 1 0 999 
K. Tanzanian CSOs 4 3 2 1 0 999 
L. Family, neighbours or 
friends 
4 3 2 1 0 999 
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M. Internet, blogs, SMS, 
Whatsapp, etc 
4 3 2 1 0 999 
 
22. When did you hear for the first time that fields of natural gas have been discovered in 
Mtwara and Lindi? [Select one] 
More than 5 years ago 5 
3-5 years ago 4 
1-2 years ago 3 
During the last year 2 
This is the first time I hear about this [Go to question number 35] 1 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know  999 
 
23. From which source did you first hear about Tanzania’s recent discoveries of oil and gas?  
[Do not read out options. Code from responses] 
1. Newspapers 1 
2. Local Radio 2 
3. National Radio 3 
4. TV 4 
5. National government 5 
6. Local government 6 
7. Opposition Parties 7 
8. Oil/Gas companies 8 
9. Religious organizations 9 
10. International/Donor organizations  10 
11. Tanzanian CSOs 11 
12. Family, neighbors or friends 12 
13. Internet  (blogs, social media) 13 
14. SMS, Whatsapp 14 
15. Other, specify_____________________________________________ 888 
Refused to answer 777 
16. Don’t know 999 
 
237 
 
24. Nowadays, what is your main source of information about Tanzania’s recent 
discoveries of oil and gas?  [Do not read out options. Code from responses] 
1. Newspapers 1 
2. Local Radio 2 
3. National Radio 3 
4. TV 4 
5. National government 5 
6. Local government 6 
7. Opposition Parties 7 
8. Oil/Gas companies 8 
9. Religious organizations 9 
10. International/Donor organizations  10 
11. Tanzanian CSOs 11 
12. Family, neighbors or friends 12 
13. Internet  (blogs, social media) 13 
14. SMS, Whatsapp 14 
15. Other, specify_____________________________________________ 888 
Refused to answer 777 
16. Don’t know 999 
 
25. Who do you think give the most reliable information about Tanzania’s recent 
discoveries of oil and gas?  [Do not read out options. Code from responses] 
1. Newspapers 1 
2. Local Radio 2 
3. National Radio 3 
4. TV 4 
5. National government 5 
6. Local government 6 
7. Opposition Parties 7 
8. Oil/Gas companies 8 
9. Religious organizations 9 
10. International/Donor organizations  10 
11. Tanzanian CSOs 11 
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12. Family, neighbors or friends 12 
13. Internet  (blogs, social media) 13 
14. SMS, Whatsapp 14 
15. Other, specify_____________________________________________ 888 
Refused to answer 777 
16. Don’t know 999 
 
26. Have any politicians been active in giving out information on the natural gas 
developments in your District? [State District][ Read all options] 
Yes 1 
No [Go to question number 28] 2 
Refused to answer [do not read] [Go to question number 28] 777 
Don’t know [do not read] [Go to question number 28] 999 
 
27. Where these politicians: [ Read all options] 
Opposition party members 1 
CCM members 2 
Both opposition party and CCM members 3 
Refused to answer [do not read]  777 
Don’t know [do not read]  999 
 
28. When you get together with family, friends or people at work, how often do you discuss 
what Tanzania’s discoveries of oil and gas will mean for you or your community? [Read 
all options][Select one] 
Daily 1 
Weekly 2 
Monthly 3 
Yearly 4 
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Never 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
29. When was the first time you heard about the Mnazi Bay to Dar es Salaam natural gas 
pipeline? [Select one] 
More than 5 years ago 1 
3-5 years ago 2 
1-2 years ago 3 
During the last year 4 
This is the first time I hear about this [Go to question number 33] 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know  999 
 
30. BEFORE you had heard of the pipeline, how did you expect the natural gas developments 
to change the future living conditions of the following people? Make them [Read out 
options] 
 Much 
worse 
Worse The 
same 
Better Much 
Better 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 999 
B. People in your region [State 
if Mtwara or Lindi Region] 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
C. People in Tanzania 1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
31. How satisfied are you with the development in the living conditions for the following 
people so far – compared to what you expected? [Read out options] 
 Very 
dissatisfie
d 
Dissatisfie
d 
Neither 
dissatisfie
d nor 
satisfied 
Satisfie
d 
Very 
satisfie
d 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR
] 
A. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 999 
B. People in 
your region 
[State if 
Mtwara or 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
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Lindi 
Region] 
C. People in 
Tanzania 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
32. If you compare your view today with your view BEFORE you heard of the pipeline,  
would you say that your faith in the government’s ability to improve the living 
conditions of the following people has:  [Read out options] 
 Decreased 
a lot 
Decreased Stayed 
the 
same 
Increased Increased 
a lot 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 999 
B. People in your 
region [State if 
Mtwara or 
Lindi Region] 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
C. People in 
Tanzania 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
33. How do you expect the natural gas developments will change the future living conditions 
of the following people? Make them [Read out options] 
 Much 
worse 
Worse The 
same 
Better Much 
Better 
Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 999 
B. People in your region [State 
if Mtwara or Lindi Region] 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
C. People in Tanzania 1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
34. When do you expect to notice a change in the living conditions for the following people 
due to the gas developments? [Read out options] 
 This 
year 
Next 
year 
2-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
More 
than 15 
years 
Never Don’t 
know 
[DNR] 
A. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 999 
B. People in your 
region [State if 
Mtwara or Lindi 
Region] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 999 
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C. People in 
Tanzania 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 999 
 
 
35. What are the most important things you think the government should do for your local 
community? [do not read – code from responses. Accept up to three answers. If 
respondent offers more than three options, ask “Which three of these are the most 
important?” If respondent offers one or two answers, ask “Anything else?”] 
 1
st
 
respons
e 
2
nd
 
respons
e 
3
rd
 
Respon
se 
Improve infrastructure 1 1 1 
Improve electricity 2 2 2 
Improve water supply 3 3 3 
Improve roads 4 4 4 
Improve health care 5 5 5 
Improve education 6 6 6 
Improve vocational training 7 7 7 
Increase local employment opportunities  8 8 8 
Decrease poverty 9 9 9 
Improve farming/agriculture 10 10 10 
Fight crime and improve security 11 11 11 
Fight corruption 12 12 12 
Improve women’s rights 13 13 13 
Involve the local communities in the decision making 
process 
14 14 14 
Inform the local communities on the natural gas 
developments 
15 15 15 
Refused to answer 777 777 777 
Other – 
specify______________________________________
___ 
888 888 888 
Don’t know  999 999 999 
 
36. a) Has the government done anything for your local community so far – on your first 
priority in the previous questions? [Remind respondents of first issue raised above. Read 
out options]  
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Yes, a lot 1 
Yes,  a little 2 
No 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
b) Has the government done anything for your local community so far – on your 
second priority in the previous questions? [Remind respondents of second issue 
raised above. Read out options]  
 
Yes, a lot 1 
Yes,  a little 2 
No 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
37. For each of the following foreign oil and gas companies, I would like you to tell me 
whether you have heard of them or not. [Read out options] [Yes=1   No =2] 
 Yes No Don’t 
know 
1. BG Group 1 2 999 
2. ExxonMobil 1 2 999 
3. Maurel and Prom 1 2 999 
4. Ophir Energy 1 2 999 
5. Petrobras 1 2 999 
6. Royal Dutch Shell 1 2 999 
7. SONGAS 1 2 999 
8. Statoil  1 2 999 
9. Wentworth Resources 1 2 999 
 
38. What are the most important things you think the foreign oil and gas companies should 
do for your local community? [do not read – code from responses. Accept up to three 
answers. If respondent offers more than three options, ask “Which three of these are the 
most important?” If respondent offers one or two answers, ask “Anything else?”] 
 1
st
 
respons
e 
2
nd
 
respons
e 
3
rd
 
Respon
se 
Improve infrastructure 1 1 1 
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Improve electricity 2 2 2 
Improve water supply 3 3 3 
Improve roads 4 4 4 
Improve health care 5 5 5 
Improve education 6 6 6 
Improve vocational training 7 7 7 
Increase local employment opportunities  8 8 8 
Decrease poverty 9 9 9 
Improve farming/agriculture 10 10 10 
Fight crime and improve security 11 11 11 
Fight corruption 12 12 12 
Improve women’s rights 13 13 13 
Involve the local communities in the decision making 
process 
14 14 14 
Inform the local communities on the natural gas 
developments 
15 15 15 
Other – 
specify______________________________________
___ 
888 888 888 
Don’t know  999 999 999 
 
 
39. Have the oil and gas companies done anything for the local community so far – on your 
first and second priority in the previous questions? [Remind respondents of first and 
second issue raised above. Read out options]  
Yes, a lot 1 
Yes,  a little 2 
No 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
b) Have the oil and gas companies done anything for the local community so far 
– on your first and second priority in the previous questions?  [Remind 
respondents of second issue raised above. Read out options]  
 
Yes, a lot 1 
Yes,  a little 2 
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No 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
 
 
40. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like 
you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you 
might do it or would never under any circumstances do it [Read out options] 
 Have 
done 
Might do Would 
never do 
Don’t know 
(DNR) 
Refused  to 
answer 
(DNR) 
A. Joined others in 
your community to 
request action from 
Government 
1 2 3 999 777 
B. Contacted the 
media, like calling 
a radio program or 
writing a letter to a 
newspaper 
1 2 3 999 777 
C. Contacted a 
government official 
to ask for help or 
make a complaint 
1 2 3 999 777 
D. Joined 
unofficial strikes 
1 2 3 999 777 
E. Participated in a 
demonstration or 
protest march 
1 2 3 999 777 
F. Used force or 
violence for a 
political cause 
1 2 3 999 777 
 
41. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 
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Statement 2 [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree strongly?] 
Statement 1: People should not participate 
in protest actions against the government, 
as it threatens stability in our country. 
Statement 2: People should participate in 
protest actions against the government, as 
this shows the government that the people 
have a voice. 
Agree strongly with 
Statement 1 
1 
Agree with 
Statement 1 
 
2 
Agree with 
Statement 2 
 
3 
Agree strongly with 
Statement 2 
4 
Agree with neither [Do not read] 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
42. I will now read out several issues. For each one, please tell me if it justifies a 
demonstration or a protest march, or not. [Read out] 
High unemployment rates Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
Displacement due to industrial development Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
Sale of land rights to foreign companies Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
The government breaking promises of local development Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
Lack of electricity Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
Local pollution due to natural gas developments Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
None of the above Yes/No/Refused/Don
’t know 
Other, please specify 
___________________________________________________
____ 
888 
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43. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 
Statement 2 [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree strongly?] 
Statement 1: The use of violence is never 
justified in Tanzanian politics today. 
Statement 2: In this country, it is 
sometimes necessary to use violence in 
support of a just cause. 
Agree strongly with 
Statement 1 
1 
Agree with 
Statement 1 
2 
Agree with 
Statement 2 
 
3 
Agree strongly with 
Statement 2 
4 
Agree with neither [Do not read] 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
 
For this draw a random number between 1 and 2, and read the list that corresponds to 
the number. Enumerator please report which list (1 or 2) the respondent was given 
Which list was given?  
List 1 1 
List 2 2 
 
44. I am now going to give you a list of statements. Please tell me HOW MANY of them are 
true for you. I don't want to know which ones, just HOW MANY  
LIST 1: 
My household has a fridge 
I can swim 
I attend village meetings regularly 
I had contact with a public clinic or hospital at least once in the last 12 months 
Number of statements chosen, list 1  
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LIST 2: 
My household has a fridge 
I can swim 
I think it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause 
I attend village meetings regularly 
I had contact with a public clinic or hospital at least once in the last 12 months 
Number of statements chosen, list 2  
 
45. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: [Read out 
options] 
 Never Once 
or 
twice 
Several 
times 
Many 
times 
Always Don’t 
know 
[Do 
not 
read] 
A. Felt unsafe walking in your 
neighbourhood? 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
B. Feared crime in your own 
home? 
1 2 3 4 5 999 
C. Been physically attacked 1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
46. Which of the following proverbs do you agree most with? Choose Proverb 1 or Proverb 2 
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree strongly?] 
Proverb 1: Dua la kuku halimpati 
mwewe/The curse of the chicken does not 
reach the kite - Or: The prayer of the fowl 
does not bother the hawk (meaning:  It is 
vain to protest against those in power) 
Statement 2: Suluhu haiji ila kwa ncha ya 
upanga/ Appeasement does not come save 
by the point of the sword. 
Agree strongly with 
Proverb 1 
1 
Agree with Proverb 
1 
 
2 
Agree with Proverb 
2 
 
3 
Agree strongly with 
Proverb 2 
4 
Agree with neither [Do not read] 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
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47. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political 
matters: [Read out options] 
Frequently 1 
Occasionally 2 
Never 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
48. Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. 
Do they have less, the same or more influence in politics than people in other regions in 
this country? [Probe for strength of opinion] 
Much less 1 
Less 2 
Same 3 
More 4 
Much more 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
Note to enumerator: Please draw a random number (1 or 2), and read the vignette that 
correspond to the number. Please report which vignette (1 or 2) the respondent was 
given 
Which vignette was given?  
List 1 1 
List 2 2 
 
Vignette 1 
Let’s return to the benefits of oil and gas developments for a moment. In the future, the 
Government of Tanzania could receive substantial revenues from the natural gas 
operations. While this should benefit all Tanzanian’s, experience from other countries 
show that the region in which the oil or gas is discovered could get extra gains in terms 
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of industry development and increased business activity. 
 
Vignette 2 
Let’s return to the benefits of oil and gas developments for a moment. While the overall 
revenues might be high, experience from other countries show that little of these 
revenues actually benefit the people living close to the oil or gas fields. On the contrary, 
oil and gas regions might actually experience negative effects such as environmental 
degradation and loss of livelihoods. 
 
49. Which group of people do you think will benefit most from the natural gas discoveries in 
Tanzania   [Do NOT read out options] 
People in Mtwara and Lindi 1 
People in Dar es Salaam 2 
People in the North of Tanzania 3 
People in government 4 
People in political parties 5 
The foreign oil and gas companies 6 
Poor people 7 
Rich people 8 
All Tanzanian’s will benefit equally 9 
Refused to answer 777 
Other, specify 
_____________________________________________________________ 
888 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
50. How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the government? 
[State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]   [Read out options] 
Never 0 
Sometimes 1 
Often  2 
Always 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
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51. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 
Statement 2 [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree strongly?] 
Statement 1: Taking to the streets to 
protest against the government’s 
management of the natural gas resources is 
not acceptable.  
Statement 2: Sometimes, it might be 
necessary to take to the streets to protest 
against the government’s management of 
the natural gas resources. 
Agree strongly  
with Statement 1 
1 
Agree with 
Statement 1 
2 
Agree with 
Statement 2 
 
3 
Agree strongly with 
Statement 2 
4 
Agree with neither [Do not read] 5 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [Do not read] 999 
 
52. What is your religion, if any? [Interviewer: Code from answer.  Do not read options.]   
None 0 
CHRISTIAN GROUPS/DENOMINATIONS 
 Christian only (i.e., respondents says only “Christian”, without 
identifying a specific    sub-group) 
1 
Roman Catholic 2 
Orthodox 3 
Coptic 4 
Protestant – Mainline 
Anglican 5 
Lutheran 6 
Methodist 7 
Presbyterian 8 
Baptist 9 
Quaker / Friends 10 
Mennonite 11 
Dutch Reformed 30 
Calvinist 31 
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Protestant – Non-mainline 
Evangelical 12 
Pentecostal (e.g., “Born Again” and/or “Saved”) 13 
Independent (e.g., “African Independent Church”) 14 
Church of Christ 32 
Zionist Christian Church 33 
Others 
Jehovah’s Witness 15 
Seventh Day Adventist 16 
Mormon 17 
MUSLIM GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS 
Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only “Muslim”, without identifying 
a specific sub-group) 
18 
Sunni  
Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only “Sunni” or “Sunni Muslim”, 
without identifying a specific sub-group) 
19 
Ismaeli 20 
Mouridiya Brotherhood 21 
Tijaniya Brotherhood 22 
Qadiriya Brotherhood 23 
  
Shia  
Shia 24 
Ismaeli 740 
Twelver 741 
OTHER  
Traditional / ethnic religion 25 
Hindu 26 
Bahai 27 
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God) 28 
Atheist (Do not believe in a God) 29 
Jewish 34 
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Other [Specify]: _______________________________________ 888 
Refused 777 
Don’t know 999 
 
53. How often, if ever, are people in your religious group treated unfairly by the 
government? [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]   [Read out options] 
Never 0 
Sometimes 1 
Often  2 
Always 3 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know [do not read] 999 
 
54. Which political party do you feel close to?  [Do not read options. Code from response] 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 740 
The Civic United Front (CUF) 741 
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) 742 
The Union for Multi Party Democracy in Tanzania (UMD) 743 
National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) 744 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) 745 
United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP) 746 
The National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) 747 
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA) 748 
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) 749 
United Democratic Party (UDP) 750 
Demokrasia Makini 751 
Chama cha Haki na Ustawi (CHAUSTA) 752 
The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) 753 
Democratic Party (DP) 754 
The Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo) 755 
Jahazi Asilia 756 
Sauti ya Umma (SAU) 757 
Other [Specify]:  888 
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__________________________________________________ 
None 9997 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know 999 
 
55. If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote 
for?  [Do not read options. Code from response] 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 740 
The Civic United Front (CUF) 741 
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) 742 
The Union for Multi Party Democracy in Tanzania (UMD) 743 
National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) 744 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) 745 
United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP) 746 
The National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) 747 
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA) 748 
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) 749 
United Democratic Party (UDP) 750 
Demokrasia Makini 751 
Chama cha Haki na Ustawi (CHAUSTA) 752 
The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) 753 
Democratic Party (DP) 754 
The Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo) 755 
Jahazi Asilia 756 
Sauti ya Umma (SAU) 757 
Other [Specify]:  
__________________________________________________ 
888 
Would not vote 9997 
Refused to answer 777 
Don’t know 999 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY 
HELPFUL. 
254 
 
 
END INTERVIEW -- DON’T FORGET TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION. ALL 
SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY THE 
INTERVIEWER AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED 
 
56. Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the 
interview? 
No one Yes/No 
Spouse Yes/No 
Children  Yes/No 
Household head Yes/No 
Village ward Yes/No 
A few others (not village ward) Yes/No 
A small crowd (not village ward) Yes/No 
 
57.  Yes No 
A. Did the respondent check with others for information to 
answer any question? 
1 2 
B.  Do you think anyone influenced the respondent’s answers 
during the interview? 
1 2 
C. Were you approached by community and/or political 
party representatives? 
1 2 
D. Did you feel threatened during the interview? 1 2 
E. Were you physically threatened during the interview? 1 2 
 
58. What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering? 
All 4 
Most 3 
Some 2 
Few 1 
None 0 
 
59.  Which questions did the respondent have trouble answering? [Identify up to three. If the 
respondent had trouble with less than three, enter “00” in the boxes] 
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A. First Question   
B. Second Question   
C. Third Question   
 
60. What was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? 
A.  Was he or she 1 
Friendly 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Hostile 
B. Was he or she 1 
Interested 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Bored 
C. Was he or she 1 
Cooperati
ve 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Uncooperati
ve 
D. Was he or she 1 
Patient 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Impatient 
E. Was he or she 1 
At ease 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Suspicious 
F. Was he or she 1 
Honest 
2 
in 
between 
3 
Misleading 
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Interview guide, non-leader interviews 
Introduction 
Thank you for taking the time to talk to me!  
My name is Elise Must, I’m a PhD student at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. My topic is expectations, inequality, natural resources and conflict, 
and Mtwara/Southern Tanzania is my case study. Independent. 
No right answers. Your opinion 
During the interview I would like to discuss the following topics: expectations linked to 
gas development, satisfaction with the government and the services they provide, views 
of the petroleum companies, the riots in January and May 2013, information sources 
and political and economic situation and so on. 
Confidentiality! All information anonymized 
Do you consent to be interviewed? 
If so, is it ok if we use a tape recorder? 
Let’s first talk about you. 
Demographics  
How old are you? 
How many people live in your household? 
What is your marital status? 
How many children do you have, if any? 
What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?   
What is your level of education? 
Make note of gender 
What is your main occupation?  Do you have a job or activity now? (If unemployed, 
retired or disabled, what was your last main job/activity?) 
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Which type of job or activity would you like to have if you could choose? 
Are you the household head? If not, what is main occupation of the household head? 
Group Identity  
How do you like other people to identify you? As a Tanzanian, as a Christian, as a 
Muslim, as a person from Mtwara or a person from (tribe) - ? 
Who would you like least to have as your neighbour? (group of people, any definition) 
Let’s talk about economic conditions 
How do you describe the present economic condition of this country?  
How do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Tanzanians? 
Think about the condition of people living in this region. Are their economic conditions 
worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in this country? 
Over the past 12 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your household: 
- Gone without enough food to eat? 
- Gone without enough clean water for home use? 
- Gone without medicines or medical treatment?   
- Gone without enough fuel to cook your food? 
- Gone without a cash income?   
Do you or someone in your household own a radio, a mobile phone, a television and/or 
a motor vehicle? 
Information sources, natural gas discoveries and expectations 
Where do you get information from on what is going on in Tanzania? And in your 
region? Village? 
When did you hear for the first time that fields of natural gas have been discovered in 
Mtwara and Lindi? From which source?  
What is you main sources of information about Tanzania’s natural gas? Who gives most 
reliable information? 
Who do you think should give you information on the natural gas development?  
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When you get together with family, friends or people at work, how often do you discuss 
what Tanzania’s discoveries of oil and gas will mean for you or your community? 
When was the first time you heard about the Mnazi Bay to Dar es Salaam natural gas 
pipeline? 
BEFORE you had heard of the pipeline, how did you expect the natural gas 
developments to change the future living conditions of yourself? And for the people 
living in this region? 
How satisfied are you with the development in the living conditions for the 
youself/people living in this region so far – compared to what you expected? 
Nowadays, how do you expect the natural gas developments will change the future 
living conditions of yourself/people living in this region? And when do you think this 
will happen? 
What are the most important things you think the government should do for your local 
community? 
What have they said that they will do? 
Has the government done anything for your local community or the region so far? 
Do you know the names of any oil and gas companies? 
What are the most important things you think the foreign oil and gas companies should 
do for your local community? 
Have the oil and gas companies done anything for your local community or the region 
so far? 
How do you view the fact that foreign companies come to Tanzania to develop the 
natural gas? 
Who do you think will benefit most from the oil and gas discoveries? 
Mobilization, civil unrest and violence  
- In your view – what where the main reasons for the riots in Jan 2013/May 2013? 
- Where they broadly supported? 
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- Did you support them? 
- Who participated? Locals? Others? 
- Where there any leaders?  
- What was said to make people join? 
- Did you participate? If yes, why? If no, would you consider participating if you get 
the opportunity again? If so, why? And if not, what could make you change your 
mind? 
- How many where killed? 
- How was the government response? 
- How is the situation in Mtwara now? 
Which issues do you think justifies a protest march? 
Religion 
What is your religion? 
How often, if ever, are people in your religious group treated unfairly by the 
government? (very sensitive, please advise). 
Politics 
When you get together with your friends or family, how often do you discuss political 
matters? 
Think about the condition of people living in this region. Do they have less, the same or 
more influence in politics than people in other regions in this country? 
How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the government?  
How many times, if ever, have injustices been made towards people in this region? 
Which political party do you feel close to? 
If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote 
for? 
Is there anything else you would like to add before we end? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL. 
 
